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1. The Relativity of Decision-Making: A Taxonomy 
The invariance axiom of rational choice is one of the fundamental principles on which 
expected utility theory is built (Bernoulli, 1954 [1738]; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Invariance of choice implies that preferences between options are independent of the way in 
which they are presented. Different presentations of the same decision problem should yield 
the same decision (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). From this perspective, it should not make a 
difference whether a product in a supermarket is evaluated in isolation or in the context of 
other products, whether organ donation is based on an opt-in or an opt-out decision, or 
whether a gamble offers $50 for sure or $100 with a likelihood of 50%. According to the 
invariance axiom of rational choice, it is irrelevant whether the proverbial glass is presented 
as half-full or half-empty. 
The idea of invariance originates from a normative analysis of decision making; it 
refers to what rational
1
 actors should do. If rational behavior is motivated by maximizing 
utility in its classical economic sense, then there should be no difference between a glass 
described as half-full and a glass described as half-empty, because the utility of the two 
options is logically identical. Without decision invariance across different descriptions and 
contexts of the same option, it is impossible to interpret one’s choices as (exclusively) driven 
by rational principles of utility maximization. 
Although the invariance axiom is based on normative considerations, it is frequently 
assumed to also provide a descriptive framework of decision making. Beyond describing what 
people should do, it is assumed to predict what people actually do. In fact, according to 
Thaler (1980), economists rarely differentiate between normative and descriptive or positive 
models of decision making and, more or less directly, assume their normative analyses of 
choice to be descriptively valid for characterizing actual behavior. 
                                                          
1
 Note that throughout the present thesis, the term “rational” behavior refers to the classical economic definition 
of rationality, that is, as behavior aimed at maximizing personal utility. 
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It is the descriptive validity of the invariance axiom of rational choice that has been 
challenged by a plethora of research findings from psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Slovic, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986), behavioral economics (Thaler, 1980), and 
consumer research (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998). Decades of research in these fields have 
demonstrated systematic violations of the invariance axiom: Different presentations elicit 
different choices, different response modes lead to different decisions, and different contexts 
produce different outcomes. 
The goal of the present thesis is to integrate several lines of research against the 
backdrop of this debate on the invariance axiom. Empirical evidence as well as theoretical 
analyses will be discussed that provide evidence for the relativistic nature of decision making 
emphasizing that decision outcomes heavily depend on descriptions, procedures, contexts, 
and mindsets. To that end, a taxonomy will be introduced that characterizes four aspects of 
the relativity of decision making. Next, the empirical and theoretical work of the present 
thesis is discussed in relation to the taxonomy, before finally coming back to the rationality 
debate concerning the invariance axiom.  
1.1. Description Dependency 
Among the first phenomena to call the invariance axiom into question were Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1981) seminal demonstrations of framing effects. Based on prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the authors predicted and found a wide range of preference 
reversals across formally identical descriptions of the same choice problem. For instance, in 
the famous Asian disease dilemma in which 600 people are expected to be killed by an 
unusual Asian disease, a clear majority chooses a certain (saving 200 out of 600 people) over 
an uncertain option (1/3 probability that all 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that 
no one will be saved) when the decision is framed in terms of gains. However, when the very 
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same decision is framed in terms of losses (i.e., lives lost instead of lives saved), a clear 
majority prefers the exact opposite, namely, the uncertain over the certain option.  
The Asian disease dilemma and many similar decision problems that have been 
created since this initial demonstration of framing effects (for overviews, see Keren, 2011b; 
Kühberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) clearly contradict the notion of 
description invariance. Preferences are not invariant across different descriptions of logically 
equivalent alternatives. The way in which an option is described affects how much it is 
preferred. 
1.2. Procedure Dependency 
A very much related line of research took a different angle on empirically challenging 
expected utility theory’s notion of invariance. While the classical framing research was 
mostly concerned with framing at the level of the description of choice alternatives, a series of 
experiments by S. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; see also 
Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) questioned the idea of procedure invariance. According to 
this idea, preferences should not be affected by their method of elicitation – preference orders 
should stay invariant across different measures of choice, preference, or price matching.  
Refuting the concept of procedure invariance, S. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) were 
able to demonstrate preference reversals across equivalent gambles as a function of the 
response mode through which the preference was indicated. Whereas attractiveness ratings 
and choices between pairs of gambles were primarily influenced by the gambles’ winning or 
losing proportions, buying and selling prices were primarily determined by the absolute dollar 
amounts to be won or lost. Thus, for logically identical alternatives, the method of elicitation 
alone is sufficient to affect which option is preferred. 
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1.3. Context Dependency 
A third line of research that challenged the validity of the invariance axiom focusses 
on the context in which the decision takes place (Tversky & Simonson, 1993). A rational 
choice between two alternatives should be independent of any third option that is inferior to 
the two focal alternatives. Based on a complete preference order, a rational actor should 
always select the most preferred option from the choice set. Research on the attraction effect, 
however, contradicts this fundamental principle of rational choice (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 
1982; Huber & Puto, 1983): When adding a clearly inferior, but asymmetrically dominated 
decoy option to a choice set (i.e., an option which is dominated by only one out of two 
options in a choice set), the attractiveness of the dominating option increases. Accordingly, by 
varying which of the two options dominates the decoy, preference reversal between the focal 
alternatives can be obtained. The context in which a decision takes places matters; allegedly 
irrelevant alternatives affect which option is preferred. 
1.4. Mindset Dependency 
A fourth line of research to contest the axioms of rational choice can be derived from 
psychological research on people’s subjective construal of a decision problem. People do not 
encounter decisions as blank slates. In fact, decades of research on the constructive nature of 
decision-making demonstrate quite the opposite: The specific mindset that is activated when 
making a choice can significantly affect a person’s preferences.  
To name a few prominent out of many fields that demonstrated such effects, research 
on construal level (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010), regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998), mood-
dependent judgments (Forgas, 1995), cultural mindsets (Oyserman, 2011), and assimilative 
versus accommodative processing (Fiedler, 2001) has provided comprehensive evidence for 
the significance of a person’s chronically or momentarily activated processing style when 
construing a decision problem.  
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For instance, after activating a mindset that induces a focus on high-level rather than 
low-level construals, people show stronger preferences for choice options that require a 
relatively high degree of self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). The way 
in which the information given in a decision problem is subjectively construed affects how 
preferences are formed. 
1.5 Discussion 
The common denominator of all the examples discussed above is the idea that decision 
making is relative. Decision making is relative rather than absolute in the sense that it is 
contingent on a wide range of extrinsic variables that go beyond what expected utility theory 
would predict to be of relevance (i.e., outcomes and probabilities). If the exclusive goal was 
to maximize utility, rational choices should be invariant across (1) descriptions, (2) response 
modes, (3) decision contexts, and (4) mindsets. However, based on the wealth of findings that 
has been accumulated over the past decades across several disciplines, the invariance idea has 
been challenged. 
This taxonomy of four aspects of relativity of decision making is not meant to be 
exhaustive. Indeed, further perspectives easily come to mind such as, for instance, ecological 
(Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Wänke, 2009) or motivational approaches (Kunda, 1990; Molden & 
Higgins, 2005). Likewise, the four aspects are not meant to be (perfectly) mutually 
independent – descriptions and contexts, for instance, may trigger mindsets. Nevertheless, this 
analysis of the relativity of decision making provides a basic taxonomy to integrate, but also 
to distinguish different aspects of contextualized decision making. This framework will be 
used to structure the empirical part of the present thesis. 
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2. The Present Work 
The present thesis is based on four manuscripts that address different aspects of 
relativity of decision making. The first research article is concerned with the effects of 
psychological distance and construal level on the formation of response categories that are 
used to express numerical quantities. The second article applies these basic ideas in the 
domain of consumer decision making and provides further insights into the specific processes 
underlying these effects. In terms of the taxonomy of relativity of decision making, these two 
studies refer to points (3) and (4), namely, the relevance of the context of the judgment and 
the relevance of people’s mindset when making a judgment. The third research article 
investigates preferences for product bundles as a function of the evaluation mode in which the 
judgment takes place. It is directly concerned with the presence versus absence of other 
choice alternatives in a decision context, thus, it is concerned with point (3) of the taxonomy. 
In the fourth and final manuscript, a theoretical perspective and an empirical review of 
framing effects are discussed in the form of a book chapter. This work naturally focusses on 
the effects of presentation and response formats, that is, it is concerned with points (1) and (2) 
of the taxonomy. In the following sections, the specific theoretical backgrounds on which the 
respective research is based will be introduced and the main findings will be summarized. 
2.1. Psychological Distance and Construal Level 
Asked about the defining or unique capabilities of humans, popular opinions might 
resort to answers such as human speech, higher-order cognition, or even the believe in 
religious entities (e.g., Burton, 2012). An aspect that is often overlooked – although, at a more 
basic level, it may even provide an underpinning for these domains of human behavior – is 
the unique capacity to transcend the here and now (Liberman & Trope, 2008). More than any 
other species, the human species is capable of construing distal entities that are detached from 
the immediate perception of a given moment. Traversing mental distances in time, humans 
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plan ahead and learn from errors in the past. Territorial spaces are segmented and organized in 
terms of provinces, states, and countries that go way beyond of what an individual can 
perceive in a given moment. Complex social structures that differentiate between friends, 
colleagues, and rivals overlay the immediate experience of human social interactions. And 
even extremely unlikely events or counterfactuals can be mentally construed, for instance, 
when taking precautions against a potentially threatening situation. 
Indeed, the human species evolved to simulate, to predict and to reconstruct what is 
not present in one’s immediate perception; humans transcend their direct experience via 
mental construction. In large part, it is work by Yaacov Trope and Nira Liberman that 
developed the fundamental principles underlying human cognition across psychological 
distances (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 
2003, 2010; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). According to construal level theory (CLT), 
mental representations vary systematically as a function of the psychological distance of the 
target object. People think differently of the same object when it is close versus distant to 
them: Psychologically close objects are represented in terms of concrete, complex, 
unstructured, and contextualized mental images; with increasing distance, their 
representations become increasingly abstract, simple, structured, and decontextualized.  
For example, in one’s immediate experience, a final exam may be about ticking 
answers on a multiple choice questionnaire, whereas, after a couple of weeks, the very same 
event may be seen as a final duty in order to receive a college degree and, even later, say after 
several years, the exam will be represented as the endpoint of a major period of life. 
Abstractness increases with increasing distance. 
CLT explicitly considers four distinct dimensions of psychological distance – time, 
space, social relations, and hypotheticality, although there is some debate about further 
dimensions of distance (Fiedler, 2007; Liberman, Trope, & Wakslak, 2007). All distance 
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dimensions are associated. When an episode is distant on one of the dimensions, it is typically 
perceived as more distant on the other dimensions, too, highlighting the unitary nature of 
psychological distance (Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, 
& Alexopoulos, 2012). Psychological distance causes variation in construal levels. Notably, 
the reverse is true as well: Differences in construal levels produce differences in perceived 
distance (Liberman & Förster, 2009). 
The effects of psychological distance and construal level on perception, evaluation, 
decision-making, and behavior are manifold and well-documented (for recent overviews, see 
Burgoon, Henderson, & Markman, 2013; Hamilton, 2014; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010; Trope et al., 2007). For instance, based on the idea that an increase in 
psychological distance puts an emphasis on an object’s meaningful core, Liberman and Trope 
(1998) demonstrated that high-level desirability concerns loom larger from a distant rather 
than a proximate perspective, whereas the reverse is true for low-level feasibility concerns. In 
one of their studies, a lecture on an interesting topic at an inconvenient time is seen as more 
attractive from a temporally distant perspective and a lecture on a tedious topic at a 
convenient time is seen as more attractive from a temporally close perspective. In a similar 
vein, people are more likely to follow their high-level values (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, 
Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009) or their long-term motivation to engage in self-control (Fujita et 
al., 2006), from a distant rather than a proximate perspective. 
2.1.1. Response Category Width as a Psychophysical Manifestation of Construal 
Level and Distance (Krüger, Fiedler, Koch, & Alves, 2014). Drawing on CLT as a 
theoretical framework, we investigated the influence of psychological distance and construal 
level on the construction of response categories. Response categories express the extension 
between the upper and lower boundary of an individual’s distribution of expectancy values 
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within specific attribute dimensions with regard to a specific stimulus object (C. W. Sherif, 
1963; M. Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Thurstone, 1927; Torgerson, 1958).  
For instance, when judging a reasonable price for a coffee in a certain place the 
boundaries of the expression “reasonable prices” have to be scaled in terms of an ordinal 
interval. There are certain prices which are “too high” to be considered reasonable, there are 
other prices which are “too low” to be considered reasonable, and in between both poles, there 
is a specific range of prices that expresses the response category “reasonable prices”. In 
virtually all social domains, response categories provide flexible tolerance limits that are used 
for making evaluative judgments: Aggressive behaviors may be deemed “inacceptable”, a 
manager’s salary may be seen as “unwarranted”, and a job candidate’s previous experiences 
may be “sufficient” to justify employment. 
The purpose of our research was to investigate the effects of psychological distance 
and construal level on such response categories. People are less knowledgeable about distal 
objects as compared with proximate objects, because the former are experienced less 
frequently than the latter, by definition (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Similarly, high-level 
construals are based on less specific information than low-level construals. As a consequence, 
we expected distal entities and high-level construals to be expressed in terms of wider 
response categories than proximate entities and low-level construals. 
Results of five experiments provide converging support for our hypothesis. For 
instance, when judging the length of a bridge, participants provide wider interval estimates 
when they are told that the bridge is distant rather than close (spatial distance), or when they 
think that the bridge has not been constructed yet versus has already been constructed 
(hypothetical distance). Similar results are obtained when raising the construal level at which 
the target object is mentally construed. 
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This research provides insights into the psychophysical underpinnings of mental 
representations across psychological distances and construal levels. People express distinct 
tolerance limits for close and low-level versus distant and high-level targets. Based on these 
fundamental differences in the mental scaling of responses, predictions for categorization, 
perception of similarities, and assimilation versus contrast processes can be derived. Namely, 
semantic categories based on high-level construals should be able to incorporate more 
category members than the respective categories construed at a lower level. Likewise, high-
level versus low-level construals should put an emphasis on similarities over dissimilarities 
and on assimilation over contrast. And, indeed, previous CLT research provides evidence for 
such effects (Goodman & Malkoc, 2012; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). 
2.1.2. Latitude of Price Acceptance Across Psychological Distance (Krüger, Alves, & 
Koch, 2015). The second research article that is part of this doctoral thesis is directly related 
to the abovementioned work. Applying the idea that the width of response categories 
increases with increasing psychological distance, we investigated distance effects on 
consumers’ latitude of price acceptance as a particularly relevant response category for 
consumer decision making.  
Latitude of price acceptance defines the range of prices a consumer considers 
acceptable for a certain product (Kosenko & Rahtz, 1988; D. R. Lichtenstein, Bloch, & Black, 
1988). Just like latitudes of acceptance at a more general level (C. W. Sherif, 1963), latitudes 
of price acceptance are critical for evaluations within the price dimension. For instance, the 
same price is evaluated more positively within a high versus a low reference price range even 
when controlling for differences in the set’s means (Janiszewski & Lichtenstein, 1999). 
In the same way as response categories for judging lengths and quantities increased 
with increasing distance (Krüger, Fiedler, et al., 2014), we expected price intervals to become 
wider when the products were presented as distant rather than close. Six studies provided 
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empirical support for this hypothesis. For instance, the typical price for a coffee was 
construed at a wider latitude of acceptance when participants were asked to estimate the price 
of the coffee for a distant location rather than for their hometown. As a consequence, price 
evaluations were more positive and purchase intentions were more pronounced for distant 
rather than close products. This effect of distance on price evaluations was particularly strong 
when elevated rather than average prices were judged. While average prices in the center of 
most people’s acceptability limits appeared to be quite attractive from both close and distant 
perspectives, elevated prices were only perceived as acceptable when distance was high, thus, 
when price latitudes were wide enough to incorporate even relatively extreme exemplars. 
Moreover, two studies investigated the role of price knowledge as an underlying 
process variable to explain the distance-price latitudes relationship in a causal chain design 
(see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Results indicated that it is because of consumers’ lower 
knowledge about prices in distant versus close locations, that they are willing to accept a 
wider range of prices when distance is high. 
2.1.3. Discussion. When judging ordinal attributes, people use response categories to 
express the distribution of expected and acceptable values. The width of such response 
categories depends heavily on the psychological distance and the construal level of the object 
to be judged. One reason for this relationship can be found in differences in perceived 
knowledge about objects across distances and construal levels. To express the uncertainty that 
stems from such knowledge asymmetries, people adjust their acceptability limits when 
generating quantitative expressions. 
As a consequence, judgments of the length of the very same bridge, judgments of the 
quantity of the very same number of items, and judgments of the price of the very same 
product vary as a function of the object’s mental construal. Coming back to the initial 
discussion on the invariance axiom of rational choice, the present studies support the idea that 
The Relativity of Decision Making  Page |13 
 
the context in which the judgment takes place and the mindset the judge is in matter for the 
outcome of the judgment. 
2.2. Evaluation Mode 
At a very basic level, any judgment can be construed as an isolated judgment of the 
focal object or as a joint comparison of the focal object along with one or more alternatives. 
Indeed, many situations in our everyday environment map onto this distinction: Supermarkets 
may offer only one or several products of the same category, a particular mobile phone may 
come in a single or in multiple variants, and a student may have the possibility to enroll in one 
or in several classes within the same module to receive his credit points. From a purely 
rational perspective, the evaluation of the focal alternative should be invariant across the 
isolated versus joint evaluation context. Psychological research on evaluation mode, however, 
contradicts such an assumption conclusively. 
According to general evaluability theory (Hsee & Zhang, 2010), judgments can differ 
substantially across joint versus separate evaluations. In separate evaluations, the focal object 
has to be evaluated without any reference context. Only the evaluators’ preexisting 
knowledge about the typical distribution of attribute values can be used to classify whether a 
certain attribute is high or low, good or bad. In joint evaluations, however, the other 
alternatives in the set provide a reference context that helps interpreting the quality of the 
focal alternative in addition to any preexisting knowledge about it. Just by comparing whether 
a certain attribute value is better than another, the evaluator gains potentially valuable insights 
into the quality of an alternative. 
Importantly, different attributes benefit differentially from the additional context 
information that is available in joint but not in separate evaluations. Drawing on Hsee’s 
(1996) rough taxonomy, there are easy-to-evaluate attributes that are context-independently 
evaluable, because people typically know about their distribution. For instance, when 
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evaluating a used dictionary, it is clear that the condition “like new” is good and the condition 
“the cover is torn” is at least mildly negative. No reference standard is necessary to make such 
a judgment. However, hard-to-evaluate attributes are typically only evaluable when there is 
context information available, because people lack specific knowledge about whether a 
certain value is good or not. In the case of a dictionary, one may speak of the number of 
entries as a relatively hard-to-evaluate attribute. In a separate evaluation, it is difficult to say 
whether 10,000 entries is good or not, because most people would not know about the typical 
number of entries in a dictionary. In a joint evaluation, however, the other alternatives can be 
used as reference information to draw an evaluative judgment about the focal object. For 
instance, in a reference set where an alternative dictionary has 5,000 entries, the original 
option will be evaluated positively; in a set with a 20,000 entry alternative, the opposite will 
be the case. 
In general, according to the evaluability hypothesis (Hsee, 1996), the relative impact 
of hard-to-evaluate versus easy-to-evaluate attributes varies across evaluation modes. In 
separate evaluations, reference information about how to interpret hard-to-evaluate attributes 
is missing. Therefore, the judgment is mostly based on easy-to-evaluate attributes. In joint 
evaluations, however, the other alternatives in the set increase the evaluability of the hard-to-
evaluate attributes rendering both types of attributes relevant for the decision. Based on this 
reasoning, choice sets can be constructed that demonstrate preference reversals across 
evaluation modes (for an overview, see Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999).  
For instance, in separate evaluations, a job applicant for a computer programming 
position with a GPA of 4.9 and the experience of having written 10 KY computer programs (a 
fictive programming language) is preferred to a candidate with a GPA of 3.0 and the 
experience of having written 70 KY computer programs. In a joint evaluation, however, the 
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candidate with the higher programming experience is preferred, because only in this 
condition, the number of KY computer programs is easily evaluable (Hsee, 1996). 
2.2.1. The Presenter’s Paradox Revisited: An Evaluation Mode Account (Krüger, 
Mata, & Ihmels, 2014). General evaluability theory (Hsee & Zhang, 2010) and the 
evaluability hypothesis (Hsee, 1996) are based on the idea that attribute evaluability is the 
chief causal agent to generate preference asymmetries across evaluation modes. One of the 
goals of the third research article that is part of this thesis was to suggest another variable that 
that might underlie preference asymmetries across evaluation modes. Namely, going beyond 
the idea of evaluability, we suggested an attentional account to explain why some option are 
preferred more strongly in joint evaluations, while some others appear as more attractive 
when evaluated separately. 
In three experimental studies, participants judged the quality of single products and 
product bundles. Bundles were always composed of the respective single product plus an 
extra add-on item. For instance, in one study, participants provided attractiveness ratings for a 
coffee maker (single product) as well as for that coffee maker plus an additional milk frother 
(product bundle). Critically, the two options were either evaluated jointly by the same 
participant or separately by two independent participants. We expected the value of the 
bundle to be higher in joint relative to separate evaluations, because the bundle’s added value 
(i.e., the add-on) is more salient when it is directly contrasted to its single product counterpart. 
Results confirmed these expectations – participants provided a higher willingness to pay and 
higher attractiveness ratings for the bundle in the joint rather than the separate evaluation 
context. 
Pertinent to the theoretical interpretation of these results, an experimental causal chain 
design (cf. Spencer et al., 2005) was able to attribute the evaluation of the product bundle to 
the level of attention that was paid to the add-on. As indicated by a change detection task (cf. 
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Simons & Levin, 1997), participants were much more attentive to the add-on in joint rather 
than in separate evaluations. It is due to these differences in attention, that the product bundle 
was evaluated more positively in joint evaluations. 
Note that it is difficult to explain the stronger preference for the bundled offer under 
joint evaluation by differences in add-on evaluability (cf. Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
It is unlikely that adding an alternative without any add-on at all changes much of the add-
on’s evaluability. Also, in one of our studies, particularly those participants who did pay 
attention to the add-on rated the bundle as more attractive. Based on this reasoning and the 
data from our causal chain of experiments, the present research suggests differences in 
attention as another route through which evaluation mode affects preferences above and 
beyond the evaluability idea. 
2.2.2. Discussion. The evaluation of a choice option depends on whether it is judged 
alone or in the presence of other alternatives. There are at least two ways in which the 
presence of additional alternatives may affect the evaluation of a focal option. First, as 
suggested by general evaluability theory (Hsee & Zhang, 2010), including additional options 
in a choice set increases the evaluability of the options within the set because comparative 
information becomes available. Second, as suggested by the present research, including 
additional options directs attention to the differences between the alternatives. Features that 
are shared are cancelled out and features that are unique receive particular weight in the 
decision process (cf. Houston & Sherman, 1995; Sherman, Houston, & Eddy, 1999). 
With regard to the relativity discussion that provides the backbone of this thesis, our 
results are illustrative of the influence of the context on the outcome of a judgment. The 
evaluation of a focal option is a function of its context. Contrary to the notion of context 
invariance, adding an allegedly irrelevant, inferior alternative to a choice context affects 
judgments of the focal option.  
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2.3. Framing Effects in Consumer Judgment and Decision-Making  
(Krüger, Vogel, & Wänke, 2015) 
Discussing the relativity of decision-making, the previous sections were concerned 
with the context in which a decision takes place and the mindset the evaluator is in when 
making his judgment. The fourth and final manuscript on which the present thesis is built is 
concerned with framing effects as further instances of relativistic decision-making.   
Framing effects occur when equivalent presentations of the same decision problem 
lead to different responses to it (Druckman, 2001; Sher & McKenzie, 2006). For instance, a 
medical treatment with a 50% success rate is logically equivalent to a medical treatment with 
a 50% failure rate. Ground beef that is 75% lean is logically equivalent to ground beef that is 
25% fat. Yet, despite the frames’ logical equivalence, people exhibit significantly higher 
preferences for the positive (success rate, lean beef) rather than the negative (failure rate, fat 
beef) description of the same choice option (Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Levin, Schnittjer, & Thee, 
1988). 
Explanations for the occurrence of framing effects are manifold and almost always 
restricted to a particular subset of effects (for overviews, see Keren, 2011b; Kühberger, 1998; 
Levin et al., 1998): In the area of risky choice framing such as in the case of the Asian disease 
dilemma (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), authors typically resort to prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as a descriptive model to clarify the effect
2
. Attribute framing, 
which is oftentimes concerned with switching the valence of a single attribute dimension such 
in the ground beef example above, is commonly explained via attentional mechanisms (Levin 
et al., 1998). Response framing (e.g., choosing versus rejecting, Shafir, 1993) is interpreted in 
terms of compatibility principles (Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990). And outcome framing – 
such as when presenting a monetary amount as an integrated whole or as separated parts 
                                                          
2
 Note, however, that despite its usefulness as a descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, prospect 
theory by itself does not provide any explanation at the algorithmic level (cf. Marr & Poggio, 1976). 
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(Thaler, 1985) – can be explained as a reference set effect (Janiszewski, 2011; Janiszewski, 
Silk, & Cooke, 2003). 
A defining criterion of framing effects is the standard of equivalence between the 
frames. Without equivalence, any preference asymmetries across the framing conditions may 
simply be a consequence of factual differences in the choice alternatives. But what does it 
mean for frames to be equivalent? Clearly, there are many standards according to which 
equivalence may be defined (see Keren, 2011a). In a rigorous analysis, Sher and McKenzie 
(2006, 2011) suggest information equivalence as a gold standard to judge the equivalence 
between frames. According to the idea of information equivalence, two frames A and B are 
equivalent only when there is no choice-relevant background condition C about which the 
listener can make inferences based on the mere fact that the speaker chose frame A instead of 
frame B. Thus, in Sher and McKenzie’s framework, framing is foremost about 
communication and the adherence to conversational logic (Grice, 1975) rather than formal 
logic.  
To illustrate this abstract idea, in the case of a doctor communicating the outcome of a 
medical treatment as successful 50% of the time, a patient may interpret the mere fact that the 
doctor chose the success rather than the failure frame as a positive signal – the choice of 
frame “leaks” information about the outcome of the treatment. As a consequence, the success 
and the failure frame differ in terms of their information equivalence despite their logical or 
mathematical equivalence. 
Along these lines, Keren (2007, 2011a) highlighted the importance to restrict any 
conclusion about equivalence to particular dimensions: Ground beef that is described as 75% 
lean versus 25% fat is logically equivalent on the dimension amount of fat. However, people 
consider the fat-frame more “trustworthy” than the lean-frame highlighting non-equivalence 
on dimensions other than logical reasoning. 
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A thorough analysis of a particular study’s definition of equivalence is indispensable 
before drawing any conclusions about human rationality. From its very beginning, framing 
research was concerned with the question whether the observed effects violate the invariance 
axiom of rational choice emphasizing potential disparities between normative and descriptive 
models of human behavior (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981, 1986). However, violations of normative principles of rational behavior must always be 
interpreted in the light of the underlying standard of equivalence. Different frames are never 
entirely equivalent and, depending on the particular modification, one may argue that not 
picking up on the subtle differences between two frames represent the “irrational” behavior 
(Keren, 2011a). 
With regard to the relativity of decision making, decades of empirical research on 
framing effects have established that decision-making depends (a) on the way in which the 
options are described and (b) on the method through which responses are elicited. Contesting 
fundamental axioms of rational choice, preferences are not invariant across descriptions and 
procedures (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). 
On a final note, it is interesting to see that in many of the paradigms used it is 
essentially no problem at all to mentally convert one frame into the other. Knowing about the 
winning proportion of a lottery, virtually everybody is able to compute the complementary 
losing proportion. Likewise, having to select a most preferred option can easily be represented 
as a task about the rejection of non-preferred alternatives. However, empirically it is well-
established that this is not what people do. Instead, in most situations, people do pay much 
attention to the particular presentation format and, therefore, provide choices relative to the 
specific decision context. 
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3. General Discussion 
Decision-making is relative – it is relative rather than absolute as it is dependent on a 
multitude of factors that are not inherent to the logical structure of the decision problem itself 
(i.e., outcomes and probabilities). In the present thesis, a subset of these factors was reviewed 
in terms of a taxonomy of relativistic decision-making. In particular, empirical evidence was 
discussed that demonstrates how the outcome of decision processes depends on (1) the 
description of the choice alternatives, (2) the response mode through which the answer is 
elicited, (3) the context in which the decision takes places, and (4) the mindset that is 
activated when making a decision. 
3.1. Antecedents of Relativistic Decision-Making 
The literature review and the empirical results that have been discussed provide 
conclusive evidence that decisions do not take place in a context-free vacuum. Instead, they 
are constructed in a given moment relative to the specific configuration and environment of 
the decision problem (Bettman et al., 1998; Slovic, 1995). But why are decision processes 
constructive and context-sensitive rather than invariant and stable?  
Different schools of thought provide different answers to this question. The early 
constructivist models of decision-making interpreted context-dependency as a consequence of 
bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1955, 1957; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
According to these models, rationality is bounded in the sense that decision-making is an 
effortful process and that cognitive and temporal resources to arrive at an optimal decision 
outcome are limited. As a consequence, decision-makers have to draw on mental shortcuts to 
simplify their decision strategies according to their cognitive limitations (Gilovich, Griffin, & 
Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It is central to this perspective, to locate the 
determinants of decision-making within the individual’s mind. Biased decision outcomes 
reflect biased cognitive processes. 
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An alternative framework to explain the constructive nature of decision-making is the 
cognitive-ecological approach (Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Juslin, 2006; Fiedler & Wänke, 
2009). According to this perspective, decision outcomes are constructed as a function of the 
environment or, more precisely, as an interaction of environment and person variables. For 
instance, availability effects may not (exclusively) reflect differences in ease of retrieval at the 
interpersonal level (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), but also differences in the prevalence of 
certain pieces of information in the environment (Combs & Slovic, 1979). In this view, 
different learning environments produce different decision outcomes. Decision-making is 
relative to the information sample at hand. Biased decision outcomes reflect accurate 
processing of biased information samples rather than deficient processing of unbiased 
samples. 
3.2. The Adaptivity of Relativistic Decision-Making 
A final and arguably most controversial issue to be discussed with regard to the 
relativity of decision-making is the question of adaptivity – is it good or is it bad that 
decision-making is a function of its context? The controversy regarding this question lies 
within the definition of an appropriate evaluation standard to determine the quality of decision 
outcomes. What does it mean for a decision to be good? 
Coming back to the introduction of this thesis, expected utility theory suggests utility 
maximization as one such standard to be used for the evaluation of decision outcomes. 
According to utility maximization principles, the answer to the adaptivity question is very 
straightforward: The dependency of decision outcomes on the framing, context, and construal 
of the decision problem is bad. Relativistic decision-making should be seen as an instance of 
irrational behavior, because, for many decision problems, there is an objectively definable 
optimal outcome that should be chosen – and even when there is none, the mere fact that the 
same person exhibits preference reversals within the same decision problem is sufficient to 
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call the rationality of his behavior into question. In this view, people behave irrationally in the 
sense that they lack the ability to pursue adequate strategies to maximize their personal 
benefits. 
This economistic perspective is surely not the only standard to evaluate the quality of 
human decision-making. Yet, it is interesting to note that on the part of psychology, there is 
much more to say about descriptive rather than prescriptive norms of human behavior. 
Psychologists developed a great number of elaborate theories and models that are well suited 
to describe how human behavior is. The question whether it is good the way it is, is frequently 
left unanswered.  
One notable exception may be found in the rationality debate that accompanied the 
heuristics and biases research program. In the early research primarily initiated by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973; 1974; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), statistical procedures and 
methodological tools such as regression models, analyses of variance, or Bayesian models 
were typically used as benchmarks to prove the naïvety and faultiness of human decision-
making (see, e.g., Birnbaum, 1983; Kelley, 1973). Applying mathematical algorithms as 
evaluation standards, human reasoning was seen as a “poor replica” of scientific methods (D. 
G. Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 75) that frequently violates even basic logical principles. 
In a markedly different perspective on the heuristics and biases research, Gigerenzer 
and colleagues suggested the concept of ecological rationality as an alternative standard for 
judging rationality in decision-making (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the 
ABC Research Group, 1999; D. G. Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The term ecological 
rationality refers to the ability to efficiently make use of the information in natural 
environments. In this view, decision strategies are seen as rational when they provide fast and 
frugal ways to arrive at satisfactory decision outcomes within a certain environment rather 
than when they provide perfectly correct results in a mathematical sense. Thus, in contrast to 
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the original notion of decision biases, from this ecological perspective, the context-
dependency of decision-making is seen as an efficient way to process information within 
concrete ecologies. 
3.3. Conclusion 
Decision-making is relative to a wide range of contextual and psychological variables 
that go beyond the logical structure of the decision problem itself. The present thesis 
highlighted psychological distance, construal level, evaluation mode, and framing effects as 
vital examples of this relativistic nature of decision-making.  
Particularly in the recent past, the fact that people’s decisions can be subtly influenced 
via the architecture of the decision problem and its context has attracted much interest not 
only of scientists but also of policymakers (Marteau, Ogilvie, Roland, Suhrcke, & Kelly, 
2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Utilizing the knowledge that has been accumulated in the 
behavioral sciences, real-world decisions as important as whether to participate in organ 
donation programs (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), whether to be honest in one’s tax 
declaration (UK Cabinet Office Behavioral Insights Team, 2012), or whether to promote 
environmentally friendly behavior (N. Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008) have been 
shown to be amenable to manipulations of the decision context.  
Context matters. Evaluations and decisions critically depend on the specific 
embodiment of the decision problem and its environment. Researching the relativity of 
decision-making thus provides the opportunity to make enlightened decisions and, ultimately, 
to guide people into making good decision, whenever optimal decision outcomes are clear. 
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Abstract 
The present research suggests that people adjust their mental response scales to an 
object’s distance and construal level. People make use of wider response categories when they 
judge distant and abstract as compared to close and concrete stimuli. Across five experiments, 
participants worked on visual and verbal estimation problems (e.g., length or quantity 
judgments). Answers were provided in interval format and differences between minimal and 
maximal estimates served as a measure of response category width. When target objects were 
framed as spatially distant rather than close (Studies 1 and 3), as unlikely rather than likely 
(Study 2), and as abstract rather than concrete (Study 4) category widths increased. Similarly, 
priming a high-level rather than a low-level mindset yielded wider interval estimates (Study 
5). The general discussion highlights the usefulness of category width as a basic measure of 
construal level and as a theoretical link between various branches of construal-level theory. 
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The Two-Fold Role of Categorization 
The basic process of categorization is ubiquitous. Whether we recognize a face, read a 
letter, or interpret a dangerous situation, we categorize a new stimulus as belonging to an 
older semantic category that already exists as part of our world knowledge in long-term 
memory. Although the same face will never produce exactly the same projection on our 
retina, we nevertheless recognize the invariance of the person behind the face. Thousands of 
different manifestations of the letter a, involving different sizes, angles, colors, font types, 
inclinations, etc., are all encoded as instances of the same semantic category. 
As a new stimulus is recognized as belonging to an existing category, the resulting 
stimulus representation is enriched with attributes that have not been perceived but can be 
inferred from general category knowledge (Bruner, 1957). At the same time, actually 
observed stimulus attributes that are irrelevant for the category may be discarded. Thus, 
semantic categories are conceived as stimulus classes represented as essential knowledge 
about their defining and characteristic features in long-term memory. When textbooks and 
journal articles in social psychology refer to categories as carriers of stereotypes, self-
concepts, and attitudes, they are usually referring to this kind of socially shared knowledge 
structures.  
In the present research, however, we are referring to response categories in a different 
sense. Whereas semantic categories’ main function is to represent firm knowledge about 
different attributes of stimulus classes in long-term memory, response categories are 
pragmatic tools to communicate quantitative information within specific attribute dimensions. 
Thus, whereas the semantic category “a glass of wine” includes socially shared knowledge 
about physical (glass), social (gregarious settings), cultural (weddings), and content-related 
attributes (alcohol), response categories serve to communicate quantitative constraints in 
specific attribute dimensions, such as a reasonable price for a glass of wine, its volume, or its 
temperature. Thus, like successive categories of a rating scale (cf. Parducci, 1965; Thurstone, 
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1927a; Torgerson, 1958; Upshaw, 1969b), we use the term “response category” more broadly 
to denote the boundaries of quantitative expressions. Note that response categories are much 
more flexible and more dependent on context and communicators’ perspectives than stable 
and socially shared semantic categories. A reasonable price for a glass of wine can be 
negotiated in many different ways and it may differ greatly between persons and situations.  
Despite the central role of response categories in scaling and psychometric measurement 
(Likert, 1932; Parducci, 1965; Thurstone, 1927a; Torgerson, 1958; Upshaw, 1969a), they 
have been rarely the focus of social-psychological research. When we categorize a behavior 
as inacceptable, a deal as fair, or a painting as beautiful, we are setting aspiration levels and 
negotiating tolerance limits. Changes in response categories can thus be used strategically to 
influence, for instance, selling and buying prices and to redefine attitudes and goals. 
The tolerance limits (in specific dimensions) of a glass of wine can be set in many 
different ways, depending on the communication partners’ judgment motive, negotiation 
strategy, aspiration level, and problem context. Accordingly, response categories can also be 
used to deal with uncertainty: When interacting with strangers in a foreign country and when 
insecure about cultural norms, typical habits and etiquettes, a wider range of behaviors may 
be considered acceptable (like slurping at the dinner table, taking off one’s shoes before 
entering someone’s place, etc.) as compared to one’s hometown when being around well-
known friends. Moreover, the mapping of preferences, aspiration levels and communication 
goals onto quantitative response categories is not only subject to deliberate strategies but also 
to various sources of fluctuation (cognitive, perceptual, environmental; cf., Thurstone, 1927a, 
1927b; Torgerson, 1958).  
As a consequence, rather than a single fixed value, response categories encompass a 
distribution of variable responses to a stimulus object – there is no sole, single reasonable 
price for a glass of wine, but a range encompassing all nuances of prices that are considered 
reasonable in a given moment. The difference between the upper and lower boundary of such 
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a distribution – indicated by maximal and minimal category value – provides an index for the 
response category’s width. In practice, this view on response categories implies that high and 
low widths reflect wide and narrow distributions of psychological responses to a stimulus 
object, respectively. Thus, while a connoisseur may have a very narrow range of what prices 
he or she deems reasonable for a certain wine, a person less familiar with wine may form 
wider tolerance limits to quantify the same stimulus attribute. 
The central aim of the present research is to shed light on one particularly important 
determinant of the category formation process. Namely, we investigate the impact of 
psychological distance and construal level (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) on the width of 
response categories used for quantitative judgments. Based on five experiments, we propose 
that response category width – operationalized as the difference between a minimal and 
maximal estimate of a stimulus attribute – affords a natural approach to measuring and 
understanding the psychophysical underpinnings of construal levels.  
Numerous studies have established an intriguingly wide range of findings from various 
research areas in regard to distance and construal level, including perception (Förster, 
Friedman, & Liberman, 2004), preference formation (Trope & Liberman, 2000), action 
identification (Liberman & Trope, 1998), personal values (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, 
& Chaiken, 2009), and self-control (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). However, 
less attention has been devoted to examining how construal level itself can be traced back to 
elementary cognitive processes. By proposing response category width as a psychophysical 
manifestation of construal level and distance, the present research aims to fill this void in the 
literature. 
Basic Assumptions of Construal-Level Theory (CLT) 
CLT can be conceived as a comprehensive theory linking psychological distance and 
construal levels. Depending on whether a judgment object or decision problem is far away (in 
time, space, probability, or social distance) or close to our own here-and-now position, we can 
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either focus on few global and essential aspects of a schematic, abstract reality or we can form 
a more local picture that includes many details and complicating features that often deviate 
from the idealized and simplified schemes. This zooming ability is presumably of great 
adaptive value. It allows us to either abstract from local and subsidiary details and context 
conditions in order to keep track of distal goals or to increase the resolution level so that more 
contextualized details become visible and finer distinctions possible, whenever a more 
contextualized short-distance view is needed.  
Empirical evidence for CLT. Corroborating evidence for the functional importance of 
this kind of distance regulation stems from numerous experiments showing that from a distal 
perspective judgments and decisions rely more on abstract, idealized, low-dimensionality 
models of reality (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002) and give more weight to 
superordinate attributes and causal origins (Rim, Hansen, & Trope, 2012) and lesser weight to 
subordinate attributes and incidental consequences (Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2006) 
than from a proximal perspective. As a consequence, manipulations of construal level or 
cognitive distance have been shown to trigger a number of judgment biases, decision 
anomalies, and preference reversals (see e.g. Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002; Trope & 
Liberman, 2000; Zhao & Xie, 2011).  
Given the central assumption of a bi-directional relationship between psychological 
distance and construal level, empirical research relies heavily on appropriate methods to 
measure construal level. Although in the published literature linguistic abstractness is 
certainly the most commonly cited measure of construal level (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, 
& Liberman, 2006), some studies have resorted to other measures, such as the number and 
inclusiveness of semantic categories in a sorting task (Liberman et al., 2002), the spontaneous 
reference to large or small measurement units (Maglio & Trope, 2011), the restrictive or 
creative span of associations (Förster et al., 2004; Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009), or the sensitivity 
for local versus global features in perception (Förster et al., 2004; Liberman & Förster, 2009). 
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However, hardly any prior research has investigated what might be considered one of the 
most natural and straightforward measures of construal level in the context of quantitative 
judgment tasks, namely, the direct estimation of category width conceived as the difference 
between separate estimates of a stimulus attributes’ upper and lower boundary. 
Construal level and category width. In order to understand why psychological 
distance and construal level would affect such quantitative judgment tasks, it is necessary to 
first analyze the relativity of judgments in the context of psychological scaling (Thurstone, 
1927a) and personal reference scales (Upshaw, 1969a). Intriguingly, judgments of the same 
person’s life satisfaction (Parducci, 1984), the same consumer products (Mellers & Cooke, 
1996), and invariant decision prospects (Stewart, Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003) depend 
heavily on the comparison level and the tolerance limits of the reference scale that is applied 
to the decision at hand. Consider, for example, again the judgment category “reasonable 
prices”. Can $10 for a coffee be categorized a reasonable price? Most people would probably 
deny and refrain from buying such a drink. However, priming people with luxury-related 
images or even more inflated prices of luxury products, or telling them that other people have 
already bought such a $10-coffee, may cause an upward shift in people’s internal reference 
scale. As a consequence, a price of $10 may become acceptable on such an elevated reference 
scale. Note that no invariant answer exists to the question of whether $10 per se is an 
acceptable price or not. “Acceptable prices” is a malleable response category that is formed ad 
hoc in a given situation for the purpose of making, for instance, a buying decision about one 
particular coffee. Moreover, reference scale effects in price judgments do not depend on 
changes in the semantic memory representation of the target object (i.e., the coffee for $ 10). 
Even when knowledge about the coffee remains identical, shifts in the reference scale can 
lead to different judgments. 
Now consider the impact of distance on the formation of the response category 
“reasonable prices”. In the same way as comparison objects or priming can cause shifts in the 
Construal Level and Category Width  Page |42 
 
 
midpoint, we expect distance to affect the width of the category. Hardly anybody would buy a 
$10 coffee in his or her hometown. However, in a foreign country, with a different culture, 
currency, and culinary norms, one may loosen the category limits and consider a very high 
price acceptable or an extremely low price still possible. We may be sure that $10 is 
inacceptable for ourselves, but when making the same judgment for a (socially distant) co-
worker, we may be less sure and, from his perspective, $10 may well be a reasonable price. 
More generally, we assume that people adjust their reference scales to the construal and 
distance of a stimulus object. Response categories do not stay invariant, when an object is 
mentally represented as concrete versus abstract or close versus distant. Instead, people 
increase their tolerance limits and thus their response category width with increasing distance 
and construal level, because distance and construal level are necessarily related to the amount 
of specific knowledge and certainty. The proximal end of the distance continuum is defined 
by direct experience (Trope & Liberman, 2010). People have a lot of specific knowledge 
about proximate objects because they encountered them repeatedly. In contrast, most distal 
objects have never been directly experienced and, therefore, judgments about these involve 
ambiguity and uncertainty. In fact, our visual perceptive system in and of itself is built for the 
regulation of informational density and uncertainty as a function of (spatial) distance: The 
further an object is removed from an observer, the blurrier the visual input gets and the higher 
the ambiguity about it. The link between distance and knowledge recently received support 
from studies demonstrating conceptual associations between construal level, psychological 
distance and the amount of information available (darkness vs. brightness; Steidle, Werth, & 
Hanke, 2011). People engage in broad, global processing when they encounter remote or 
unfamiliar objects that have not been experienced before (Förster, Marguc, & Gillebaart, 
2010).  
In a similar vein, we expect construal level to be linked to category width. Naturally, 
people can be less precise about estimating the duration of a sports event in comparison to a 
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basketball game, or when judging the aggressiveness of an act of hostility in comparison to an 
insult. Just like for distant objects, people are less knowledgeable about the concrete attributes 
of high-level construals – which by definition omit precise information. As a result, people 
take a wider range of possibilities into account when judging the attributes of an abstract 
target, which is composed of many specific instances, as compared to a concrete one. 
Research on Parducci’s (1965) range-frequency model supports our reasoning about 
knowledge and category width. According to this model, people split up crude categories into 
more fine-grained ones (i.e., they reduce category width), when they encounter increasingly 
more instances of that category (i.e., when a category’s frequency increases). As more 
specific knowledge is available for close and low-level targets, we similarly expect people to 
narrow down the category width of those targets. In a classical study, Hovland and  Sherif 
(1952) provide evidence for this idea by demonstrating that people are more restrictive in 
accepting statements that are close to their own opinion than in rejecting statements that are 
not. The distribution of response categories is skewed: People use narrow categories for 
judging stimuli at the psychologically close end (i.e., close to their own opinion) and crude 
categories at the psychologically distant end of the attitude dimension. 
Overview of the Present Studies 
In five experiments, we investigate the influence of psychological distance (Studies 1, 2 
and 3) and construal level (Studies 4 and 5) on category width. In particular, participants are 
presented with stimulus objects and estimate the upper and lower boundary of a quantitative 
attribute of each object as a measure of category width. We manipulate the object’s spatial 
distance (Studies 1 and 3), likelihood (Study 2) and construal level (Study 4) or participants’ 
mindset construal level before they approach the estimation task (Study 5). If differences in 
category width are indeed a fundamental characteristic of distant versus close objects and 
high- versus low-level construals, we expect participants’ interval estimates to increase with 
increasing distance and construal level. 
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For two reasons, we believe that such a study makes a valuable contribution beyond 
previous research. First, at the theoretical level, we are convinced that demonstrating the 
impact of construal level on category width does not merely add another item to an already 
long list of manifestations of distance and abstractness. Rather, direct interval estimates on 
quantitative judgment scales afford a natural means of establishing one of the central 
psychophysical underpinnings of construal level and distance that may foster understanding of 
a wide variety of related findings. Indeed, assuming that response categories become wider 
with increasing construal level offers a straightforward explanation why high-level (low-
level) processing is associated with a focus on (dis-)similarities (Förster, 2009), why priming 
global (local) perception styles fosters assimilation (contrast; Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 
2008), why people include more (less) instances in a semantic category that is distant (close; 
Liberman et al., 2002), why broader (narrower) associations are formed in distant (close) 
tasks (Förster et al., 2004), and why stereotyping is more (less) pronounced in high-level 
(low-level) mindsets (McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012). 
Second, the interval judgment paradigm in and of itself is of practical importance, and 
has face validity for a number of real-life settings. In marketing and consumer behavior, 
interval estimates (e.g., of minimally and maximally acceptable prices) determine the 
acceptance of various brands and markets (Dost & Wilken, 2012). In social psychology, the 
width of the categories used to identify elderly, handicapped, or criminal people reflects 
tolerance and moderates the impact of stereotypes and discriminatory behavior (Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 1999). Or, in decision research, interval construction tasks have been shown to 
produce particularly strong overconfidence effects (Juslin, Winman, & Hansson, 2007). 
Extending construal-level research to interval-estimation therefore raises new implications for 
applied fields such as marketing, stereotyping, and overconfidence. Moreover, for future 
research interval judgments afford a practical and natural quantitative assessment of construal 
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levels, going beyond linguistic measures of abstract versus concrete language, or general 
preferences for global versus local, or desirable versus feasible stimulus aspects.  
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to investigate whether the width of a response category is 
adjusted to the geographical distance of a target item. Participants were provided with a series 
of visual stimuli (bridges) and their task was to provide upper and lower boundary estimates 
about a quantitative stimulus attribute (length) as a measure of category width. We expected 
response categories to be wider, hence interval judgments to be larger, when the objects were 
located in a spatially distant (France) rather than close location (USA). By applying (and 
sometimes over-generalizing) the rule that wider categories are required to judge distal rather 
than proximal objects, participants should broaden their mental unit size and apply larger 
categories when providing responses for distal as compared to proximate targets. 
Method 
Participants. Forty-four US-American participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk online platform (MTurk; 22 women, age M = 33.62 years, SD = 9.24
3
) and 
paid 0.50 USD for their participation (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011, for 
information regarding MTurk). Participants were randomly assigned by the computer program 
to either the USA (low spatial distance) or the France (high spatial distance) condition. 
Materials and procedure. At the beginning of the online study participants were 
informed that their task in the present study was to estimate the length of several bridges. 
Each participant was instructed to provide interval estimates, that is, a minimal and a maximal 
estimate for each bridge’s length and worked on a sample item. Next, participants read the 
following sentence as a manipulation of the target objects’ spatial distance: “All the bridges 
you will be presented with are located in the United States [France] and, from an 
                                                          
3
 Demographic data from two participants is missing due to a technical error. In this and all other studies only 
English-speaking, US-American participants who completed the entire survey were accepted as participants, 
following common guidelines on how to use MTurk (Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012). 
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architectural perspective, represent typical examples of bridges from this region.” 
Additionally, participants were asked to write a few words about American (French) 
architecture in order to make sure that they took sufficient note of the spatial distance 
manipulation. 
The main task consisted of 12 web pages presented in a random order. Each page was 
composed of a large photo displaying a bridge (see Figure 1) and the dependent measure 
below. Dependent on condition, the bridges either had English (e.g. Sunderland Bridge, West 
Gate Bridge) or French names (e.g. Pont Saint-Louis, Pont de l'Archevêché). Participants had 
to provide their interval estimates by answering questions of the following format: “The 
Sunderland Bridge [Pont Saint-Louis] is in between ___ft. and ___ft. long”. After answering 
all 12 items, participants filled out demographics, were thanked for their participation and 
received their payment electronically via Mechanical Turk. 
Results and Discussion 
In order to assess category width, we first subtracted the lower-boundary from the 
upper-boundary estimate for each of the twelve bridges. Since bridges differed greatly in 
terms of their actual lengths, scores were first z-standardized separately for each bridge and 
then summed up (α = .91). One participant was excluded from data analysis for generating 
negative intervals (including this participant does not change level of significance in the 
reported analysis). 
As predicted, psychological distance did affect category width. Participants formed 
larger response categories when the bridges were ostensibly located in France (Z = 3.96) as 
compared to the USA (Z = -2.34), t(41) = 2.79, p = .008, d = .78. A descriptive analysis 
reveals that in each of the twelve items category widths were larger in the high spatial 
distance condition.  
Results indicate a clear pattern confirming our central hypothesis. Wider response 
categories were formed when the bridges were framed as psychologically distant rather than 
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close. Notably, the stimulus objects themselves – the bridges – did not differ between 
conditions. Providing information about a bridge’s location was sufficient to affect 
participants’ reference scales that they used for generating their numerical estimates. As a 
consequence, interval widths differed as a function of distance. 
Study 2 
 The central aim of Study 2 was to generalize the findings obtained in the previous 
study to another dimension of psychological distance: Likelihood. According to CLT, there 
are four distance dimensions, which are interrelated and share a common underlying meaning 
(Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Fiedler, Jung, Wänke, & Alexopoulos, 2012; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). Therefore, we expected the likelihood of an object to be similarly 
linked to response category width as spatial distance. To test this prediction, participants saw 
the same series of bridges that was already used in Study 1. However, this time we added 
several optical filters in an image processing program (Paint Shop Pro X, Corel Corporation) 
in order to make the original photographs look like computerized planning sketches (see 
Figure 2) that could either exist in reality (high likelihood condition) or not (low likelihood 
condition).  
Method 
 Participants. Eighty US-American participants were recruited via MTurk (32 women, 
age M = 31.74, SD = 9.07), paid 0.50 USD for their participation in this study and randomly 
assigned to either the high likelihood or the low likelihood condition.  
 Materials and procedure. The experimental procedure was consistent with the 
previous study except for the following changes regarding the manipulation of psychological 
distance. In particular, at the beginning of the experiment, participants either read that “All the 
bridges in the sketches we will present you have finally been built” or that those bridges “have 
not been built yet”. Participants saw the same twelve bridges as in the previous study, but 
several optical filters were added to the photographs to be able to convince participants that 
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they were seeing digital planning sketches of bridges, which may or may not exist in reality. 
Critically, all participants saw the same twelve sketches when they provided their interval 
estimates. However, half of them thought that the bridges actually exist, while the other half 
thought that they do not exist yet. In the end of the study, participants were probed for 
suspicion about the images, answered demographics and received their payment via MTurk. 
Results and Discussion 
 Following Study 1’s procedure, category width was computed by subtracting the 
estimated minimum from the estimated maximum, z-standardized and summed up over all 
twelve items (α = .93). Two participants were excluded from the analyses for providing 
negative interval scores, and two participants reported to not believe our cover story about the 
sketches (including these participants does not affect the level of significance).  
Using a likelihood rather than a spatial distance manipulation, results from the Study 1 
could be replicated. Participants provided wider response categories, when the bridges were 
presented as unlikely (Z = 2.83) rather than likely (Z = -2.76), t(74) = 2.81, p = .006, d = .65. 
Studies 1 and 2 provide convergent evidence for the idea that people attune their 
internal reference scale to the psychological distance of an object to be judged. An increase in 
the distance of a target object leads to an increase in the coarseness of the reference scale that 
is used for providing a judgment about it. Thus, response categories are wider for distal than 
for proximate targets. Note that such reasoning is not concerned with the underlying mental 
representation of the target object in the first place. Although we do not want to preclude the 
possibility that different semantic categories can be chosen in order to represent a bridge (e.g. 
overpass, footbridge), we believe that the obtained results can more reasonably be explained 
in terms of response categories. The items to be judged were permanently visible to the 
participants and all information was directly accessible in the photographs. Thus, above all, 
the estimation task was about the scaling of a numerical estimate. 
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Study 3 
Study 3 extended the results obtained so far, by investigating the distance-width 
association in a different judgment domain. In particular, participants’ task was to provide 
quantity estimates about the number of individual items in a food bowl. Based on our 
theoretical reasoning, we expected participants to provide wider response categories when the 
foods were framed as spatially distant rather than close. Moreover, after judging all items we 
asked participants to rate their general confidence about the estimates they had just given. 
When people indeed use category width in order to compensate for differences in certainty 
about distal versus proximate targets, subsequent confidence judgments should be equally 
high, because certainty differences are already communicated by respective interval widths 
(cf. Klayman, Soll, Juslin, & Winman, 2006; Yaniv & Foster, 1995). Thus, we expected 
differences for category width but not for subsequent confidence judgments. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-five US-American participants were recruited using MTurk (27 
women, age M = 36.89 years, SD = 11.4). Participants received 0.50 USD for their 
participation and were randomly assigned to either the USA (low spatial distance) or France 
(high spatial distance) experimental condition. 
Materials and procedure. After reading the instructions and seeing a sample item, 
participants were asked to write a few words about the American or French cuisine to ensure 
they paid sufficient attention to the spatial distance manipulation. The subsequent estimation 
task consisted of 10 web pages that were presented in random order and displayed 
photographs of bowls and boxes filled with different kinds of fruits, nuts or vegetables (see 
Figure 3). Dependent on experimental condition, the food items were either labeled in English 
(cherries, hazelnuts, blueberries) or French (cerises, noisettes, brimbelles) with the English 
translations following in parentheses. Below each photograph participants filled out the main 
dependent measure: “There are in between ___ and___ cherries [cerises (cherries)] in the 
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box.”. After providing interval estimates for all 10 foods, participants indicated their overall 
confidence about the judgments they had given on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from very 
unconfident to very confident. Upon answering the confidence item they filled out 
demographics, were thanked for their participation and received their payment via Mechanical 
Turk. 
Results and Discussion 
A sum score of category width based on the 10 individual items was computed 
following Study 1’s procedure (α = .95). As predicted, the spatial distance manipulation 
affected category widths. When the foods were presented as spatially distant (Z = 1.63) higher 
interval estimates were provided than when the same items were presented as spatially close 
(Z = -1.58), t(63) = 2.06, p = .044, d = .54. A descriptive analysis revealed the robustness of 
the experimental effect: The same ordinal pattern was found in each of the ten items used in 
the experiment.  
Next, we analyzed participants’ final confidence ratings about their judgments. Not 
surprisingly, confidence was negatively correlated with category width, thus validating the 
measure, r(65) = -.40, p = .001. The negative sign of the correlation implied that participants 
generated larger intervals when they felt less confident about their estimates. Most 
importantly, however, confidence and psychological distance (coded 0=USA, 1=France) 
were unrelated, r(65) = -.01, ns. Thus, participants from both experimental conditions rated 
their confidence equally high, though their interval estimates differed in width. Apparently, 
any certainty differences related to a target object’s distance had already been expressed 
through appropriate adjustments of category width.  
Study 3 corroborates the results obtained in the first study two studies. Increasing the 
psychological distance of a stimulus increases the coarseness of the reference scale that is 
used for providing a quantitative judgment about it. Importantly, results from the previous 
studies were replicated in a different judgment domain. 
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Study 4 
So far, we established a consistent relationship between psychological distance and 
category width. As CLT proposes similar implications for construal level, (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), Study 4 was designed to investigate how construal level affects category 
width. In particular, the same estimation task as in Study 3 was used, but this time the foods 
were either given an abstract category or a concrete exemplar label as a manipulation 
construal level (cf. Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006; Wakslak 
& Trope, 2009). By their very definition, low-level construals put an emphasis on the specific 
details of an object, while high-level construals highlight its core meaning, function and goals 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). Hence, the former are more suitable for narrowing down 
quantitative judgments than the latter, which is why we expect participants to use more fine-
grained reference scales and to provide more precise judgments when low-level rather than 
high-level information is activated. 
In the end of the study, after finishing the estimation task, participants answered an 
edited version of the Behavioral Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) as a 
check on the construal level manipulation. The BIF affords a linguistic measure of a person’s 
current mindset abstractness (Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006; Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-six US-American participants agreed to take part in the study for 
0.50 USD via MTurk (29 women, age M = 32.36 years, SD = 12.18) and were randomly 
assigned to either the category or the exemplar condition.  
Materials and procedure. Materials and procedures were identical to Study 3 except 
for the two following changes regarding the experimental manipulation and the manipulation 
check. First, the construal level of the foods was manipulated by framing the items either in 
abstract categorical or concrete exemplar terms. Specifically, the photographs were either 
abstractly labeled as fruits, nuts or vegetables (high-level construal) or concretely denoted as 
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blueberries, pine nuts or beans (low-level construal). Labels appeared on top of each photo 
and were included in the question about the item quantity (“What do you estimate the quantity 
of the blueberries [fruits] to be?”). 
Second, upon finishing the main task, participants answered a four item questionnaire 
that evaluated their preferences for abstract versus concrete linguistic expressions. The 
questionnaire was constructed according to the BIF principles (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), a 
widely used tool for assessing a person’s construal level. In particular, each item consisted of 
a behavioral episode that was followed by one ends-related (high-level) and one means-
related (low-level) alternative redescription of that behavior. One of the items was taken 
directly from the original questionnaire (eating) and three additional ones were created in 
accordance with the food-related cover story of the experiment (sticking to a diet; going to the 
gym; having a healthy nutrition, α = .56). For instance, participants had to indicate whether 
they preferred being healthy” (high-level, coded as 1) or “eating less” (low-level, coded as 0) 
as an alternative identifications of “sticking to a diet”.  
Results and Discussion 
Scores were standardized and summed up as in the previous studies (α = .93). We 
predicted higher category widths when the items were presented in categorical rather than 
exemplar format. Our expectations were confirmed. When the foods were framed abstractly 
as fruits or vegetables participants provided higher category widths (Z = 1.81) than when the 
items were framed on a more concrete level as blueberries or beans (Z = -2.26), t(64) = 2.30, p 
= .025, d = .57. Again, the same ordinal pattern was obtained in each of the ten items. 
Moreover, we expected the preceding construal level manipulation to carry over to the 
subsequent BIF questionnaire (cf. Fujita & Roberts, 2010). Indeed, participants in the 
category condition indicated relatively stronger preferences for the high-level action 
identifications (M = 2.56) than participants in the exemplar condition (M = 1.85), t(64) = 2.30, 
p = .025, d = .57. Thus, the abstract versus concrete labeling of the foods did affect 
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participants’ construal level at which they represented the items. Taken together, Study 4 
provides convincing evidence that response category width do vary as a function of both, 
psychological distance and construal level. 
Study 5 
 Thus far, our studies have demonstrated that manipulating the psychological distance 
and the construal level of a target object affects interval estimates about its attributes. Study 5 
was designed to go beyond these results by manipulating participants’ general mindset 
construal level independent of the target object itself. Previous research demonstrated 
repeatedly that construal level mindsets can be activated experimentally, affecting at what 
construal level objects are processed subsequently (see, e.g. Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 
2004; Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006; Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007). One of the 
advantages of such task-unrelated mindset manipulations is that a-priori differences regarding 
the target (i.e., any differences independent of the experimental manipulation) can be ruled 
out as an explanation for later effects. Accordingly, in Study 5, participants first answered 
several how- or why-questions about maintaining physical health as a mindset manipulation 
of construal level (cf. Freitas et al., 2004) and then provided category width estimates of ten 
estimation problems. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred seventy US-American participants (86 women, age M = 
35.60 years, SD = 12.01) agreed to participate in the present study via MTurk for 0.50 USD 
and were randomly assigned to either the how- (low-level construal) or the why-condition 
(high-level construal). 
 Materials and procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants read that 
their task was to work on two ostensibly unrelated questionnaire studies, which in fact were 
the experimental manipulation and the dependent measure. After reading the instruction, 
participants worked on the mindset manipulation (adapted from Freitas et al., 2004). In 
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particular, participants in the low-level construal condition were asked to provide four 
increasingly specific answers to the question “How can you improve and maintain your 
physical health?”. Participants in the high-level condition, in contrast, had to provide four 
increasingly abstract reasons for “Why should you improve and maintain your physical 
health?”. As the former task is about providing concrete means whereas the latter task is about 
generating abstract ends, the tasks prime low- and high-level construal, respectively. 
 Next, participants received the dependent measure that consisted of ten estimation 
problems. For instance, participants were asked to estimate “How many peanuts make an 
average 18 oz jar of peanut butter?”,  “What amount of gasoline does a typical automobile use 
during its lifetime?”, or “How many e-mails are sent every day? (including spam, advertising, 
etc.)”. For each question, they could indicate their answers by moving two sliders on a scale. 
One slider was blue-colored and labeled “min.”, the other one red-colored and labeled “max.”. 
The scale was a 300 pixel long horizontal bar with only the two endpoints being labeled. The 
endpoints of each item’s scale were determined in a pretest of one-hundred participants who 
provided a simple mean estimate for each item. From the respective distributions of answers 
for each question, the 15
th
 and the 85
th
 percentile were rounded and taken as lower and upper 
endpoints, respectively. Thus, for instance, for the scale of the number of peanuts to make a 
jar of peanut butter, the pretest determined 100 peanuts and 3,000 peanuts as endpoints; for 
the amount of lifetime gasoline usage, the pretest yielded 4,000 and 50,000 gallons. To make 
participants familiar with the item format, they first worked on a sample question explicating 
the instructions in detail. Participants were informed to “Please move both sliders to provide a 
minimal estimate and a maximal estimate” and to click a next-button when they were satisfied 
with their final slider positions. Then, they worked on the ten estimation problems. The 
computer program coded the final slider position on a scale from 1 (lowest possible value) to 
100 (highest possible value). After providing interval estimates for all ten questions, 
participants filled out demographics and were thanked for their participation in the study. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Category width scores were obtained by subtracting the position of the minimum-
slider from the position of the maximum-slider. Thus, scores could potentially range from 0 
(both slider have the identical position) to 99 (the minimum- and the maximum-slider 
positions at the lower and upper end of the scale, respectively). Negative intervals due to 
participants mixing up the two sliders were transformed into positive scores (overall, this 
applied to 4.2% of all answers). Finally, an average interval width over all ten items was 
calculated for each participant, α = .90.  
We expected the generation of concrete means as opposed to abstract ends in the 
mindset priming task to affect the width of the intervals in the subsequent estimation task. A 
mean comparison of participants’ interval sizes confirmed our expectations, t(168) = 2.23, p = 
.027, d = .34. Participants provided wider intervals after having worked on the why- (M = 
29.64) as compared to the how-version (M = 25.69) of the mindset priming task. 
 Study 5 substantiates the evidence for an association of construal level and response 
category width. Manipulating participants’ mindset construal level, interval widths in a 
subsequent estimation task were wider when they were based on high-level as compared to 
low-level construals. Thus, Study 5 supports the idea that construal level per se is sufficient 
for affecting response categories, also when it is not related to the target object whatsoever. 
General Discussion 
People attune their mental scales and response categories to an object’s distance and 
construal level. When an object is moved away from someone’s egocentric perspective or 
when it is construed at a higher level of abstraction, people adjusts their mental space by 
widening response categories. Coarse units are used to characterize the vagueness of the 
abstract and distant, and fine-grained units are used to capture the specificity of the concrete 
and close. In support of this notion, five studies have shown that, first, a wider range of 
lengths becomes acceptable when estimating bridges in a distant versus close (Study 1) or 
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unlikely versus likely context (Study 2). Second, the number of food items in a bowl is judged 
with a higher category width from a distant as compared to a close perspective (Study 3). 
Third, wider intervals are generated when food items are described in high-level terms (Study 
4). Finally, high construal level mindsets increase interval widths in a series of subsequent 
estimation problems (Study 5). 
Many scholars have argued and empirically demonstrated that less is known about the 
distant than the near, because the former is by definition less often part of one’s direct 
experience (Bar-Anan et al., 2006; Bar-Anan et al., 2007; Fiedler, 2007; Hamilton & 
Thompson, 2007; Steidle et al., 2011; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006). As a 
consequence, judgments from a distant perspective involve a higher degree of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. To compensate for such differences, people attune their internal reference scales 
to the context in which the judgment takes place. Just like an experienced real estate agent can 
be more precise about judging the value of an apartment than an inexperienced prospective 
buyer, people are able to scale objects in terms of more fine-grained units when these are 
close to them rather than distant. Intriguingly, they exhibit this behavior even in situations 
where the factual amount of information is constant and only specific cues allude to an 
object’s experiential distance, like in the studies presented. 
In a similar vein, high-level construals allow for higher latitude than low-level 
construals, because they disregard an object’s specific details for the benefit of emphasizing 
abstract information such as goals, functions and meanings. While concrete low-level 
information narrows down the perspective and allows for differentiations at a relatively high 
resolution level, high-level information is less instrumental for precise judgments as it focuses 
on general aspects that most objects have in common. Everybody has a relatively precise idea 
of a coffee cup and the simple fact that it is used for drinking coffee limits most of its 
attributes (such as size, content, or value) considerably. The more abstract construal 
container, however, puts an emphasis on the object’s basic function, and consequently lacks 
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most of the details, which would be central for narrowing down concrete inferences about it. 
Containers can have many sizes and can differ greatly in terms of their contents and values. 
As a result, even if the object is the same, construing it as a coffee cup and not as a container 
renders its details more accessible and decreases the possible shapes it may assume. As the 
present research demonstrates, people do justice to this higher specificity by adjusting their 
internal response scales to the object’s construal level. 
Implications for Construal Level Theory 
 At the theoretical level, the concept of category width is pivotal for gaining insights 
into the psychophysical underpinnings of construal levels. Much research has been concerned 
with antecedents and consequences of construal level and distance (for an overview, see e.g., 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). However, at the “algorithmic level” (Marr, 1982) it is less 
established how construal level can be conceptualized beyond verbal descriptions. In 
accordance with the five studies presented, we suggest the width of response categories as one 
fundamental property of psychological distance and construal levels. 
Past CLT research has not made an explicit distinction between semantic categories 
and response categories. Does the notion of construal level pertain to the abstractness with 
which a whole semantic category is represented or is it useful to consider the width or grain 
size of response categories in distinct attribute dimensions? Indeed, some findings 
demonstrate that high distance or construal level sensitizes people for different attributes 
(value, primary attributes) than low distance or construal level (probability, secondary 
attributes). The notion of category width, in contrast, affords a straightforward measure of 
people’s sensitivity to specific quantities. In any case, the reported results suggest that it is 
worthwhile studying the influence of construal level on the properties of reference scales used 
for quantitative judgments. Future studies will have to clarify the specific processes through 
which construal level and distance affect response scales. Our research suggests knowledge-
based certainty as one of the critical mediating factors. Future experiments may investigate 
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this relationship more closely and establish additional factors that explain the construal level-
width association. 
At a more pragmatic level, our studies have profound implications for conducting 
construal level research. Construal level is often measured by assessing a participant’s general 
mindset abstractness. For instance, in the classical Navon letter task participants’ reaction 
times toward global stimuli are compared with their reaction times toward local stimuli 
(Navon, 1977), the Behavioral Identification Form asks for preferences of means-related over 
ends-related behavioral descriptions (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), and the Kimchi-Palmer 
figures test refers similarity judgments about geometrical figures to global or local features 
(Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). These tasks afford useful tools for assessing a participant’s current 
mindset level of construal. However, in regard to specific stimulus objects, they must be 
considered rather indirect measures, as they do not directly tap into a person’s representation 
of a particular object in a given context. We suggest category width as an easily applicable 
measure that is able to fill this void. Asking participants to provide interval estimates about an 
object’s attributes represents a straightforward approach to measuring construal level. 
Category Width as an Explanatory Construct 
As the present research is concerned with a fundamental manifestation of distance and 
construal level, the concept of category width may add one more layer of understanding to 
other prevailing areas of related research. For instance, in a series of experiments Förster 
(2009) demonstrated a general link between global (local) processing and a focus on 
similarities (dissimilarities). Applying the notion of category width in future research may 
shed light on this intriguing relation: According to the present results, an increase in a 
person’s processing level should lead to larger category widths. As broader, less restrictive 
categorization reinforces the recognition of similarities (Wallach, 1958) and as objects being 
categorized together are judged to be more similar (Goldstone, Lippa, & Shiffrin, 2001), the 
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interplay of global (local) processing and similarity (dissimilarity) focus may reflect the usage 
of wider (narrower) response categories.  
A parallel argument can be made for the link between construal level and assimilation 
versus contrast (see Förster et al., 2008). Schwarz and Bless’ (2007) inclusion-exclusion 
model suggests that assimilation occurs when information is included in a category whereas 
contrast occurs when it is excluded from it. As including an exemplar into a category 
essentially requires a broad conceptual scope (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Liberman et al., 2002), 
category width may assume an important mediational role in construal level’s link to 
assimilation versus contrast. In support of this notion, the importance of category width for 
assimilation versus contrast has recently been demonstrated in consumer decision making: 
When a target’s range (e.g., the perceived prestige range of a new car) is wide enough to 
overlap with its context (e.g., the prestige range of other cars), assimilation occurs. However, 
when it is too narrow to overlap, the object is contrasted away from its context (Chien, 
Wegener, Hsiao, & Petty, 2010). 
Conclusion 
The present research suggests response category width as a psychophysical 
underpinning of construal level and distance. Variation in category width can have important 
practical consequences on social categorization and discrimination, the perception of 
normality, and acceptance or tolerance limits in various domains of life. Therefore, the notion 
of category width is not only theoretically relevant for CLT, but in and of itself a vital 
component for understanding categorization – one of human’s most fundamental and 
pervasive cognitive capacities. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Item used in Study 1. Participants’ task was to provide an interval estimate of the 
bridge’s length. Dependent on condition, this photograph was either presented as “Tamar 
Bridge” (spatially close) or “Pont au Change” (spatially distant). 
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Figure 2. Item used in Study 2. The images were introduced as digital planning sketches and 
participants were either told that the bridges actually existed (high likelihood) or not (low 
likelihood). 
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Figure 3. Item used in Studies 3 and 4. Participants’ task was to provide an interval estimate 
of the quantity of blueberries in the bowl. In Study 3, the photograph was either presented as 
“blueberries” (spatially close) or “brimbelles (blueberries)” (spatially distant). In Study 4, 
the photograph was presented as “blueberries” (exemplar) or “fruits” (category). 
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Abstract 
Whenever products are offered across different vendors, locations, or points in time, 
psychological distance is necessarily involved in the decision process. The present research 
investigates the consequences of these distances for consumers’ price expectations and offer 
evaluations in terms of latitude of price acceptance (LPA). LPA defines the range of prices a 
consumer expects to pay for a certain product. Results indicate that with increasing spatial 
distance (Study 1), social distance (Study 2), and construal level (Study 3), consumers 
increase their LPA. A causal chain of experiments and a statistical mediation analysis (Studies 
4 and 5) demonstrate that it is consumers’ lower knowledge of typical prices in distant versus 
close locations that mediates the influence of distance on LPA. The consequences of distance-
evoked differences in LPA for price evaluations and purchase intentions are investigated 
(Studies 4 and 6): Acceptability thresholds matter particularly for elevated (vs. average) prices 
at the boundary (vs. the center) of consumers’ LPA such that expensive offers are more likely 
to be accepted from a distant perspective.  
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Price assessments and purchase decisions across psychological distances are 
ubiquitous. Goods from virtually any product class can be ordered from an abundance of 
different places. Consumers can choose whether they want to buy locally or purchase the very 
same product from a different city, a different country, or even a different continent. Traders 
must decide which offer is the best, when comparing commodity prices across vendors. Legal 
agreements and derivative markets make it possible to commit to purchase decisions months 
and years in advance. And consumers traverse social distances, when differentiating between 
their own and other people’s, or between a friend’s and a stranger’s property. Indeed, 
whenever alternatives are available across different locations, times, or providers, 
psychological distance is necessarily involved in a decision. 
Drawing on Construal level theory (CLT; Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010) as a comprehensive theory of psychological distance, the objective of the 
present research is to investigate the effects of these distances on consumers’ price 
expectations, price evaluations and purchase decisions. Based on the idea that consumers feel 
less knowledgeable about prices in psychologically distant locations, we argue that their 
latitudes of acceptable prices increase with increasing psychological distance – a wider range 
of prices is considered acceptable when distance is high rather than low. As a consequence, 
evaluations of specific retail prices should vary with distance, too. With increasing 
acceptability limits, consumers should be more likely to accept elevated (vs. average) prices at 
the upper threshold (vs. the center) of their acceptability range and, therefore, they should be 
more likely to purchase products at such an elevated price level. Six studies will investigate 
these ideas experimentally. 
Conceptual Background 
The price that a consumer expects to pay for a specific product or product class when 
entering a store defines an critical reference point to which external retail prices are compared 
(Kalyanaram & Winer, 1995). Internal reference prices express powerful comparison 
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standards and tolerance limits that are used to evaluated the attractiveness of retail prices and, 
ultimately, to determine purchase decisions (Chandrashekaran & Jagpal, 1995; Klein & 
Oglethorpe, 1987; Kumar, Karande, & Reinartz, 1998; Mayhew & Winer, 1992; Mazumdar, 
Raj, & Sinha, 2005; Winer, 1986). 
Importantly, Consumers do not hold a single, unitary representation of an internal 
reference price for a specific product. Rather, they embrace an entire range of acceptable 
values in the form of a reference price interval to express their price expectations (Cheng & 
Monroe, 2013; Janiszewski & Lichtenstein, 1999; Kalyanaram & Little, 1994; Monroe, 1971; 
Raman & Bass, 2002). This interval is referred to as a consumer’s latitude of price acceptance 
(LPA). It is identified by the difference between the upper and the lower threshold of 
expected prices. 
Latitudes of Acceptance 
At a more general level, the concept of latitudes of acceptance originates in the 
literatures on psychophysical measurement (Thurstone, 1927a, 1927b; Torgerson, 1958) and 
social judgment theory (M. Sherif & Hovland, 1961; M. Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 1958). In 
these literatures, latitude of acceptance is defined as “that range of stimulus values judged 
acceptable” with regard to a certain stimulus category (C. W. Sherif, 1963, p. 148). In 
psychophysics, latitudes of acceptance characterize the range of magnitudes or the “region” 
on a physical (e.g., weight, brightness) or social stimulus continuum (e.g., attitudes, 
evaluations, political orientations) associated with the same psychological response. Latitudes 
of acceptance are fundamental to virtually all evaluative processes as they determine what is 
considered acceptable or unacceptable, what is judged as good or bad, or whether to purchase 
a product or not (e.g. Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957). 
Latitude of Price Acceptance  
In consumer research, the notion of latitudes of acceptance received particular 
attention with regard to reference prices (Kosenko & Rahtz, 1988; Lichtenstein & Bearden, 
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1989; Lichtenstein, Bloch, & Black, 1988; Mazumdar & Jun, 1992; Rao & Sieben, 1992; C. 
W. Sherif, 1963). According to range theory (Volkmann, 1951; see also Janiszewski & 
Lichtenstein, 1999), LPA is pivotal for evaluating specific retail prices, because it determines 
whether offers are accepted or rejected. From this perspective, the upper and lower threshold 
of a reference range serve as critical reference points that people use to determine the value of 
any given stimulus within that dimension (Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968; M. Sherif & Hovland, 
1961). Thus, for instance, a price of $1.25 is judged less favorably within a low ($.74 to 
$1.49) rather than a high reference range ($.99 to $1.74), even when controlling for 
differences in mean prices (Janiszewski & Lichtenstein, 1999). Similarly, extending the range 
of available alternatives by adding an inferior decoy-option renders differences between two 
other options smaller (for the attraction effect, see Huber & Puto, 1983). And conversely, 
attribute values are perceived as more dissimilar within a narrower consideration range 
(Mellers & Cooke, 1994). 
LPAs are crucial reference categories that consumers make use of in order to evaluate 
the quality of external retail prices. Yet, despite their significance for making evaluative 
judgments, LPAs are malleable constructs that are subject to a wide range of contextual 
factors (Kalyanaram & Little, 1994; Kosenko & Rahtz, 1988; Mazumdar & Jun, 1992). For 
several reasons, we believe psychological distance to be a critical determinant of LPA with 
significant consequences for consumer decision making. We will elaborate our reasoning as 
well as our hypotheses in the next sections. 
Psychological Distance 
Psychological distance is defined as the subjective experience that an object is close or 
far away from the self, from here, and from now (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Liberman, Trope, 
& Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). It is conceptualized as the amount of 
direct experience with an object and measured from an egocentric point of view (Liberman & 
Förster, 2009). With reference to CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010), an increasingly large body 
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of research has documented the significance of psychological distance for many different 
areas such as mental abstraction and categorization (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002), 
visual perception (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006), self-consistency (Eyal, 
Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009), length estimations (Maglio & Trope, 2011), 
and trend extrapolation (Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). Particularly in 
consumer research, studies on psychological distance and construal level are well documented 
(for overviews, see Hamilton, 2014; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007): Product evaluations 
(Kim, Zhang, & Li, 2008), effects of advertising (Martin, Gnoth, & Strong, 2009), and quality 
inferences based on price (Yan & Sengupta, 2011) and package size (Yan, Sengupta, & Wyer 
Jr, 2014) were shown to be subject to distance and construal level. 
Psychological Distance Affects Latitude of Price Acceptance 
The Role of Knowledge. Most pertinent to the present research, psychological 
distance can be expected to act as an essential regulator of knowledge (see Fiedler, 2007, for a 
similar argument). Defined by the amount of direct experience with an object, psychological 
distance is almost necessarily related to the amount of knowledge that is available about it. 
Objects that are experienced frequently (i.e., psychologically close objects) are represented at 
a higher level of resolution than objects that are experienced infrequently (i.e., 
psychologically distant objects). With an increase in experience (i.e., a decrease in distance), 
knowledge is accumulated. 
At the empirical level, several lines of research provide support for the idea that 
knowledge increases with decreasing distance. At its core, CLT is built on the idea that 
reduced distance results in more fine-grained, more detailed mental representations that 
render specific knowledge more accessible (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 
2006; Henderson et al., 2006). When the amount of (visual) information is high, objects are 
conceptually associated with lower psychological distances (Steidle, Werth, & Hanke, 2011). 
Likewise, taking over an immersed instead of a distanced perspective reduces the feeling of 
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having limited knowledge (Kross & Grossmann, 2012). As a consequence, certainty and 
precision are higher when judging psychologically close rather than distant objects (Krüger, 
Fiedler, Koch, & Alves, 2014; Maglio & Trope, 2011). 
Psychological Distance affects LPA via knowledge. Based on the idea that 
knowledge varies with psychological distance, we expect distance to affect LPA due to 
differences in price knowledge. When distance is high, consumers have only little knowledge 
about a product’s typical price distribution. Lacking experiences with what is commonly paid 
for a product, consumers should be more willing to accept even relatively extreme prices. 
When distance is low, however, experiences with typical retail prices are more frequent and, 
therefore, consumers can be expected to narrow down their limits of acceptable prices. For 
instance, in their hometown, consumers accumulate many experiences with the prevailing 
price norms giving rise to very narrow and fine-grained representation of what prices can be 
considered acceptable. In contrast, in a rarely visited foreign city, consumers lack such 
specific price knowledge and, therefore, have to rely on coarser price representations when 
determining their acceptability limits. 
The present research thus aims to marry two lines of research which so far have not 
yet been connected in order to derive novel hypotheses in an applied consumer context. On 
the one hand, previous research on CLT has demonstrated that people adjust the precision and 
width of their response categories to the psychological distance of the object to be judged – 
people characterize distal targets by coarser mental units and wider intervals than close targets 
(Krüger et al., 2014). On the other hand, previous research on price expectations has 
demonstrated that being knowledgeable and certain about market prices reduces the range of 
prices a consumer accepts to pay for a certain product (Kalyanaram & Little, 1994; Kosenko 
& Rahtz, 1988; Mazumdar & Jun, 1992). 
Integrating these two lines of research, the present work applies the influence of 
distance on interval estimates in the price context and extends the existing literature by 
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investigating the mediational role of price knowledge in this regard. Moreover, by inquiring 
about purchase intentions and price attractiveness ratings, we are able to unveil the 
consequences of distance-evoked differences in quantitative judgments known from the CLT 
literature (Krüger et al., 2014; Maglio & Trope, 2011) in terms for their evaluative impact in 
the price domain. 
Hypotheses 
Based on our reasoning about the relationship of psychological distance, price 
knowledge and LPA, we expect consumer’s LPA to increase with increasing distance. At the 
same time, we expect price knowledge to decrease with increasing psychological distance and 
to mediate the influence of distance on LPA. Moreover, drawing on range theory (Janiszewski 
& Lichtenstein, 1999; Volkmann, 1951) and social judgment theory (M. Sherif & Hovland, 
1961), we expect distance-related differences in LPA to affect price evaluations and purchase 
decisions. The wider a consumer’s tolerance limits, the higher the willingness to accept a 
specific retail price, because the likelihood that this particular price is included in the  LPA is 
higher for wider intervals. Particularly, when it comes to judging prices at the upper boundary 
of the acceptability range (i.e., prices significantly above average market value), LPA should 
be of relevance, because, in this region of the price dimension, differences in LPA are more 
likely to affect whether a retail price is part of the interval, or not. However, when it comes to 
judging prices that are close to the center of the range, LPA can be expected to be of less 
concern, because average prices will be included in most consumers’ LPA independent of the 
width. 
Overview of the Studies 
Six studies were designed to test our hypotheses. The first block of studies (Study 1-3) 
investigated the general relation of distance and LPA; the second block of studies (Study 4-6) 
explored the role of knowledge as an underlying psychological process as well as the 
implications of distance-related differences in LPA for consumer decision making. In 
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particular, in Study 1, we manipulated spatial distance by collecting data from two different 
cities comparing LPA in a bidirectional way (i.e., for each city, from a close and a distant 
perspective). In Study 2, drawing on the direct relationship of psychological distance and 
construal level (Trope & Liberman, 2010), we manipulated participants’ mindset construal 
level before they indicated their LPA for a series of typical consumer products. And in Study 
3, we manipulated social distance via ownership and assessed LPA for owners versus non-
owners of a coffee mug. 
Studies 4 and 5 followed an experimental-causal-chain design (Spencer, Zanna, & 
Fong, 2005) to establish the role of price knowledge as a mediator between distance and LPA. 
In particular, in Study 4, we manipulated spatial distance and measured its effect on price 
knowledge and LPA; additionally, a statistical mediation analysis was conducted. In Study 5, 
knowledge was experimentally manipulated to assess its causal influence on LPA in order to 
investigate the second path of the experimental causal chain. Finally, Studies 4 and 6 
investigated the consequences of distance-evoked differences in LPA for evaluations of 
elevated versus average prices and purchase intentions. 
We believe that these studies make a valuable contribution going beyond previous 
research for several reasons. First, despite the immediate relevance of psychological distance 
for modern consumer decision making, the implications of distance for price expectations 
have not yet been studied. With reference to psychological distance, several lines of prior 
research have focused on the importance of price as a product attribute (e.g., Bornemann & 
Homburg, 2011; Yan & Sengupta, 2011), yet this research is the first to investigate the direct 
consequences of distance on numerical price expectations and acceptability thresholds. 
Moreover, this investigation of the quantitative underpinnings of distance effects also 
contributes to the literature on CLT, particularly, with regard prior research on similarities 
(Goodman & Malkoc, 2012) and category inclusiveness (Liberman et al., 2002). We will 
return to these considerations in the general discussion.  
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Study 1: Spatial Distance 
Study 1 was designed to investigate whether LPA varies across spatial distance. If 
consumers indeed only have little direct experience with typical retail prices in distant versus 
close places, we expected them to have wider tolerance limits when distance is high. We 
tested this idea by collecting price expectation data for a common act of consumption (i.e., 
eating a pizza) from the perspective of two different cities: Mannheim and Cologne. 
Participants from each city provided their LPA for both their current location at the time of 
the experiment (spatially close) and the respective other city (spatially distant). Thus, in the 
present design, price ratings for both cities are available from a close as well as from a distant 
point of view such that it is possible to disentangle any specific effect of either of the two 
cities from the effect of spatial distance. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and twenty participants (47 men, 73 women; age M = 
22.30, SD = 2.97) from the University of Mannheim and the University of Cologne took part 
in the present experiment. The study followed a 2 (location of experiment: Mannheim vs. 
Cologne) × 2 (target city: Mannheim vs. Cologne) experimental design with the former and 
the latter factor varying between- and within-participants, respectively. 
Materials and procedure. In this experiment, participants were asked to imagine 
being interested in going out for eating a pizza. Critically, in counterbalanced order, they did 
this from a spatially close and a spatially distant perspective, which implied thinking about 
Mannheim and Cologne. For each city, participants indicated their price expectations for a 
pizza in interval format as a measure of LPA. That is, they indicated a minimal and a maximal 
price “that a restaurant in Mannheim[Cologne] charges for a pizza” in Euro. After providing 
price expectations for both places, participants filled out demographics and were debriefed 
and thanked. 
Results 
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LPA was calculated by subtracting the minimal from the maximal price for each city. 
Scores were submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA. As predicted, a significant 
interaction term emerged, F(1, 119) = 20.17, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .15 (see Figure 1). In particular, 
whereas Mannheim participants indicated a narrower LPA for the pizza in Mannheim (M = 
€10.65) than in Cologne (M = €11.72), paired t(59) = 2.55, p = .014, d = .33, Cologne 
participants indicated the exact opposite, namely, a narrower LPA for Cologne (M = €9.50) 
than  Mannheim (M = €11.11), paired t(59) = 3.80, p < .001, d = .58 (these and all following 
effect sizes of paired t-tests are corrected for dependence between means, see Morris & 
DeShon, 2002). Neither of the two main effects reached statistical significance, Fs < 1. 
Discussion 
  Study 1’s results provide first support for the idea that LPA differs for close versus 
distant places. In the proximity, people are restrictive in their judgments and consider only a 
narrow range of prices as typical for a specific product. In the distance, however, people are 
more lenient with regard to their price expectations. Not having much direct experience with 
the typical price distribution, people adjust their reference categories by forming a wider LPA. 
Notably, judgments only varied as a function of the distance from which they were made, but 
not as a function of the particular city to be judged illustrating the pervasiveness of the 
psychological construal of the prices across the two cities. 
Study 2: Construal Level 
CLT suggests a direct relationship between psychological distance and construal level 
(Bar-Anan, Liberman, & Trope, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Priming high (low) 
construal level increases (reduces) perceived psychological distances of objects and events to 
the self (Liberman & Förster, 2009). Drawing on this reasoning, in Study 2, we manipulated 
participants’ mindset level of construal before they indicated their LPA for a series of 
consumer electronics products that were handed to them by the experimenter. We expected 
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wider price latitudes for participants who were primed with a high- rather than a low-level of 
construal. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-eight student participants (24 men, 44 women; age M = 24.40, SD 
= 5.03) from a large public university participated in the present study and were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions (i.e., high-level versus low-level construal). 
Due to the linguistic requirements of the manipulation, only native speakers were accepted as 
participants.  
Materials and procedure. The study consisted of two paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires which were presented as independent studies to the participants. The first task 
was the construal level mindset manipulation. Drawing on previous work (Fujita, Trope, 
Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Henderson et al., 2006; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), participants 
were provided with a list of 30 objects (e.g., flower, chair, mammal). For each of the 30 
objects, dependent on condition, participants were either asked to “find the general category 
for each example” (high-level construal) or to “find a specific example of each category” 
(low-level construal). Generating abstract categories versus generating concrete examples 
primes high-level and low-level construal, respectively. 
The second task consisted of the dependent measure and was presented as an unrelated 
consumer science study. In this part of the study, participants were brought five consumer 
electronics products (one at a time) to their individual cubicle and asked to provide their 
minimal and their maximal price expectation about it. The items were a DSLR camera, a 
laptop, a computer keyboard, a digital camera and a webcam. After exploring each product, 
participants answered the main dependent variable assessing LPA (“The price for this [DSLR 
camera] lies in between ____€ and ____€.”). Finally, they provided demographic 
information. 
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Results and Discussion 
Due to significant absolute differences in prices between the products (e.g., laptop vs. 
webcam), LPAs were z-standardized, before an average score across items was calculated (α 
= .77). As expected, the construal level priming affected LPA in the same way as 
psychological distance did in the previous study. Participants in the high-level construal 
condition (Z = 0.17) provided wider price ranges than participants in the low-level construal 
condition (Z = -0.18), t(66) = 2.05, p = .045, d = .50. Results were consistent across all five 
items. 
Study 2’s results demonstrate that LPA also varies as a function of construal level. 
Participants who were primed to construe their environment at a high level of abstraction 
provided wider LPAs than participants how were primed with a low-level construal. Notably, 
the products to be judged were identical between the two conditions. Differences in 
participants’ mental construal of the products alone were sufficient to affect their price 
judgments. 
Study 3: Social Distance 
The goal of Study 3 was to investigate psychological ownership as a ubiquitous form 
of social distance in everyday consumer decision making. Psychological ownership can be 
defined as the “state where an individual feels as though the target of ownership or a piece of 
that target is ‘theirs’” (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003, p. 86). It goes beyond mere legal 
ownership, because it also entails the cognitive-affective states of liking and familiarity with a 
target object (Reb & Connolly, 2007). Owned objects become part of the extended self (Belk, 
1988) and are more frequently part of a person’s direct experience (Pierce et al., 2003). In line 
with the idea that ownership constitutes a facet of social distance, a direct link between 
ownership and construal level has recently been demonstrated (Irmak, Wakslak, & Trope, 
2013). 
In Study 3, we tested whether ownership influences LPA. To that end, participants 
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were either endowed with a coffee mug (owners) or not (non-owners) following Reb and 
Connolly’s (2007) procedure to manipulate ownership. Then, they generated an interval 
estimate of the mug’s price. We expected owners to form a narrower LPA than non-owners. 
Method 
Participants. Seventy-nine student participants (19 men, 60 women; age M = 22.30, 
SD = 4.29) from a large public university took part in the present experiment in exchange for 
a mug or chocolate of equal value. The study was part of a larger experimental session and 
participants were randomly assigned to either the owner or the non-owner condition. 
Materials and procedure. In the laboratory, participants were seated at separate 
cubicles without visual access to each other. In total, they worked on several experiments for 
about 60 minutes. Right at the beginning of the experimental session, owners received a 
regular white coffee mug and brief written instructions stating that in addition to their 
financial compensation they would also receive a coffee mug which they “now own and can 
take home after finishing the experiment”. In contrast, non-owners received neither a mug nor 
any instructions relevant to the present study, but immediately started working on unrelated 
experiments. Participants in both conditions worked on unrelated tasks for about 50 minutes 
before the beginning of the present study. During that period of time, owners in contrast to 
non-owners were given the opportunity to establish a feeling of psychological ownership for 
the mug (cf. Reb & Connolly, 2007). 
Upon completion of the unrelated tasks, non-owners received the same mug as the 
owners did before. However, non-owners were instructed to “return this mug to the 
experimenter […] after finishing the experiment” to ensure that none of them believed the 
mug to be theirs. Then, participants in both conditions worked on a questionnaire with the 
dependent measures. In particular, they first indicated their LPA for the mug (“The price of 
my (the) mug lies in between ____€ and ____€.”). Next, they answered three questions 
assessing social distance. In particular, on 7-point rating scales, participants rated perceived 
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closeness (“How close is the mug to you?”), distance (“How large do you judge the distance 
between you and the mug to be?”), and liking of the mug (“How much do you like the 
mug?”). An explanatory note accompanied the closeness and distance question to increase 
their understandability. At the end of the experiment, participants filled out demographics, 
were thanked, debriefed, and could either take home the mug (owners) or received chocolate 
of equal value (non-owners) as compensation.  
Results and Discussion 
LPA was computed by subtracting the minimal from the maximal price estimate for 
the mug. Based on the high internal consistency of the social distance items (α = .75; distance 
coded reversely), we computed an aggregate score by averaging the three respective scales. 
Data from one outlier were excluded for being more than 3.3 standard deviations above the 
mean response of all other participants (cf. Osborne & Overbay, 2004). 
First, we analyzed the manipulation check. Providing evidence for a successful 
manipulation, participants in the ownership condition (M = 3.87) perceived the mug as 
socially closer than participants in the non-ownership condition (M = 4.38), t(76) = 1.72, p = 
.044, d = .40 (one-tailed). Next, we analyzed LPA. In line with our hypothesis, owners (M = 
€2.39) provided narrower expected price ranges than non-owners (M = €3.35), t(76) = 1.99, p 
= .050, d = .45. In fact, endowing participants with the mug and giving them additional time 
to establish a feeling of ownership toward it was enough to reduce their LPA by roughly 30%. 
Study 3 replicates the effect of distance on LPA with regard to one of the most 
relevant forms of social distance for consumer decision making: psychological ownership. 
Owners who are relatively more familiar with a product provide a more specific price 
estimate for that product than non-owners who are relatively unfamiliar with it. Again, the 
mug to be judged was identical across conditions, participants’ construal of it was sufficient to 
affect their price expectations. 
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Studies 4-6: Underlying Psychological Process  
and Implications for Consumer Behavior 
Thus far, three studies provided converging evidence for differences in LPA as a 
function of the spatial distance, the construal level and the social distance of the product to be 
judged. In the following studies, we will test our hypothesis that knowledge acts as a critical 
mediator between distance and LPA in an experimental-causal-chain design (Spencer et al., 
2005) as well as via statistical mediation. In Study 4, we manipulate distance and investigate 
its direct effect on LPA and knowledge, as well as its indirect effect on LPA via knowledge. 
In Study 5, we investigate whether knowledge causally affects LPA by manipulating it in 
order to provide experimental evidence for our mediational hypothesis. Finally, Studies 4 and 
6 explore the implications of distance-evoked differences in LPA for consumer behavior. In 
particular, we test our hypothesis that particularly elevated (vs. average) prices are evaluated 
more positively when consumers when psychological distance is high. 
Study 4: Knowledge as a Mediator 
People have less direct experience with psychologically distant rather than close 
objects. As a consequence, they are less knowledgeable about distant objects and have to 
resort to coarser response categories when judging them. Based on this reasoning, we 
designed Study 4 to measure knowledge as an underlying mechanism through which we 
expected psychological distance to affect LPA. We presented participants with five cities that 
differed in terms of their psychological distance. For each city, participants indicated their 
LPA for a typical consumer product (a cup of coffee) and their knowledge about its price 
distribution in the respective city. Then, they judged the attractiveness of an elevated price for 
that product. Because elevated prices are close to the boundary of most participants’ 
acceptability range, their evaluation should be particularly susceptible to differences in LPA. 
Finally, participants indicated whether they would purchase the expensive product. 
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Method 
Participants. Eighty student participants (26 men, 54 women; age M = 22.29, SD = 
5.85) from University of Heidelberg participated in the current experiment. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were presented with five cities in random 
order that differed in terms of their psychological distance. The cities were the participant’s 
hometown (defined as the place where they spent most of their lives; participants entered the 
name of this city themselves), Heidelberg (their current place of living; on average 
participants lived there for about one year), Hamburg (a distant domestic city), Salzburg (a 
distant foreign city) and New York (a very distant foreign city).   
For each of these cities, participants completed the following four dependent 
measures. First, they indicated how much knowledge they had about coffee prices in that 
specific location (“How good do you judge your knowledge about coffee prices in [city] to 
be”). Second, they indicated their LPA by providing a minimal and a maximal price estimate 
for a coffee in the respective city. Third, participants judged the attractiveness of a 
particularly expensive coffee (“How attractive do you consider €2.50 as a price for a cup of 
coffee in [city]”) and, fourth, they indicated their likelihood of accepting this offer (“How 
likely is it that you would purchase a cup of coffee for €2.50 in [city]”). The elevated price 
level was determined in a pretest with eleven independent participants who provided a single 
estimate for an average price of a coffee. We added an extra 50% to their mean estimate (M= 
€1.69, SD = 0.23€) and arrived at €2.50 as the elevated price used in the present study. Upon 
completion of all four items for each location, participants rated their price knowledge and 
LPA once more by rank-ordering the five cities in terms of the two dimensions. Finally, they 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Due to the repeated measurement of variables within the same participant, linear 
mixed models were used to analyze the data. To keep analyses consistent, all mixed models 
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followed the same procedure: Variables were standardized, covariance matrices were 
specified as unstructured and REML estimation procedures were used. Also, we combined 
both knowledge and both LPA ratings into a single knowledge and a single LPA variable, 
respectively. 
First, we analyzed the effects of psychological distance on the four dependent 
variables computing four separate mixed models. With increasing psychological distance 
(dummy coded: higher values = higher distance), we expected (a) knowledge about coffee 
prices to decrease, (b) LPA to increase, (c) the evaluation of the elevated price to become 
more positive, and (d) purchase intentions to become more pronounced. Throughout all 
analyses, we entered the intercept and distance as within-participants factors as random 
effects to our model.  
Statistical analyses confirmed all four hypotheses (see Figure 2). The higher the 
distance to a city, the lower participants judged their knowledge about coffee prices in that 
city to be, F(1,79) = 187.98, p < .001 (see Table 1 for regression coefficients). At the same 
time, LPA increased with increasing distance, F(1,79) = 620.43, p < .001. Moreover, when 
the city was more distant, participants evaluated the elevated coffee price offer more 
favorably, F(1,79) = 61.13, p < .001, and indicated higher purchase intentions for the coffee, 
F(1,79) = 27.02, p < .001. As another way to analyze the data, we coded for each participant 
whether the elevated price (€2.50) was included in the individual LPA (0 = no; 1 = yes). In a 
general linear mixed model for analyzing repeated measurements of binary data, the elevated 
price was more often included in a participant’s LPA the higher the psychological distance, 
F(1, 79) = 24.88, p < .001. 
 Next, we analyzed our process model of knowledge mediating the influence of 
psychological distance on LPA in a mixed model mediation analysis. Following Bauer et al.’s 
(2006) procedure, a significant indirect effect of psychological distance on participants’ LPA 
via knowledge emerged, 99% CI [.080, .248] (see Table 1 for regression coefficients). 
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Discussion 
Study 4 extends the findings obtained in the previous studies in two crucial regards. 
First, the present results provide empirical evidence for the role of knowledge as a mediating 
variable between psychological distance and LPA. It is due to consumers’ lower knowledge 
about the distribution of typical retail prices in a distant city that they accept a wider range of 
prices as compared with a close city where they are more price knowledgeable and, therefore, 
more restrictive in their judgments. Second, as a consequence of these distance-related 
differences in LPA, consumers are more likely to accept an expensive offer the higher its 
psychological distance. Results indicated that an offer priced 50% above the average product 
price is more likely to be included in a consumers’ LPA when distance is high. Consequently, 
from a psychologically distant point of view, consumers are more willing to tolerate the 
elevated price as indicated by more positive attractiveness ratings and stronger purchase 
intentions. 
Study 5: Knowledge as a Causal Influence 
To validate the role of price knowledge as an underlying psychological process 
beyond statistical mediation, the purpose of Study 5 was to investigate knowledge’s causal 
influence on LPA following the logic of an experimental-causal-chain design (Spencer et al., 
2005). That is, after having demonstrated a causal relationship between distance and 
knowledge in Study 4, we now investigate the causal influence of knowledge on LPA. To that 
end, participants provided their LPA for a coffee with regard to a city they knew much about 
and a city they knew practically nothing about. To assess the unique influence of knowledge 
on LPA, we also assessed and controlled for differences in spatial distance of the two cities. 
Method 
Seventy-six US-Americans (52 men, 24 women; age M = 31.43, SD = 8.52) 
participated in this online experiment via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; see 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). At the beginning of the experiment, participants were 
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asked to enter the name of the US-American city that they “currently know most about” and 
the name of a city that they “practically don’t know anything about”. These two cities served 
as the within-participants manipulation of knowledge in the subsequent price estimation task. 
Upon entering the two city names, participants were informed that we were interested 
in their price expectations for a regular 12oz. coffee. Next, they indicated their LPA for the 
first city (i.e., high- or low-knowledge; order counterbalanced) by selecting a minimal and a 
maximal price from a dropdown menu (“What do you estimate the typical selling price for a 
regular 12oz. coffee to be in [city]?”). Then, they answered the same item with regard to the 
respective other city (i.e., low- or high-knowledge). After providing ratings for both cities, 
participants indicated the spatial distance of each city on a 7-point rating scale. Finally, they 
filled out demographics and were thanked, debriefed, and compensated for their participation.  
Results and Discussion 
Replicating the correlational data from the previous study, knowledge had a significant 
causal influence on participants’ LPA, paired t(75) = 2.69, p = .009, d = .31. LPA was 
significantly narrower for the high- (M = $1.30) than the low-knowledge judgment (M = 
$1.47).  
Additionally, we assessed whether this finding would hold even when controlling for 
differences in spatial distance. Note that this represents a rather conservative test of our 
hypothesis as we also excluded knowledge’s variance that is shared with distance. Due to the 
extremely high intercorrelation of distance and knowledge, standardized β = .879, t(75) = 
19.68, p <.001, it was not possible to include both variables as predictors into the same 
regression analysis without running into the problem of multicollinearity. Therefore, we 
controlled for distance by restricting our analysis to those participants who indicated similar 
spatial distances for the two cities (i.e., all differences below the median of differences). Only 
including answers for similarly distant cities, LPA still varied across the high- (M = $1.30, SD 
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= $0.58) and low-knowledge judgment (M = $1.52, SD = $0.77), paired t(38) = 2.41, p = .021, 
d = .41. 
Study 5 completes the picture with regard to role of knowledge for LPA. Consumers 
can be relatively certain when judging prices in a place they know much about; accordingly, 
they narrow down their LPA. For unfamiliar places, however, they have much less experience 
with the specific characteristics that might justify a particular price expectation – facing an 
impoverished informational background, price interval judgments are more lenient. Taken 
together, Studies 4 and 5 provide consistent statistical as well as causal evidence for the role 
of knowledge as an underlying process mediating the influence of psychological distance on 
LPA. 
Study 6: Implications for Price Evaluations and  
Purchase Intentions 
The central goal of Study 6 was to highlight the implications of distance-related 
differences in LPA for price evaluations and purchase intentions. If it is indeed the inclusion 
versus exclusion of a particular price in a consumer’s individual LPA that determines how an 
offer is evaluated, LPA should be more relevant for the evaluation of an extreme versus an 
average price. Any price that is relatively close to the boundaries of the acceptability range 
should be more susceptible to differences in latitude of acceptance than a more central value, 
which, for most people, should be considered acceptable mostly independent of LPA. 
To test these ideas, we investigated price evaluations and purchase intentions for a 
movie ticket as a function of price level (average vs. elevated) and spatial distance. According 
to Variety magazine, the average price for a movie ticket in the United States in 2013 was 
$8.38 (Saperstein, 2013, July 19). Thus, we used $8.00 and $12.50 (i.e., $8.38 plus ~50%) as 
ticket prices in the average and the elevated price condition. We expected distance to exert a 
stronger influence on evaluations of the elevated rather than the average price. Moreover, only 
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for the elevated price, we expected distance’s influence on price evaluations to be mediated 
via LPA.  
Note that the expected moderation of price level as well as the mediation via LPA also 
allow us to demonstrate the significance of LPA beyond the role of desirability versus 
feasibility concerns as a potential alternative account (desirable offers can be expected to 
become more attractive with increasing distance; see Liberman & Trope, 1998). We will 
return to this argument in the discussion section of this study. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and fifty-five US-Americans (102 men, 53 women; age M 
= 32.78, SD = 11.30) participated in this study via MTurk. The experiment followed a 2 
(spatial distance: low vs. high) × 2 (price level: average vs. elevated) experimental design 
with the former and the latter factor varying within- and between-participants, respectively.  
Materials and procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants entered 
the name of a spatially close (“the city where you are right now”) and a spatially distant US-
American city (“a city which is very distant form where you are right now”). Next, they 
answered the following dependent variables separately for both cities (city order was 
counterbalanced). First, participants indicated their expectations about the lowest and the 
highest price “that a movie theater in [city] charges for a movie ticket”. Then, dependent on 
condition, they evaluated either the average ($8.00) or the elevated ticket price ($12.50) in 
terms of price attractiveness (“How attractive do you consider $[price] as a price for a movie 
ticket in [city]?”; 7-point scale) and purchase intentions (“If you had to make a choice, would 
you purchase a movie ticket in [city] for $[price]?”; dichotomous choice). After all judgments 
were provided for the first city (close vs. distant), participants answered the same items for the 
second city (distant vs. close). Finally, they indicated their price knowledge about each city on 
a five-point scale. 
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Results 
First, we assessed the effects of psychological distance on LPA and knowledge as well 
as the relationship between the two. Replicating the results from the previous studies, 
acceptability ranges were wider for the spatially distant (M = $6.91) than for the spatially 
close city (M = $6.18), paired t(154) = 3.47, p < .001, d = .28. Also, knowledge was lower for 
the distant (M =2.37) than for the close city (M = 4.67), paired t(154) = 20.61, p < .001, d = 
2.04, and LPA and knowledge were negatively related, β = -.16, t(86.69) = 3.06, p = .003. 
Price attractiveness ratings. We analyzed participants’ price evaluations in a 2 
(spatial distance: low vs. high) × 2 (price level: average vs. elevated) mixed-model ANOVA. 
As predicted, a significant interaction emerged whereby the effect of spatial distance was 
more pronounced for the elevated (Mclose_city = 2.18 vs. Mdistant_city = 3.49, t(75) = 6.25, p < 
.001, d = .72) than for the average price (Mclose_city = 4.92 vs. Mdistant_city = 5.58, t(75) = 3.79, p 
< .001, d = .43), F(1, 153) = 5.67, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .04. Also, the average price (M = 5.23) was 
judged as more attractive than the elevated price (M = 2.84), F(1, 153) = 122.78, p < .001, ηp
2
 
= .45, and prices were generally judged more favorably for the distant (M = 4.55) than for the 
close city (M = 3.58), F(1, 153) = 52.53, p  < .001, ηp
2
 = .26. 
Next, we tested whether LPA similarly was more significant to evaluations of elevated 
rather than average prices in a linear mixed model analysis with LPA, price level (dummy 
coded: 0 = elevated; 1 = average), and their interaction term as predictors. We included LPA 
(within-participants factor) and the intercept as random effects to the model. Price level 
predicted attractiveness, F(1, 147.81) = 119.04, p < .001, LPA predicted attractiveness, F(1, 
60.42) = 5.94, p = .018, and the interaction between the two was marginally significant, F(1, 
60.33) = 2.90, p = .094 (see Table 2). We broke down the interaction term by analyzing the 
two price levels in separate mixed models. As expected, LPA predicted price attractiveness 
when price level was elevated, F(1, 28.96) = 8.09, p = .008, however not when it was average, 
F<1. Thus, the results of the LPA-analysis dovetail nicely with the analysis of spatial 
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distance: Both LPA and distance are more predictive for attractiveness ratings of elevated 
rather than average prices. 
To find out whether LPA mediated the effect of distance on price attractiveness 
ratings, we conducted a mixed effects mediation analysis (Bauer et al., 2006). We entered 
spatial distance as the predictor, LPA as the mediator, and price attractiveness ratings as the 
dependent variable. Analyzing only elevated prices, a significant indirect effect emerged 
whereby LPA mediated the influence of spatial distance on price attractiveness, 95% CI [.004, 
.135]. However, as to be expected from the previous analyses, the corresponding indirect 
effect for average prices did not reach statistical significance, 95% CI [-.098, .042]. 
Purchase intentions. We analyzed participants’ purchase intentions in a generalized 
linear mixed model for analyzing dichotomous dependent variables. Mirroring the results of 
the price attractiveness ratings, the analysis indicated a significant effect of distance, F(1, 
153) = 10.43, p = .001, a significant effect of price level, F(1, 153) = 55.77, p < .001, and – 
most pertinent to our main hypothesis – a significant interaction, F(1, 153) = 4.99, p = .026 
(see Figure 3). To break down the interaction term, we conducted two separate McNemar 
tests. As expected, at the average price level (N = 79), there was no difference between the 
close (78.5% of participants indicated they would purchase the ticket) and the distant city 
(83.5%), p = .48. However, at the elevated price level (N = 76), spatial distance mattered 
considerably: Almost three times as many participants were willing to purchase the movie 
ticket in the distant (44.7%) as compared with the close location (15.8%), p < .001. 
Inclusion of price in LPA. As an additional way to analyze the data we investigated, 
first, whether distance and price level affected whether the ticket’s specific retail price (i.e., 
$8.00 and $12.50, respectively) was included in participants’ LPA or not, and, second, 
whether price inclusion was related to attractiveness ratings and purchase intentions. For that 
purpose, we created a dummy variable that coded whether the retail price was included in 
participants’ LPA (0 = not included; 1 = included). We submitted this price inclusion variable 
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to a linear mixed model analysis. Results indicated a significant main effects of distance, F(1, 
153) = 69.87, p < .001, and price level, F(1, 153) = 79.55, p < .001. In particular, the retail 
price was more often included in participants’ LPA in the distant (90.3% of LPAs include the 
retail price) rather than close city (63.2%), and when the price was average (95.5%) rather 
than elevated (57.2%). Most relevant with regard to our main hypothesis, these main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 153) = 41.42, p < .001. Breaking down this 
interaction in two separate McNemar tests, at the average price level (N = 79), inclusion was 
at a very high level for both, the distant (98.7%) and the close city (92.4%), p = .13. At the 
elevated price level (N = 76), however, inclusion was about 2.5 times higher when distance 
was high (81.6%) rather than low (32.9%), p < .001. 
Finally, we analyzed whether price inclusion mattered for price attractiveness ratings 
and purchase intentions. Highlighting the importance of LPA for consumer decision making, 
both price attractiveness ratings, F(1, 153) = 200.07, p < .001 (Mincluded = 4.76 vs. Mnot_included 
= 1.78), and purchase intentions, F(1, 153) = 41.63, p < .001 (70.6% [included] vs. 8.3% [not 
included] of participants indicated they would purchase the ticket), were much higher when 
the retail price was included in a participant’s LPA than when this was not the case. 
Discussion 
Study 6 highlights, the substantial consequences of distance-evoked differences in 
LPA for the evaluation of (elevated) retail prices as well as price level as a critical boundary 
condition for the effect of distance on purchase decisions to occur. Having wider acceptability 
limits in distant versus close locations, consumers are more likely to include an elevated price 
in their LPA and, as a consequence, evaluate an offer as more attractive. However, this effect 
of distance is attenuated (attractiveness ratings) or even vanishes completely (purchase 
intentions) when consumers judge average prices. At the theoretical level, this moderation by 
price level substantiates our reasoning about the significance of LPA particularly when it 
comes to judging values at the boundaries of the range – differences in acceptability limits do 
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not matter equally for all decision but they matter specifically for those decisions in which 
extreme rather than average values are to be judged. 
Finally, Study 6’s design is elucidative in terms of ruling out the role of desirability 
versus feasibility concerns as a potential alternative account to explain why offers appear as 
more attractive when distance is high. According to such an account (Liberman & Trope, 
1998), with increasing distance, people would focus less on the feasibility (e.g., retail price) 
and more on the desirability (e.g., utility) of an offer resulting in more positive evaluations of 
desirable products. And indeed, the main effects of psychological distance in our results 
generally support such reasoning. Yet, the interaction with price level that was obtained 
beyond these main effects highlights the critical role of LPA over and above the desirability 
account: If it was only for their higher desirability / lower feasibility that distant products 
become more attractive, this effect should be obtained for both elevated and average prices 
(note that, within each price level, the offer stays perfectly constant and it is only distance that 
varies). However, in support of the present research’s account, results clearly indicate that 
price level moderates the distance effect. Moreover, providing additional evidence for the 
critical role of LPA, Study 6’s mediation analysis revealed that distance’s influence on price 
evaluations was mediated via LPA. 
General Discussion 
Psychological distance affects consumers’ price expectations and, therefore, their price 
evaluations and purchase intentions. Consumers are more restrictive in their latitude of 
acceptance when judging prices of psychologically close rather than distant products. As a 
consequence, the very same offer can be rejected from a psychologically close perspective, 
where LPAs are narrow, but still be accepted from a psychologically distant perspective, 
where LPAs are broad. 
Obtaining converging evidence across different methods, we investigated the impact 
of spatial distance (Studies 1, 4, and 6), construal level (Study 2), social distance (Study 3) 
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and knowledge (Study 5) on LPA. Spatial distance was manipulated by contrasting judgments 
across two cities in a bidirectional analysis (Study 1), by presenting participants with a list of 
experimenter-selected cities (Study 4), and by making participants self-generate close and 
distant locations (Study 6). Across these diverse operationalizations, results uniformly support 
our prediction of increasing LPA with increasing distance. Additionally, Studies 4 and 5 
provide statistical as well as experimental evidence for knowledge as a mediator between 
distance and LPA. The more distant a product, the less knowledgeable consumers feel about 
its typical price distribution thereby increasing their LPA. Finally, Studies 4 and 6 
investigated the implications of distance-evoked differences in LPA for consumer decision 
making. In particular, the evaluation of elevated relative to average prices was affected by 
LPA. Consumers’ wider acceptability limits from a distant perspective increased the 
likelihood of elevated prices to be included in their LPA and, therefore, their intention to 
purchase the respective product. 
Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
Consumers employ price expectations as internal benchmarks to which they compare 
observed prices when making purchase decisions (Kalyanaram & Winer, 1995). The present 
research highlights the importance of psychological distance for the formation of such internal 
reference standards. We believe that the current approach has significant implications for 
several bodies of research as well as for the development of future marketing strategies. 
Assortment size preferences. Goodman and Malkoc (2012) showed that consumers 
see different alternatives in an assortment as more alike and substitutable when distance is 
high rather than low (see Jing, Zixi, & Dhar, 2013, for a similar effect of construal level). The 
present research may add to the understanding of this finding: Building on the idea of more 
leniently defined category boundaries for distant versus close objects, it can be expected that 
product attributes are more likely to overlap. As a consequence, different alternatives should 
be perceived as more similar. Also, Liberman et al.’s (2002) demonstration of higher category 
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inclusiveness with increasing distance dovetails nicely with such reasoning. Distant, broadly 
defined categories highlight similarities and inclusive thinking, whereas close, narrowly 
defined categories highlight differences and exclusive thinking. 
Beyond prices. The present research has been concerned with the formation of price 
expectations. However, other dimensions of consumer decision making may be affected by 
psychological distance in a similar vein. Acceptability thresholds are essential to most if not 
all dimensional criteria of product evaluation. For instance, customer satisfaction varies 
significantly as a function of whether beef is perceived as “tender” (Miller, Carr, Ramsey, 
Crockett, & Hoover, 2001), or whether waiting time is seen as “unacceptably long” (Chebat & 
Filiatrault, 1993). Drawing on the present research, future studies should investigate the 
influence of psychological distance on latitude of acceptance within other dimensions of 
product evaluation, too. 
Factual distance versus psychological distance. Adopting the design of other 
psychological distance studies (Trope & Liberman, 2010), participants provided judgments 
either from a short or a long distance perspective for otherwise identical target items. Yet, in 
the case of price judgments, one might argue that (a) factual differences in prices as well as 
(b) factual differences in consumers’ knowledge about these prices may underlie the effects 
obtained in the present studies. With regard to factual differences in prices, several aspects of 
our studies took care of this potential confound: For instance, in Study 1, participants 
provided judgments for the same two cities either from a short or a long distance perspective, 
demonstrating the independence of the particular city to be judged from the effect of distance. 
Yet, the argument remains that factual differences in price knowledge may underlie the 
distance effects obtained in our studies. In this regard, Study 2 (priming construal level) and 
Study 3 (manipulating ownership), provide solid evidence for our idea that subjective 
construals are sufficient to produce the effect.  
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Also, in the real world, factual distance and psychological distance can be expected to 
highly correlate. Taking the definition of psychological distance as amount of direct 
experience (Trope & Liberman, 2010) seriously, objects that are factually very close will have 
a much greater likelihood to enter an observer’s direct experience and, therefore, to be 
perceived as closer also psychologically. Nevertheless, on theoretical grounds, it surely is 
possible to disentangle both types of distances and to create experimental setups that 
orthogonalize the two. Future research may unveil potential differences between factual and 
psychological distances and investigate whether and how they relate to consumers’ price 
expectations. 
Managerial Implications 
Marketing strategies may benefit from taking psychological distance into account 
when determining optimal retail prices. With increasing distance and decreasing price 
knowledge, consumers accept a wider range of prices allowing retailers to raise the price 
level. For instance, the present research suggests that tourists would pay more for an identical 
product than locals. From a distanced perspective, tourists have less price knowledge and are 
thus less restrictive in their LPA. Similarly, marketing strategies that try to convince 
prospective customers of a product’s novelty or exoticness may increase consumers’ price 
tolerance limits towards these products. Conversely, by strategically inducing a short distance 
perspective onto a certain product, a competitor’s elevated price level may not be seen as 
tolerable anymore from a consumer’s point of view increasing the attractiveness of one’s own 
lower priced product. 
Conclusion 
In today’s globalized world, more and more options are available from a plethora of 
different places and vendors. The present research demonstrates that the psychological 
distance associated with an alternative has significant consequences for decisions about it. 
People know more about their immediate environment than they do about remote places. As a 
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consequence, they are restrictive in terms of accepting an offer in the here and now. In the 
distance, however, people are more lenient in their judgments and thus more willing to accept 
an offer which would likely be rejected in the proximity. 
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |99 
 
 
References 
Bar-Anan, Y., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2006). The association between psychological 
distance and construal level: Evidence from an implicit association test. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 135(4), 609-622.  
Bauer, D. J., Preacher, K. J., & Gil, K. M. (2006). Conceptualizing and testing random 
indirect effects and moderated mediation in multilevel models: new procedures and 
recommendations. Psychological Methods, 11(2), 142.  
Belk, R. W. (1988). Possessions and the extended self. Journal of Consumer Research, 139-
168.  
Bornemann, T., & Homburg, C. (2011). Psychological distance and the dual role of price. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 38(3), 490-504.  
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980 
Chandrashekaran, R., & Jagpal, H. (1995). Is there a well-defined internal reference price? 
Advances in Consumer Research, 22(1).  
Chebat, J.-C., & Filiatrault, P. (1993). The impact of waiting in line on consumers. 
International Journal of Bank Marketing, 11(2), 35-40.  
Cheng, L. L., & Monroe, K. B. (2013). An appraisal of behavioral price research (part 1): 
price as a physical stimulus. AMS Review, 3(3), 103-129.  
Eyal, T., Sagristano, M. D., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Chaiken, S. (2009). When values 
matter: Expressing values in behavioral intentions for the near vs. distant future. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(1), 35-43.  
Fiedler, K. (2007). Construal level theory as an integrative framework for behavioral 
decision-making research and consumer psychology. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 17(2), 101-106.  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |100 
 
 
Fujita, K., Henderson, M. D., Eng, J., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006). Spatial Distance and 
Mental Construal of Social Events. Psychological Science, 17(4), 278-282.  
Fujita, K., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Levin-Sagi, M. (2006). Construal levels and self-
control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(3), 351-367.  
Goodman, J. K., & Malkoc, S. A. (2012). Choosing here and now versus there and later: The 
moderating role of psychological distance on assortment size preferences. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 39(4), 751-768.  
Hamilton, R. W. (2014). Decisions at a Distance: Effects of Psychological Distance on 
Consumer Decision Making. JCR Research Curation, Spring 2014.  Retrieved April 3, 
2014, from http://www.ejcr.org/curations-9.html 
Henderson, M. D., Fujita, K., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006). Transcending the 'Here': The 
Effect of Spatial Distance on Social Judgment. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 91(5), 845-856. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.845 
Hovland, C. I., Harvey, O. J., & Sherif, M. (1957). Assimilation and contrast effects in 
reactions to communication and attitude change. The Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 55(2), 244-252. doi: 10.1037/h0048480 
Huber, J., & Puto, C. (1983). Market boundaries and product choice: Illustrating attraction 
and substitution effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 31-44.  
Irmak, C., Wakslak, C. J., & Trope, Y. (2013). Selling the Forest, Buying the Trees: The 
Effect of Construal Level on Seller- Buyer Price Discrepancy. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 40(2), 284-297. doi: 10.1086/670020 
Janiszewski, C., & Lichtenstein, Donald R. (1999). A Range Theory Account of Price 
Perception. Journal of Consumer Research, 25(4), 353-368. doi: 10.1086/209544 
Jing, X. U., Zixi, J., & Dhar, R. (2013). Mental Representation and Perceived Similarity: How 
Abstract Mindset Aids Choice from Large Assortments. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 50(4), 548-559.  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |101 
 
 
Kalyanaram, G., & Little, J. D. C. (1994). An Empirical Analysis of Latitude of Price 
Acceptance in Consumer Package Goods. Journal of Consumer Research, 21(3), 408-
418. doi: 10.2307/2489682 
Kalyanaram, G., & Winer, R. S. (1995). Empirical Generalizations from Reference Price 
Research. Marketing Science, 14(3), G161-G169. doi: 10.2307/184158 
Kim, K., Zhang, M., & Li, X. (2008). Effects of Temporal and Social Distance on Consumer 
Evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(4), 706-713. doi: 10.1086/592131 
Klein, N. M., & Oglethorpe, J. E. (1987). Cognitive Reference Points in Consumer Decision 
Making. Advances in Consumer Research, 14(1).  
Kosenko, R., & Rahtz, D. (1988). Buyer market price knowledge influence on acceptable 
price range and price limits. Advances in Consumer Research, 15(1), 328-334.  
Kross, E., & Grossmann, I. (2012). Boosting wisdom: Distance from the self enhances wise 
reasoning, attitudes, and behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
141(1), 43.  
Krüger, T., Fiedler, K., Koch, A. S., & Alves, H. (2014). Response Category Width as a 
Psychophysical Manifestation of Construal Level and Distance. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 40(4), 501-512. doi: 10.1177/0146167213517009 
Kumar, V., Karande, K., & Reinartz, W. J. (1998). The impact of internal and external 
reference prices on brand choice: The moderating role of contextual variables. Journal 
of Retailing, 74(3), 401-426. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-4359(99)80102-X 
Liberman, N., & Förster, J. (2009). Distancing from experienced self: How global-versus-
local perception affects estimation of psychological distance. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 97(2), 203-216.  
Liberman, N., Sagristano, M. D., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect of temporal distance on level 
of mental construal. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(6), 523-534.  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |102 
 
 
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability considerations in 
near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal construal theory. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 5-18.  
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now. 
Science, 322(5905), 1201-1205.  
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological distance. Social psychology: 
Handbook of basic principles, 2, 353-383.  
Lichtenstein, D. R., & Bearden, W. O. (1989). Contextual Influences on Perceptions of 
Merchant-Supplied Reference Prices. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(1), 55-66. 
doi: 10.2307/2489301 
Lichtenstein, D. R., Bloch, P. H., & Black, W. C. (1988). Correlates of Price Acceptability. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 243-252. doi: 10.2307/2489529 
Maglio, S. J., & Trope, Y. (2011). Scale and construal: How larger measurement units shrink 
length estimates and expand mental horizons. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 18(1), 
165-170.  
Martin, B. A. S., Gnoth, J., & Strong, C. (2009). Temporal construal in advertising. Journal of 
Advertising, 38(3), 5-20.  
Mayhew, G. E., & Winer, R. S. (1992). An Empirical Analysis of Internal and External 
Reference Prices Using Scanner Data. Journal of Consumer Research, 19(1), 62-70. 
doi: 10.2307/2489188 
Mazumdar, T., & Jun, S. Y. (1992). Effects of Price Uncertainty on Consumer Purchase 
Budget and Price Thresholds. Marketing letters, 3(4), 323-329. doi: 10.2307/40216271 
Mazumdar, T., Raj, S., & Sinha, I. (2005). Reference price research: review and propositions. 
Journal of Marketing, 69(4), 84-102.  
Mellers, B. A., & Cooke, A. D. (1994). Trade-offs depend on attribute range. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20(5), 1055-1066.  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |103 
 
 
Miller, M., Carr, M., Ramsey, C., Crockett, K., & Hoover, L. (2001). Consumer thresholds 
for establishing the value of beef tenderness. Journal of Animal Science, 79(12), 3062-
3068.  
Monroe, K. B. (1971). Measuring price thresholds by psychophysics and latitudes of 
acceptance. Journal of Marketing Research.  
Morris, S. B., & DeShon, R. P. (2002). Combining effect size estimates in meta-analysis with 
repeated measures and independent-groups designs. Psychological Methods, 7(1), 105.  
Osborne, J. W., & Overbay, A. (2004). The power of outliers (and why researchers should 
always check for them). Practical assessment, research & evaluation, 9(6), 1-12.  
Ostrom, T. M., & Upshaw, H. S. (1968). Psychological perspective and attitude change. In A. 
G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological foundations of 
attitudes (pp. 217-242). New York: Academic Press. 
Pierce, J. L., Kostova, T., & Dirks, K. T. (2003). The state of psychological ownership: 
Integrating and extending a century of research. Review of General Psychology, 7(1), 
84-107. doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.7.1.84 
Raman, K., & Bass, F. M. (2002). A general test of reference price theory in the presence of 
threshold effects. Tijdschrift voor Economie en management, 47(2), 205-226.  
Rao, A. R., & Sieben, W. A. (1992). The effect of prior knowledge on price acceptability and 
the type of information examined. Journal of Consumer Research, 19(2), 256-270.  
Reb, J., & Connolly, T. (2007). Possession, feelings of ownership and the endowment effect. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 107-114.  
Saperstein, P. (2013, July 19). Average Movie Ticket Price Is Highest Ever. Variety.com.  
Retrieved February 10, 2014, from http://variety.com/2013/film/news/average-movie-
ticket-price-is-highest-ever-1200565675/ 
Sherif, C. W. (1963). Social categorization as a function of latitude of acceptance and series 
range. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(2), 148.  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |104 
 
 
Sherif, M., & Hovland, C. I. (1961). Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in 
communication and attitude change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Sherif, M., Taub, D., & Hovland, C. I. (1958). Assimilation and contrast effects of anchoring 
stimuli on judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55(2), 150.  
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: why 
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining 
psychological processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 845.  
Steidle, A., Werth, L., & Hanke, E.-V. (2011). You Can’t See Much in the Dark: Darkness 
Affects Construal Level and Psychological Distance. Social Psychology, 42(3), 174-
184. doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000061 
Thurstone, L. L. (1927a). A law of comparative judgment. Psychological Review; 
Psychological Review, 34(4), 273.  
Thurstone, L. L. (1927b). A mental unit of measurement. Psychological Review, 34(6), 415.  
Torgerson, W. S. (1958). Thurstone's Judgment Scaling Model. In W. S. Torgerson (Ed.), 
Theory and methods of scaling (pp. 155-158). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110(3), 403-
421.  
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. 
Psychological Review, 117(2), 440-463.  
Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Wakslak, C. (2007). Construal levels and psychological distance: 
Effects on representation, prediction, evaluation, and behavior. Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 17(2), 83-95.  
Volkmann, J. (1951). Scales of Judgment and Their Implications for Social Psychology. In J. 
H. Rohrer & M. Sherif (Eds.), Social psychology at the crossroads; the University of 
Oklahoma lectures in social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 273-298). Oxford, UK: Harper. 
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |105 
 
 
Wakslak, C. J., & Trope, Y. (2009). The effect of construal level on subjective probability 
estimates. Psychological Science, 20(1), 52-58.  
Wakslak, C. J., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Alony, R. (2006). Seeing the forest when entry is 
unlikely: Probability and the mental representation of events. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 135(4), 641-653.  
Winer, R. S. (1986). A Reference Price Model of Brand Choice for Frequently Purchased 
Products. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(2), 250-256. doi: 10.2307/2489230 
Yan, D., & Sengupta, J. (2011). Effects of construal level on the price-quality relationship. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 38(2), 376-389.  
Yan, D., Sengupta, J., & Wyer Jr, R. S. (2014). Package size and perceived quality: The 
intervening role of unit price perceptions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 24(1), 4-
17. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcps.2013.08.001 
 
  
Price Acceptance Across Distance  Page |106 
 
 
Table 1 
Study 4: Standardized beta-weights for the four linear mixed models and the mediation 
analysis  
Predictor Outcome Variable β SE 95% CI t-value 
Psychological 
Distance 
Knowledge
a 
-.649 .047 -.743, -.555 -13.710*** 
LPA
c 
.708 .028 .651, .765 24.908*** 
Attractiveness .326 .042 .243, .409 7.818*** 
Purchase Intention .235 .045 .145, .325 5.199*** 
LPA
c’ 
.545 .038 .469, .621 14.198*** 
Knowledge LPA
b 
-.249 .045 -.339, -.159 -5.543*** 
 
Note: *** indicates p < .001. Superscript a, b, c and c’ indicate the respective paths of the 
mediation analysis of psychological distance on LPA via knowledge.
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Table 2 
Study 6: Standardized beta-weights for the linear mixed models regressing price 
attractiveness ratings on price level and latitude of price acceptance. 
Predictor Outcome Variable β SE 95% CI t-value 
Price level 
Attractiveness 
.584 .053 .478, .689 10.911*** 
LPA .129 .053 .023; .235 2.437* 
Price level × LPA -.090 .053 -.196, .016 1.704
†
 
LPA [only elevated] 
Attractiveness 
.218 .077 .061, .375 2.844** 
LPA [only average] .050 .069 -.088, .188 .720 
 
Note: *** indicates p < .001, ** indicates p < .01, * indicates p < .05, 
† 
indicates p < .010. The 
latter two analyses refer to the separate regressions that were conducted to break down the 
interaction only including judgments about either the elevated or the average price.
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Latitude of price acceptance as a function of spatial distance in Study 1. Congruent 
judgments (Mannheim—Mannheim; Cologne—Cologne) and incongruent judgments 
(Mannheim—Cologne; Cologne—Mannheim) represent low and high spatial distance, 
respectively. Error bars display +1 SE. 
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Figure 2. Knowledge, latitude of price acceptance, price attractiveness and purchase 
intentions as a function of psychological distance in Study 4. Y-axis displays z-standardized 
values. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of participants indicating that they would purchase the cinema ticket as a 
function of price level and spatial distance in Study 6. 
  
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Elevated ($12.50) Average ($8.00)
Price Level 
Low Spatial Distance High Spatial Distance
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Presenter’s Paradox Revisited: An Evaluation Mode Account 
 
Tobias Krüger, André Mata and Max Ihmels 
University of Heidelberg 
Presenter’s Paradox Revisited  Page |112 
 
 
Abstract 
Three experimental studies demonstrate that evaluation mode influences the assessment of 
product bundles. Consumers’ preferences for product bundles are more pronounced in a joint 
evaluation mode, where the bundle is directly contrasted to its single counterpart (i.e., the 
bundle without its add-on), than in a separate evaluation mode, where the bundle is evaluated 
in isolation. An attentional explanation is suggested: Consumers pay more attention to the 
unique features of a product bundle (i.e., the add-on) and, therefore, prefer the bundle more 
strongly in joint rather than in separate evaluation. This account bears relevance for the 
presenter’s paradox (Weaver, Garcia, and Schwarz, 2012), according to which presenters 
(i.e., people deciding what to offer to others) prefer bundle options, whereas evaluators (i.e., 
people deciding what to get for themselves) prefer single options. In the original research, 
presenters and evaluators provided judgments in joint and separate evaluation, respectively. 
Disentangling role (presenter vs. evaluator) and evaluation mode, our results show that, 
independent of role, people prefer bundle over single options in joint evaluations and are 
largely indifferent in separate evaluations. Thus, a substantial part of the original findings is 
attributable to evaluation mode. The presenter’s paradox is revised in light of the present 
account. 
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For decades, product bundling has been a widely used marketing strategy to sell 
consumer products and industrial goods (Gaeth, Levin, Chakraborty, & Levin, 1991). At a 
general level, bundling can be defined as “the practice of marketing two or more products 
and/or services in a single ‘package’” (Guiltinan, 1987, p. 74). A very common form of 
product bundling is to include a small add-on to a main product. For instance, an mp3 player 
includes an additional music download, small toys are added to children’s cereal boxes, a 
bottle of shampoo comes with a sample of conditioner, or the booking of a hotel room 
includes a free dinner on the first night. The goal of these marketing strategies is to increase 
the attractiveness of an offer by including an additional item. 
The Presenter’s Paradox 
Recent research by Weaver, Garcia, and Schwarz (2012), however, suggests that the 
advantages of bundling as a marketing strategy may not be as straightforward as previously 
thought. In particular, the authors argue that a person’s role – that is, whether a person is a 
presenter or an evaluator – is a critical determinant of whether including an add-on to a main 
product increases or decreases an offer’s attractiveness. According to Weaver et al., presenters 
(i.e., people deciding what to offer to others; typically marketers) see an offer as more 
attractive when the add-on is included, despite the fact that the respective evaluators (i.e., 
people deciding what to get for themselves; typically consumers) find it more attractive 
without the add-on. As a consequence, a presenter’s paradox emerges whereby presenters 
may endorse bundling as a marketing strategy even though it may be detrimental from an 
evaluator’s perspective. 
In Weaver et al.’s (2012) original research on the presenter’s paradox, several studies 
provided consistent evidence for these hypotheses as well as for differences in terms of the 
underlying processing styles how product bundles are assessed across the two roles. However, 
in their studies, presenters and evaluators were in different evaluation modes when judging 
the products. Whereas presenters were always able to assess both the bundle and the single 
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option (i.e., the bundle without the add-on) in a joint evaluation, evaluators could only assess 
either the bundle or the single option in separate evaluations that were collected in a between-
participants design. Thus, evaluations of presenters and evaluators were made on different 
grounds. Although this experimental set-up may reflect many real-world situations, the 
present research disentangles the influence of people’s role and their evaluation mode, in 
order to clarify their independent effects. 
Evaluation Mode 
At the theoretical level, the distinction between evaluating an option in isolation 
versus in the context of an alternative refers to the notion of evaluation mode. According to 
general evaluability theory (Hsee & Zhang, 2010), any evaluation is formed in one of two 
modes: Joint evaluation mode (JE) refers to decision contexts in which two or more values are 
available and can be directly compared, whereas separate evaluation mode (SE) refers to 
decision contexts in which only a single value is available that is evaluated in isolation. Thus, 
directly contrasting bundle and single option as in the case of presenters represents an 
instance of JE, whereas evaluating the bundle and the single option alone as in the case of 
evaluators represents an instance of SE. Importantly, past research has demonstrated 
significant preference reversals across many domains as a function of evaluation mode (for an 
overview, see Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). 
The goal of the present research is to explore the consequences of evaluation mode 
when it comes to evaluating single versus bundle options, thereby shedding new light on the 
presenter’s paradox (Weaver et al., 2012). In particular, we hypothesize that the attention that 
is paid to the bundle’s add-on differs when it is presented in JE versus SE, and that this 
difference affects evaluations across the two modes. We expect consumers to be more likely 
to notice the add-on, and therefore to prefer the bundle more strongly, when both options are 
presented jointly than when the bundle is presented in isolation. 
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The Cancellation and Focus Model 
Our reasoning is based on the cancellation and focus model (Dhar & Sherman, 1996; 
Houston & Sherman, 1995; Sherman, Houston, & Eddy, 1999), which makes predictions 
about the salience of shared versus unique features when comparing choice alternatives. 
According to this model, features that are shared across alternatives are cancelled out in the 
decision process, whereas unique features are salient and focused on – a hypothesis that was 
recently backed up by eye-tracking data (Sütterlin, Brunner, & Opwis, 2008).  
Drawing on the cancellation and focus model, we predict differences in feature 
salience across evaluation modes when judging single versus bundle products. In JE, the add-
on is represented as a unique feature that is only provided by the bundle option, whereas the 
main product is represented as a shared feature that is provided by both the bundle and the 
single option. Therefore, in JE, we expect the bundle’s add-on to be more salient than the 
main product. In SE, however, unique and shared features do not exist because only a single 
option is available rendering neither the add-on nor the main product particularly salient.  
Based on this account , the preference asymmetries across roles that were obtained in 
Weaver et al.’s (2012) research may be attributable to presenters and evaluators being in JE 
and SE, respectively. The added value of the bundle may have been more salient to presenters 
than to evaluators thereby increasing presenters’ endorsement of the bundle over the single 
option. 
Hypotheses 
Directly contrasting a product bundle with a single product in a joint comparison 
highlights the added value of the bundle (i.e., the add-on) as a unique feature. Thus, we expect 
consumers in JE to prefer bundle over single options independent of their role. Formally: 
H1: In a joint evaluation mode, bundle options are preferred to single options. 
Moreover, because in JE the added value of the bundle is more salient than in SE, we 
expect the bundle to be perceived as more attractive in JE than in SE. 
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H2: Bundle options are perceived as more attractive in a joint evaluation mode than 
in a separate evaluation mode. 
These first two hypotheses are concerned with the consequences of evaluation mode 
for the assessment of bundle versus single options; the next two deal with the underlying 
mechanism. Namely, we investigate whether contrasting a product bundle with its respective 
single version increases the salience of the add-on as a unique product feature, therefore 
making the add-on more salient in JE rather than SE. Formally: 
H3: The added value of bundle over single options (i.e., the add-on) is more salient 
in a joint rather than in a separate evaluation mode. 
 Finally, we expect that add-on salience is related to preferences. When consumers pay 
more attention to the added value of a bundle, they should perceive it as more attractive than 
when they do not pay much attention to it. 
H4: With increasing salience of a bundle option’s added value (i.e., add-on), the 
bundle is perceived as more attractive. 
The Present Studies 
To test these hypotheses, we developed the following research plan. In Study 1, we 
extended the design of Weaver et al.’s (2012) first study by orthogonally manipulating 
evaluation mode and role to test for their independent effects. In Studies 2 and 3, we 
investigated add-on salience as a mechanism underlying preference asymmetries across 
evaluation modes. Following Spencer, Zanna, and Fong’s (2005) recommendation to 
investigate hypotheses concerning mediators that are both measurable and manipulable in an 
experimental-causal-chain design, add-on salience was measured (Study 2) and manipulated 
(Study 3). 
For three reasons, we believe that these studies make a novel and substantial 
contribution. First, Study 1 sheds new light on the presenter’s paradox (Weaver et al., 2012) 
by assessing to what degree role and evaluation mode independently affect preferences for 
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bundle versus single products. Second, the present research brings together lines of research 
that were developed independently and had not been integrated before: Building on what is 
known about evaluation mode (Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2010) and the cancellation 
and focus model (Houston & Sherman, 1995; Sherman et al., 1999), we investigate attentional 
asymmetries across evaluation modes (Studies 2 and 3). Third, the present research has 
significant implications for the marketing of product bundles. If the added value of a bundle 
promotion indeed goes largely undetected when it is not contrasted against a single 
alternative, the potential of this marketing strategy may be significantly reduced. We will 
return to these points in the General Discussion. 
Study 1 
To test our hypotheses that (1) bundles are preferred to singles in JE and (2) that 
bundles are perceived as more attractive in JE than in SE, we replicated and extended the 
design of Weaver et al.’s (2012) first study. In the original study, the single option was an 8-
gigabyte iPod Touch and the bundle option was the same iPod Touch along with a free music 
download. Presenters always received both options in a within-participants design, whereas 
evaluators received either the single or the bundle option in a between-participants design. 
Moreover, presenters indicated their preferences by making a choice between bundle and 
single, whereas evaluators indicated their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for one or the other 
option. 
We extended the original methods in two regards. First, we expanded the design by 
introducing an evaluator condition in which both options were presented in JE, and a 
presenter condition in which both options were presented in SE to obtain a full factorial 
design. Second, we assessed both dependent variables (i.e., choice and WTP) for both roles.  
Methods 
Participants. Using the same data collection website as in the original study (Weaver 
et al., 2012), we collected data from 120 US-Americans (47 females; age M = 31.37, SD = 
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11.00) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  
Design. The study followed a 2 (role: presenter vs. evaluator) × 3 (evaluation mode: 
JE vs. SE/single first vs. SE/bundle first) × 2 (target item: single vs. bundle) experimental 
design with the first two factors varying between and the latter within participants. 
Participants in the two separate evaluation conditions (i.e., SE/single first and SE/bundle first) 
were also presented the other option (bundle and single, respectively) after having provided 
their initial judgment. Thus, choice data are also available for these participants. Note, 
however, that choices by their very nature represent JE rather than SE. Accordingly, only the 
first judgment in the SE/single first and SE/bundle first conditions was considered for 
analyzing preferences in SE. 
Procedure. Participants received one of six scenarios, dependent on condition, which 
were taken and adapted from the original study (Weaver et al., 2012). In particular, presenters 
in the SE/single first [JE] condition read:  
Imagine you are in charge of creating packages for iPods. You have the 
option to offer customers [either] an 8-gigabyte iPod Touch and cover [or 
the same 8-gigabyte iPod Touch and cover along with one free music 
download.] 
The SE/bundle first condition was analogous, except that the bundle was mentioned 
instead of the single option. In the JE condition, where both options were presented 
simultaneously, the order of single and bundle option was counterbalanced.  
Evaluators in the SE/single first [JE] condition read: 
Imagine you are looking to buy a gift for a friend and you are 
considering purchasing an iPod Touch. In the store you see the following 
[two] iPod package[s] for sale: [You have the option to buy either] an 8-
gigabyte iPod Touch and cover [or the same 8-gigabyte iPod Touch and 
cover along with one free music download.] 
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Just as in the presenter condition, the SE/bundle first condition was created by 
mentioning the bundle instead of the single option and the order of both options was 
counterbalanced in the JE condition. 
Dependent Variables. In both JE conditions, presenters [evaluators] first answered a 
choice measure (“If your goal is to have consumers believe the package is more valuable [to 
choose the package you consider more valuable], which one would you choose?”). Then, they 
indicated customers’ [their own] WTP for both options in counterbalanced order (“How much 
do you think prospective customers [you] would be willing to pay for the 8-gigabyte iPod 
Touch and cover [along with one free music download?]”). 
In the four SE conditions, the procedure was adjusted so that participants first 
expressed their WTP for one option without yet knowing about the existence of another 
option. After providing their answers, they received the respective scenario (presenter vs. 
evaluator) from the JE conditions, that is, they were presented with both options 
simultaneously and were thus able to indicate a choice. Finally, they indicated their WTP for 
the second, not-yet rated option. 
Results 
Choice. Overall, there was a strong preference for the bundle over the single option. In 
total, 89% of all participants chose the bundle, χ2(1) = 73.63, p < .001. This main effect was 
qualified by an interaction of role and evaluation mode, such that the bundle option was 
chosen more frequently by presenters than by evaluators, χ2(1) = 6.99, p = .008 (see figure 1). 
Nevertheless, the fact that 97% of presenters and 82% of evaluators chose the bundle, both 
χ2(1) > 24.07, ps < .001(note that the rate of presenters choosing the bundle option is very 
similar to the 92% reported by Weaver et al., 2012), provides support for our hypothesis that 
consumers in JE generally prefer bundle over single options. 
WTP in Separate Evaluation Mode. Analyzing only the first rating in the SE/single 
first and SE/bundle first conditions, WTP judgments were submitted to a 2 (role: presenter vs. 
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evaluator) × 2 (target item: single vs. bundle) between-subjects ANOVA. Presenters (M = 
198.33, SD = 108.40) expected their prospective customers to be generally willing to pay 
more than evaluators actually were (M = 139.58, SD = 89.99), F(1, 75) = 6.71, p = .012, ηp
2
 = 
.08. No general preference for either option and no interaction were obtained, Fs < 1 (see 
table 1). 
WTP in Joint Evaluation Mode. Joint WTP values were submitted to a 2 (role: 
presenter vs. evaluator) × 2 (target item: single vs. bundle) mixed-model ANOVA. A main 
effect of target item emerged whereby participants were generally willing to pay more for the 
bundle than the single option, F(1, 39) = 8.06, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .17. This main effect was 
qualified by an interaction of role and target item, F(1, 39) = 6.30, p = .016, ηp
2
 = .14, 
suggesting that the trend to prefer the bundle was more pronounced for presenters than 
evaluators (see table 1).  
As another way to analyze WTP in JE, we computed a preference index based on WTP 
by subtracting WTP for the single from WTP for the bundle such that each participant could 
be classified as preferring the bundle (positive scores), preferring the single (negative scores), 
or being indifferent (zero score). Submitting these scores to a 2 (role: presenter vs. evaluator) 
× 3 (preference based on WTP: single vs. bundle vs. indifference) chi-square test of 
independence revealed that preferences were not equally distributed across roles, χ2(2) = 8.50, 
p = .014. Whereas presenters were more likely than evaluators to prefer the bundle (55% vs. 
30%), χ2(1) > 4.41, p = .036, evaluators were more likely than presenters to be indifferent 
(58% vs. 33%) , χ2(1) > 4.01, p = .043. Preferences for the single option were equally low for 
both roles (both 12%). Critically, considering only those participants who showed a 
preference, both presenters and evaluators preferred the bundle over the single option, both 
χ2(1) > 4.84, ps < .028.  
Joint Versus Separate Evaluation Mode. Finally, we analyzed the preference for 
bundles over singles across the two evaluation modes. To be able to compare SE (where data 
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were collected between-participants) with JE (where data were collected within-participants), 
we computed the difference between WTP for the bundle versus single for participants in JE, 
and we compared these values to the average difference between WTP for the bundle versus 
single across all participants in SE (obtained from subtracting the average WTP for singles 
from the average WTP for bundles in SE). As expected, participants in JE had a stronger 
preference for the bundle over the single than participants in SE, one-sample t(40) = 5.10, p < 
.001, d = 0.80 (see table 1). 
Discussion 
Evaluation mode affects consumers’ preferences for bundle versus single options. 
First, bundle options are preferred to single options in JE, whereas consumers are largely 
indifferent between the two options in SE. Second, the relative preference for the bundle is 
more pronounced in JE than in SE. We believe that these findings were obtained due to the 
higher salience of the add-on in JE as compared with SE. Directly contrasting an offer of an 
iPod that includes a music download with an offer that does not presumably directed 
participants’ attention to the download and increased their preference for that offer. The goal 
of the next two studies will be to investigate this idea experimentally.  
In addition to these strong and consistent effects of evaluation mode, differences in 
bundle versus single preferences also emerged as a function of role. Presenters indicated 
relatively stronger preferences than evaluators for the bundle in (1) the choice measure, (2) 
the WTP measure in JE (however, not in SE), and (3) the preference index based on WTP. 
Thus, there still may be differences in terms of presenters’ and evaluators’ processing styles 
when evaluating bundles as suggested by Weaver et al. (2012). However, contrary to the 
original notion of the presenter’s paradox, in none of the analyses did evaluators prefer the 
single option. In fact, a clear majority of evaluators chose the bundle when confronted with 
the same choice that presenters faced in the original study. Thus, although presenters tended 
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to overestimate evaluators’ interest in the bundle, evaluators did not prefer the single option 
over the bundle. 
Study 2 
Studies 2 and 3 investigated the attention paid to the add-on as an underlying factor to 
mediate the influence of evaluation mode on bundle preferences in an experimental-causal-
chain design (Spencer et al., 2005). Thus, in Study 2, we manipulated evaluation mode and 
assessed whether participants paid more attention to the added value of the bundle in JE 
versus SE. To that end, participants received a series of consumer products that came as a 
bundle (e.g., a camera plus a camera backpack). Participants in the SE condition only received 
the bundle version of each product, whereas participants in the JE condition received both the 
bundle and a single version of the same product (e.g., only a camera). After providing 
purchase intentions for all eight products, participants worked on a change detection task, 
which was designed to assess how salient the add-on was when purchase intentions were 
provided. The change detection paradigm has been used in both visual cognition research 
(Simons & Levin, 1997) and psycholinguistics (Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, & Dawydiak, 2004) 
to assess the extent to which certain stimuli are paid attention to and are carefully processed. 
If it is indeed the case that the add-on is more salient when a bundle is contrasted to its 
respective single version, then participants in JE should be more likely to detect changes in 
the description of the add-on than participants in SE. 
Methods 
Participants. Seventy-eight US-Americans (27 females; age M = 32.94, SD = 10.23) 
participated via MTurk and were randomly assigned to either the JE or the SE condition. 
Procedure. Participants saw eight consumer products (e.g., laptop, coffeemaker, TV) 
in random order. Each product existed in a single, as well as in a bundle version. Product 
descriptions were taken from amazon.com; participants thus rated existing consumer 
products. For instance, the digital camera bundle was described as “Canon PowerShot A2500 
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16MP Digital Camera with 5x Optical Image Stabilized Zoom and 2.7-Inch LCD (Red) along 
with a Canon Deluxe Camera Backpack”. The single version was identical to this bundle 
version except for the camera backpack not mentioned. To manipulate evaluation mode, 
participants in the JE condition saw both versions (i.e., single and bundle), whereas 
participants in the SE condition only saw the bundle version. After reading the description of 
a product, participants indicated their purchase intention (“How likely would you buy this 
option?”; 7-point scale). 
After judgments were provided for all eight products, participants proceeded to the 
change detection task (in order not to influence participants’ behavior in the initial evaluation 
task, they were not informed about this second task at the beginning of the experiment). In 
this task, participants received all eight product bundle descriptions a second time. This time, 
however, their task was to detect whether there was any difference in the description from the 
original version. From the eight items to be judged in this task, four items contained only a 
change to the add-on, two hybrid items contained changes to both the add-on and the main 
part, and two items contained no change at all (participants were informed in advance that 
there could be one, two or no changes to the original description). Participants first indicated 
whether they detected a change or not, and if they did, they described it briefly in a textbox. 
Change detections were only considered correct when the description correctly identified the 
change. 
Results 
Purchase intentions. Participants in JE (M = 5.47, SD = 1.01) expressed higher 
purchase intentions for the bundle than participants in SE (M = 3.92, SD = 1.07), t(76) = 6.58, 
p < .001, d = 1.49. Also, participants in JE expressed higher purchase intentions for the 
bundle than for the single item (M = 3.50, SD = 1.16), paired t(38) = 9.57, p < .001, d = 1.54. 
Purchase intentions for the bundle in SE were not significantly different from purchase 
intentions for the single in JE, t(76) = 1.65, NS. 
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Change detection. Across the six items in which an add-on change occurred, 
participants in JE (M = 2.69, SD = 1.45) detected more changes than participants in SE (M = 
1.46, SD = 1.12), t(76) = 4.19, p < .001, d = 0.97 (see figure 2). Change detection for the two 
control items, where no changes occurred, did not differ across conditions, t(76) = 1.33, NS 
(for these two items the correct answer was to not mention any change).  
Change detections for the two hybrid items were analyzed in a 2 (evaluation mode: JE 
vs. SE) × 2 (type of change: add-on vs. main part) mixed model ANOVA. The critical 
interaction, F(1, 76) = 20.70, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .21, indicated that participants in JE detected 
add-on changes (M = 1.10, SD = 0.75) more frequently than main part changes (M = 0.38, SD 
= 0.59), paired t(38) = 4.74, p < .001, d = 0.77, whereas participants in JE performed equally 
well across both types of change, paired t(38) = 1.42, NS. Yet, overall change detection 
performance did not differ across evaluation modes, F < 1. Lastly, participants were generally 
more successful at detecting add-on changes than main part changes, F(1, 76) = 7.45, p = 
.008, ηp
2
 = .09. 
Effects of change detection on purchase intentions. Participants expressed stronger 
purchase intentions for those bundles for which they correctly detected an add-on change (M 
= 4.92, SD = 1.65), as compared with bundles for which they did not detect it (M = 4.42, SD = 
1.72), paired t(63) = 2.38, p = .020, d = 0.28 (14 participants that either detected none or all 
changes were not considered in this analysis). Moreover, in a mixed-effects regression model 
considering all six items were an add-on change was implemented (with change detection 
scores and the intercept included as random effects to the model), change detection 
significantly predicted purchase intentions, F(1, 61.42) = 11.98, p = .001. 
Discussion 
Study 2’s results demonstrate that evaluation mode affects how much attention is paid 
to the different components of a product bundle. In JE, the contrast of the bundle with a single 
option highlights the difference between the two. JE renders the add-on salient and, therefore, 
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emphasizes the relative advantage of the product bundle, increasing its attractiveness. In SE, 
however, the contrast to the single option is missing. As a result, the add-on’s salience and the 
bundle’s attractiveness are lower as compared with JE. In this regard, the analysis of the two 
hybrid items is revealing: It was not the case that participants in either of the two evaluation 
modes were generally better at detecting changes. Instead, those in joint evaluation mode 
were specifically good at detecting changes in the add-on, whereas those in separate 
evaluation mode were equally good at detecting add-on and main part changes. Finally, 
results demonstrated that salience matters for purchase intentions: Participants who detected a 
change in the add-on indicated higher purchase intentions than participants who did not. 
Study 3 
The goal of Study 3 was to provide experimental evidence for the second path of our 
causal chain design by manipulating add-on salience and measuring its impact on bundle 
preferences. We designed two different SE conditions in which the bundle’s add-on was 
either made salient or not and compared them to a JE condition. If JE indeed enhances the 
attractiveness of the bundle via add-on salience, then increasing the add-on’s salience in SE 
should have a comparable effect on the bundle’s attractiveness. Thus, we expected the bundle 
to be considered more attractive in JE and under high salience in SE than under low salience 
in SE. 
Methods 
Participants. One hundred and fifty US-Americans (55 females; age M = 33.21, SD = 
11.41) participated in the present experiment via MTurk and were randomly assigned to one 
of three experimental conditions (JE, SE/high salience, SE/control salience). 
Procedure. Participants in all three conditions judged the attractiveness of a product 
bundle comprised of a coffee maker and an additional milk frother, presented in a photograph. 
In the SE/control salience condition (see figure 3A), participants saw an actual promotional 
photograph of the bundle that was taken from the website of an online shop selling the 
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product. In this photograph, the milk frother was placed right next to the coffee maker within 
the same frame such that both items blended in. In the SE/high add-on salience condition (see 
figure 3B), the coffee maker and the milk frother were spatially separated and each of the two 
objects was placed inside its own frame, making the add-on much more conspicuous as it 
visually stuck out from the main item. In the JE condition, the bundle photograph from the 
SE/control salience condition was placed right next to a photograph of the single product 
alone (figure 3C). In all three conditions, participants judged the attractiveness of the bundle 
offer on a 7-point scale from “very unattractive” to “very attractive”. In the JE condition, 
participants also judged the single option on the same scale. 
Results 
As predicted, participants preferred the bundle more strongly in JE (M = 5.62, SD = 
1.34), and in SE under high add-on salience (M = 5.44, SD = 1.34), as compared with the 
SE/control salience condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.77), F(2, 147) = 4.46, p = .013, ηp
2
 = .06. 
Contrast analyses revealed that there was no difference between JE and the SE/high salience 
condition, t < 1. Yet, both of these conditions differed significantly from the SE/control 
salience condition, ts > 2.20, ps < .030, ds > 0.44. Moreover, replicating the results from both 
previous studies, participants in JE preferred the bundle over the single option (M = 4.66, 
SD = 1.33), paired t(49) = 3.47, p = .001, d = 0.50. Lastly, the attractiveness rating of the 
single product in JE was only different from the attractiveness rating of the bundle in SE 
under high add-on salience, t(102) = 2.99, p = .004, d = 0.59, not under low add-on salience, t 
< 1. 
Discussion 
Study 3’s results complete the causal chain of experiments: Manipulating the salience 
of the add-on, participants indicated higher attractiveness ratings for the bundle when the add-
on was salient than when it was not. In fact, the preference for the bundle in SE can be as high 
as the preference for the bundle in JE as long as its added value is clearly noticeable. 
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However, not highlighting the add-on in SE makes the bundle appear less attractive than when 
the add-on is salient, and no more attractive than the single product in JE. 
Study 3’s results are consistent with our attentional account and with Study 2’s finding 
that paying attention to the add-on increases the attractiveness of the bundle. Still, we cannot 
preclude alternative interpretations. The visual salience manipulation that was used in this 
study might have also affected the perceived numerosity of items in the bundle and, therefore, 
the attractiveness of the offer. Indeed, according to the Weber-Fechner-law and the concept of 
diminishing marginal utilities, the utility of two single items can be higher than the utility of 
the compound of the two. Note, however, that neither of these accounts would be mutually 
exclusive with regard to our attentional explanation. 
General Discussion 
Evaluation mode matters for the assessment of product bundles. In JE, attention is 
directed to the added value of a bundle over a single offer; in SE, this attentional advantage of 
the add-on is missing. As a result, first, consumers in JE prefer product bundles over single 
products and, second, consumers in JE prefer product bundles more than do consumers in SE. 
The purpose of the present research was threefold: First, we sought to reinvestigate the 
presenter’s paradox by also taking evaluation mode into account. Second, building on the 
cancellation and focus model (Houston & Sherman, 1995; Sherman et al., 1999), our goal was 
to explore attentional processes underlying people’s preferences across evaluation modes. 
And third, we were interested in the managerial implications of evaluation mode for the 
marketing of product bundles. We will now discuss each of these aspects. 
The Presenter’s Paradox Revisited 
Weaver et al. (2012) proposed a presenter’s paradox whereby people in a presenter 
role prefer bundles over singles, whereas people in an evaluator role prefer singles over 
bundles. Yet, in the original research, presenters and evaluators provided their judgments in 
JE and SE, respectively. Disentangling role and evaluation mode, the present research sheds 
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new light on these findings. Both presenters and evaluators had strong and consistent 
preferences for the product bundle in JE, whereas neither role expressed a clear preference in 
SE. Thus, a substantial part of the effects described in the presenter’s paradox is attributable 
to evaluation mode. 
Nevertheless, several intriguing results regarding the role factor provide starting points 
for future research. First, even though a clear majority of both presenters and evaluators chose 
the bundle in JE, it was still the case that evaluators did so to a lesser degree than presenters. 
Also, presenters indicated a higher WTP for the bundle than evaluators (however, this 
tendency was only statistically significant in JE). Thus, the proposal that presenters overvalue 
evaluators’ appreciation for product bundles remains unchallenged. In this regard, it may well 
be that, even when holding evaluation mode constant, presenters and evaluators do engage in 
different processing styles that affect their product evaluations, as suggested by Weaver et al. 
(2012). 
The idea that evaluators prefer the single option was, however, not supported by the 
present results. In Study 1, evaluators’ WTP in SE was not higher for the single than for the 
bundle option (in fact the opposite trend was observed). Based on the present theorizing, it 
seems unlikely that consumers in SE would prefer singles over bundles – if anything, neither 
option should be preferred without a reference context, which is what our results suggest. In 
Studies 2 and 3, add-ons were used that might not have been as mildly favorable as the ones 
used in the original studies (such as the free music download in Study 1) – that may have 
contributed to the differences between the present and Weaver et al.’s (2012) results. 
Weaver et al. (2012) suggested differences in holistic versus piecemeal processing to 
account for stronger preferences for singles and bundles, respectively. Holistic processing 
refers to an integrated focus on the big picture or the whole, whereas piecemeal or analytic 
processing refers to a segregated focus on an object’s individual components (see, e.g., 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Interestingly, the present study's theorizing about 
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the psychological processes involved in JE versus SE can be related to this distinction of 
piecemeal versus holistic processing: Both JE and piecemeal processing foster the perception 
of a bundle’s add-on as an individual component which is added to the main product to 
increase its value; both SE and holistic processing foster the perception of the bundle as a 
whole undermining the prominence of the bundle’s add-on. 
Finally, Weaver et al.’s (2012) and the present research can be reconciled when taking 
into consideration that, in many real-world situations, presenters and evaluators are in JE and 
SE, respectively. While presenters (often marketers) assemble choice options for other people, 
evaluators (often consumers) can only choose what has been provided to them. Thus, 
presenters are typically confronted with a wider range of options than evaluators which may 
provide them with a perspective more similar to JE than it is for evaluators. 
The Role of Attention across Evaluation Modes 
Previous research on evaluation mode has predominantly been concerned with 
attribute evaluability as a process through which evaluation mode affects preferences (Hsee, 
1996; Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2010). By providing a contextual reference standard, 
the decision weight of certain attributes (particularly those that are hard to evaluate) is 
enhanced in JE, which can lead to preference reversals in comparison to SE. The present 
research suggests an additional route through which evaluation mode affects preferences. 
People tend to focus on features that are unique across options and cancel out features that are 
shared. The salience is higher for the former than the latter (Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Houston 
& Sherman, 1995). Applying this logic to JE versus SE, the present research provides 
evidence for differences in feature salience across evaluation modes. By definition, JE is 
about the comparison of at least two alternatives, whereas SE is about the evaluation of 
alternatives in isolation. Therefore, unique and shared features along with respective attention 
asymmetries only exist in JE not in SE. 
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Two predictions arise from this account: First, in JE unique features receive more 
attention than shared features, whereas in SE both types of feature receive comparable 
attention. Second, unique features receive more attention in JE than in SE. Both hypotheses 
are supported by Study 2’s results: First, participants in JE were better at detecting add-on 
changes (i.e., unique features) than main part changes (i.e., shared features) whereas 
participants in SE did not differ in performance across change types. Second, participants in 
JE were generally much better at detecting add-on changes than participants in SE.  
Furthermore, the present research highlights the importance of such attention 
asymmetries for the evaluation of product bundles. In Study 2, when participants correctly 
identified a change in the description of a bundle’s add-on and, in Study 3, when the add-on 
was visually made salient, the attractiveness of the bundle increased considerably. 
Implications for Consumer Behavior and Marketing 
The present research has straightforward and substantial implications for the 
marketing of product bundles. Using an actual promotional image taken from an online shop, 
results of Study 3 indicated that not highlighting a bundle’s added value can significantly 
undermine the potential of the marketing strategy. In fact, when the add-on was not made 
salient, the bundle’s attractiveness was judged to be as low as that of the single product. 
As a natural means of highlighting a bundle’s added value over a single product, the 
present research suggests to directly contrast both alternatives. Pragmatically, shops selling 
bundles should present the respective single products as well with the purpose of making the 
bundle appear maximally attractive. Alternatively, by visually increasing the add-on’s 
salience, a similar effect can be obtained (cf. Study 3). However, such marketing strategies 
may potentially backfire for add-ons with a negative utility. In the present studies, the add-on 
in the bundle always represented an advantage over the single alternative. Yet, when 
marketing add-ons with negative value, JE versus SE may actually decrease a bundle’s 
attractiveness. 
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In conclusion, product bundling is a frequently used marketing strategy across a wide 
range of consumer domains. The present research demonstrates the pervasive role of 
evaluation mode and add-on salience for the assessment of product bundles, and that these 
factors should be taken into consideration when designing bundle marketing campaigns.  
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Table 1 
Effects of Evaluation Mode and Role on WTP (Study 1) 
  iPod iPod plus download  
  M SD M SD t-value (df) 
SE Presenter 209.70 124.39 186.37 90.45 .667 (37) 
 Evaluator 131.65 73.19 147.50 105.51 .552 (38) 
JE Presenter 177.29 64.55 186.24 67.29 2.815 (20)* 
 Evaluator 157.80 88.92 158.35 88.83 .709 (19) 
SE  170.67 108.21 166.44 99.14 .181 (77) 
JE  167.78 77.05 172.63 78.81 2.726 (40)** 
 
Note. The final column displays t-values for comparing iPod and iPod plus download in the 
respective row (between and within participants for separate and joint evaluations, 
respectively). The last two rows display results averaged across both roles. ** indicates p < 
.01, * indicates p < .05  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Choices of the single versus bundle option by role (Study 1). 
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Figure 2. Change detections by evaluation mode and type of change (Study 2).  
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Figure 3A. SE/Control salience condition (Study 3). This image was also used as the bundle 
option in the JE condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 3B. SE/High salience condition (Study 3) 
 
 
 
Figure 3C. Single option used in the JE condition (Study 3) 
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Do consumers care whether ground beef is advertised as 75% lean or 25% fat? Does it 
matter whether a gamble offers $50 for sure or a 50% chance to win $100 and a 50% chance 
to win nothing? Does it make a difference whether a doctor communicates the outcome of a 
medical treatment as successful in 80% of all cases or as not successful in 20% of all cases? 
From a normative point of view, the answer to these questions is pretty 
straightforward: It shouldn’t. Expected utility theory assumes human behavior to be governed 
by various axioms of rationality (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947); rational decision 
makers choose according to a prospect’s expected utility and not according to the way in 
which it is portrayed. Granting that 25% fat is the same in other words as 75% lean, and 80% 
survival is the same as 20% mortality, the different descriptions should not affect consumers’ 
choice of ground beef or patients’ choice of a medical treatment. Put more generally, the way 
in which a decision is presented, its framing, should not affect a decision maker’s preference 
as long as expected utilities stay invariant. 
Yet, decades of research found that framing can have dramatic consequences for 
people’s preferences and choices (Keren, 2011b; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Despite 
their logical equivalence, people prefer ground beef that is 75% lean over ground beef that is 
25% fat (Levin & Gaeth, 1988), a gamble that offers $50 for sure over a gamble that offers a 
50% chance to win $100 (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and a medical treatment that is 
successful in 80% of all cases over a treatment that is not successful in 20% of all cases 
(Wilson, Kaplan, & Schneiderman, 1987). 
Questioning fundamental axioms of rational choice, framing effects are at the heart of 
the rationality debate of human decision making (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). The present 
chapter will sketch this interesting debate as well as its implications for consumer behavior. 
We will first derive a general definition of what can be considered a framing effect. Next, to 
organize the comprehensive literature, we will discuss the most prevalent typologies with 
representative findings in the realm of consumer judgment and decision-making and the most 
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common accounts of framing effects. Finally, we will broaden the perspective by discussing 
moderators to see whether framing effects can be switched off, and by reviewing specific 
applications of the framing idea in the field of consumer research. 
What Are Framing Effects? 
Framing effects are said to occur when equivalent presentations of the same decision 
problem lead to systematically different decisions (Sher & McKenzie, 2006). Thus, at their 
core, framing effects are about the communication of a decision problem (Keren, 2011a) and 
are typically concerned with how choice alternatives are described and through which 
response mode answers are elicited. To define what can be considered a framing effect (and 
not just a preference between two actually different options), the equivalence of the frames is 
a critical criterion. Indeed, preference asymmetries across choice options that factually differ 
in their expected utilities would neither violate normative principles of rational choice nor 
would they be considered as framing effects. Preferences for a medical treatment with a 50% 
success rate over a treatment with a 60% failure rate are easily explained via differences in 
expected utilities without drawing on any psychological account about the representation of 
the decision problem. It is the preference of a treatment with a 50% success rate over the one 
with a 50% failure rate that cannot be accounted for by a rational actor’s expected utilities as 
both outcomes are mathematically or logically equivalent.  
Obviously, according to this definition, the standard of equivalence – like logical, 
formal, or mathematical equivalence – is essential for the demarcation of the effect. We will 
come back to a discussion of useful definitions of equivalence in a later section of this 
chapter. First, we will provide a general overview of the most important framing effects 
within common framing typologies. 
Typologies and Examples of Framing Effects 
To consolidate the vast and diverse literature on framing effects several attempts have 
been made to establish typologies that organize the plethora of findings. Subdividing framing 
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effects may be useful to the extent that different psychological mechanisms come into play in 
different areas of framing research. Thus, theoretical explanations for why framing effects 
occur are manifold and have to be tailored to the specific nature of the decision problem.  
The probably most widely-cited typology of framing effects has been suggested by 
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998). Based on (a) what is framed, (b) what the frame affects, 
and (c) how the effect is measured, the authors propose three distinct types of framing effects 
– risky choice framing, attribute framing, and goal framing – with the goal to resolve 
seemingly non-integrable, contradictory patterns of results from previous research and to 
tailor specific accounts and underlying mechanisms to a particular subset of findings. 
Risky Choice Framing 
In risky choice framing, people are confronted with two choice options that differ in 
their degree of risk. These options are either framed positively (i.e, in terms of gains) or 
negatively (i.e., in terms of losses). The most prominent example of risky choice framing – 
the Asian disease problem – was published in a seminal article by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981). In the Asian disease problem, participants are informed that an unusual Asian disease 
is expected to kill 600 people, but that there are two alternative programs to combat the 
disease. Participants’ task is to choose between the two programs. In the positive and the 
negative framing condition, the outcome of the two programs is described in terms of people 
saved and people dying, respectively. Essentially for a risky choice framing, the two options 
in each program differ in their degree of risk – that is, in both conditions there is one program 
with a riskless outcome (i.e., 200 people surviving; 400 people dying), and one program with 
an outcome that involves a specified degree of risk (i.e., 1/3 probability that 600 people are 
saved and 2/3 probability that no people are saved; a 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 
a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die).  
Participants’ choices in the Asian disease problem reflect a preference reversal across 
the two framing conditions: Whereas the majority of participants in the positive framing 
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condition (72%) prefers the riskless option, the majority of participants in the negative 
framing condition (78%) prefers the risky option. Thus, despite the logical equivalence of the 
frames, choices differ substantially as a function of the frames’ valence. Based on prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1981) conclude that people 
are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses – an effect 
which is backed up by the notion of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991), which states that a negative loss (e.g., -$100) looms larger than its 
equivalent positive gain (e.g., +$100). We will elaborate on the specific explanations for risky 
choice framing at a later point in this chapter. 
Although much of the research concerning risky choice framing has been concerned 
with the Asian disease problem and its variants, risky choice framing has also received much 
attention in the field of consumer and marketing research. For instance, in a hypothetical 
scenario, Qualls and Puto (1989) asked a random sample of professional fleet managers to 
make a choice between awarding a maintenance contract for a fleet to one of two providers. 
Critically, one provider offered a fixed rate (riskless option), whereas the other provider 
offered a rate dependent on the number of vehicles in the fleet, which was not entirely 
predictable (risky option). Consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) earlier research, 
the fleet managers were more likely to choose the fixed rate and the flexible rate when the 
options were framed as positive and negative, respectively. And even financial planners, who 
deal with the evaluation of risky prospects as part of their professional life, were shown to be 
susceptible to risky choice framing in a problem conceptually analogous to the Asian disease 
dilemma in the domain of investment strategies (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). 
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) original publication of the Asian disease 
problem, a large number of studies across a wide range of domains has replicated the original 
results. A meta-analysis by Kühberger (1998) reported an average effect size of d = .31 across 
136 studies that were concerned with risky decisions. Effects tended to be stronger when an 
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experimental paradigm was similar to Tversky and Kahneman’s – for instance, with regard to 
response mode (choice vs. ratings), and differences in the level of risk between the two 
options (qualitatively vs. quantitatively).  
Attribute Framing 
The second class of Levin, Schneider and Gaeth’s (1998) typology, attribute framing, 
is concerned with the most simple case of valence framing: A single attribute of a decision 
object is either framed in positive or in negative terms. Just as the glass can be half full or half 
empty, performance can be described in terms of success or failure rates, medical treatments 
in terms of survival or mortality rates, a conference in terms of what percentage of papers is 
accepted or rejected, or consumer satisfaction in terms of percentage of satisfied or of 
dissatisfied consumers (Beach, Puto, Heckler, Naylor, & Marble, 1996). As long as the 
dichotomous probabilities add up to 1, one frame is mathematically equivalent to the other – 
communicating the success rate logically implies the failure rate and vice versa.  
Our introductory example of ground beef represents one of the most prominent 
examples of attribute framing (Levin, 1987; Levin & Gaeth, 1988). Consumers evaluated the 
quality of ground beef which was labeled as “75% lean ground beef” (positive frame) more 
favorably than when it was labeled as “25% fat ground beef” (negative frame) despite the 
logical equivalence of the two frames. Similarly, consumers evaluated soup advertised as 95% 
fat-free as healthier than a soup advertised as 5% fat (Sanford, Fay, Stewart, & Moxey, 2002). 
Not surprisingly nutrients deemed unhealthy are often advertised in a positive frame, as an 
abundance of product claims as X% fat-free (salt-free, etc.) shows. This kind of framing can 
be extended to many attributes that involve numerical quantities, for example, X% of the parts 
were made by American (domestic) versus non-American (foreign) workers (Levin, Jasper, & 
Gaeth, 1996). Likewise in the medical domain, a treatment is evaluated as more effective and 
is more likely to be recommended to another person or a family member when it is described 
with a “50% success rate” rather than a “50% failure rate” (Levin, Schnittjer, & Thee, 1988). 
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In contrast to risky choice framing, which involves the joint evaluation of two 
alternative options (e.g., the two different programs in the Asian disease dilemma), attribute 
framing involves only a single alternative that is evaluated in isolation (e.g. ground beef). 
Note that this also changes the nature of preference reversals (also called bidirectional 
framing effect, see Wang, 1996): In attribute framing, a preference reversal  can only be 
obtained in terms of a majority of participants favoring an option (e.g. purchasing ground 
meat) in one framing condition and a majority of participants not favoring the option in the 
other condition. 
In general, research on attribute framing quite consistently provides evidence for a 
valence-consistent shift: Choice options are evaluated more positively when presented in 
positive rather than in negative terms. Although there is evidence for moderators in attribute 
framing (e.g., Freling, Vincent, & Henard, 2014), in their review, Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 
(1998) do not report a single study in which a negative frame produces more favorable 
evaluations than the respective positive frame and conclude that the research on attribute 
framing “presents the clearest evidence of a homogeneous phenomenon” (p. 160) from all the 
three types of framing effects within their taxonomy.  
As a potential explanation to account for the occurrence of attribute framing effects, 
differences in category accessibility and priming have been discussed (Levin et al., 1998) – 
positive and negative frames produce predominantly positive and negative associations, 
respectively. We will dwell on the mechanisms behind attribute framing after discussing goal 
framing, the third and final class in Levin et al.’s (1998) taxonomy. 
Goal Framing 
Goal framing is concerned with the potentially beneficial consequences of engaging in 
a certain behavior versus the potentially detrimental consequence of not engaging in it. Thus, 
it refers to the goal – attaining a gain versus avoiding a loss – which an individual adopts 
when performing a certain behavior. For example, the decision to change the energy provider 
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can be framed as saving money (attain gain) or as preventing unnecessary costs (avoid loss) 
by switching from the old provider. 
Goal framing is similar to attribute framing as it involves the judgment of a single 
rather than multiple options. It is, however, different from attribute framing as both frames 
describe a behavior as concordantly good (or concordantly bad). Goal frames do not 
characterize a specific aspect as positive in one framing condition and as negative in the other 
condition (such as presenting ground beef either as lean or as fat). Instead, goal framing 
focusses on a behavior’s positive consequences; yet, these consequences are either presented 
as positive because of gaining something (e.g., save money) or they are presented as positive 
because of not losing something (e.g., avoid unnecessary costs). Thus, in goal framing, both 
frames promote the same action or result (e.g., change energy provider) but for different 
reasons whereas, in attribute framing, an object’s attribute is either presented in positive or in 
negative terms.  
Levin and colleagues propose loss aversion as an underlying mechanism to explain 
goal framing. As losses loom larger than gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), people should 
be more likely to take an action that avoids a loss rather than one that attains a gain (for a 
discussion, see section below). 
Much research on goal framing is motivated by how appeals should be framed to be 
most persuasive. The simple prediction is that pointing out how a behavior can prevent losses 
should be more effective in motivating the behavior than pointing out how the same behavior 
attains gains. In a field experiment conducted by Ganzach and Karsahi (1995; see also Thaler, 
1980), credit card owners received a marketing pamphlet that framed the benefits of credit 
card usage either in terms of gains obtained from using the card (e.g., paying by card is 
convenient, no danger that money will be lost or stolen) or in terms of losses suffered from 
not using it (e.g., paying by cash is less convenient, danger that money will be lost or stolen). 
Results of two hundred forty-six credit card owners indicated that 54.8% of the customers in 
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the loss-frame condition and 23.6% of the customers in the gain-frame condition used their 
credit card within the first month after receiving the pamphlet. Also, customers in the loss-
frame condition charged their credit card with more than twice the amount than those in the 
gain-frame condition. Thus, the loss-frame pamphlet was much more effective in promoting 
credit card usage than the gain-frame pamphlet in several respects. 
Whether gain-framed or loss-framed messages or appeals are more persuasive has 
extensively been researched with respect to health behavior and consumption of health-related 
products. In line with the credit card example above, a widely-cited article by Meyerowitz and 
Chaiken (1987) presents evidence for women’s higher engagement rates in breast self-
examination (BSE) under a loss- versus a gain-frame. In the loss frame condition, participants 
were told that “women who do not do BSE have a decreased chance of finding a tumor”, 
whereas, in the gain frame condition, participants were told that “women who do BSE have an 
increased chance of finding a tumor” (p. 504). Results indicate that women who were made 
aware of the negative consequences from not doing BSE had a more positive attitude towards 
it than women who were made aware of the positive consequences from doing BSE. 
Moreover, in a follow-up study 4 months after the initial experimental session, women in the 
loss-frame condition reported a higher frequency of actually having performed BSE than 
women in the gain-frame condition. Similar to Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s results, a loss-
framed advertising slogan for a grape juice (“don’t miss out on preventing clogged arteries”) 
elicited more liking for the brand than an analogous gain-framed slogan (“prevent clogged 
arteries”) (Lee & Aaker, 2004). 
Yet, the literature is not as consistent as one would want it to be as there are also 
findings for gain-framed advertising appeals to be more persuasive (e.g., Rothman, Martino, 
Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999). Indeed Rothman and Salovey (1997) claimed loss-
frames to be only more effective for promoting behavior that detects health problem, such as 
BSE, but gain-frames to be more effective for promoting behavior that prevents the onset of a 
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disease. Although results regarding the effectiveness of an ad for a mouth rinse are in line 
with this claim (Rothman et al., 1999), they are inconsistent with Lee and Aaker’s (2004) 
findings reported above.  
To make matters even more complicated for applied purposes, it is not always clear 
whether the gain or loss relates to the action and non-action (attaining health or preventing 
misery vs. missing out on attaining health or failing to prevent misery), as in the research 
cited above, or to the focused end-state (health or happiness vs. disease or misery). Obviously, 
there are several critical variables that moderate the effects of goal framing (see section below 
on moderators of framing). 
Alternative Typologies of Framing effects 
Levin and colleagues’ (1998) classification and, in particular, their claim that different 
types of framing map onto distinct underlying mechanisms has not remained without 
criticism. Keren (2011) questioned among other things whether the underlying processes of 
the three types are indeed distinctively different and pointed out that the categories are not 
necessarily conceptually different but overlapping. The latter, however, might also apply to 
alternative typologies that aim to organize the framing literature. In any case, several authors 
suggested alternative typologies to organize the literature. 
For instance, Soman (2004) suggested to differentiate between outcome framing, 
structure framing and task framing, which refer to different components of a decision 
problem. In his framework, outcome framing characterizes the way in which an outcome is 
described such as when communicating a numerical quantity in terms of gains versus losses 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), or when scaling an amount of money in different currencies 
(Raghubir & Srivastava, 2002). Likewise, monetary outcomes can be framed in terms of 
amount of interest or rate of interest. In this regard, Soman also subsumes one particularly 
interesting variant of framing as outcome framing, namely the aggregation and disaggregation 
of gains and losses. The same costs can result from a base price and a surcharge or a higher 
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base price and a rebate. In one study, participants preferred an insurance with a $1600 
premium per year that offered a $600 rebate in case of not filing any claims over an insurance 
with a $1000 premium that included a deductible of $600 (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & 
Kunreuther, 1993). In both cases consumers had to pay $1600 in case of a claim and $1000 in 
case of no claim. However, first the difference in subjective utility between the loss of $1600 
and $1000 is more than compensated by the gain of $600, and second adding the subjective 
utilities of the losses of $1000 and $600 is more negative than the one resulting from the loss 
of $1600 (see prospect theory account below). Note that in this case, although both options 
look mathematically equivalent, in real life the option with the rebate actually implies losing 
the opportunity to invest the $600 and is therefore the worse option.  
A popular strategy in pricing is to break down or segregate costs into smaller units to 
make them seem less severe. According to such a pennies-a-day strategy, a few cents per day 
seem negligible and are accepted more willingly than a larger yearly fee (Gourville, 1998). 
Contrariwise, aggregation of small savings into larger sums makes them look more 
significant: Consumers required a mean saving of $56 per year to switch their telephone 
company but it took monthly savings of $11.75 (equivalent to $141 a year) on average to 
make them switch (Gourville, 1998). Interestingly, the preference for segregation of costs 
over aggregation is inconsistent with prospect theory. Apparently small losses are truly 
neglected.   
The second class in Soman’s (2004) taxonomy, structure framing, refers to the 
arrangement of the decision problem and concerns, for instance, whether information is 
presented sequentially rather than at once (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), or whether several 
aspects of a decision are presented in isolation versus as a compound (Soman & Gourville, 
2001).  
And, finally, task framing refers to the nature of the response task that is used to elicit 
the answer such as choosing versus rejecting one of two options (Shafir, 1993). An interesting 
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application of task framing is found in customization: Often consumers can configure their 
purchase by adding options to a base model or starting from scratch. In other cases, the 
default comes fully equipped but consumer can choose to drop features. In line with loss 
aversion, a laboratory study found that consumers ended up with more options and a more 
expensive purchase when they stripped down a default model compared to beefing up the 
base model (Park, Jun, & MacInnis, 2000). In this vein, many studies showed that when a 
default option is provided consumers are likely not to change it (e.g., Johnson & Goldstein, 
2003). For instance, due to different insurance laws in two US states a comparison between 
the two states provides a natural experiment (Johnson et al., 1993). In one US state where a 
motor insurance premium included the right to sue for pain and suffering, about 75% of 
drivers retained that right and only about 25% waved that right for a lower insurance 
premium. In the neighboring state, where the default insurance did not contain the right to sue 
for pain and suffering, only about 20% chose to pay extra to acquire that right.  
Another recurring theme throughout several framing typologies is the distinction 
between framing in a strict sense versus framing in a loose sense, which is concerned with 
different definitions of equivalence across the frames (Keren, 2011a; Kühberger, 1998). 
Framing in a strict sense refers to logical or mathematical equivalence such as in the Asian 
disease dilemma. Framing in a loose sense refers to linguistic redescriptions of the same 
decision problem or to changes in the response mode such as, for instance, when framing a 
task as contributing versus withdrawing from a public resource pool (Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 
1992), or when choosing versus rejecting one out of two options (Shafir, 1993). 
Finally, Druckman (2001, 2011) differentiates between frames in communication 
versus frames in thought (for a similar distinction, see Kahneman, 2000). Frames in 
communication characterize specific emphases on a message’s content such as, for example, 
the importance of economic issues in a political debate. Frames in thought, in contrast, refer 
to an individual’s construal of a particular message: A person with an economic frame of 
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mind may look specifically for economy-related information in a political message. Thus, in 
many situations, frames in communication versus frames in thought are concerned with a 
speaker’s utterance and a listener’s interpretation, respectively. 
Discussion 
Framing is a multidimensional construct. Indeed, highlighting the need for well-
conceived typologies, several authors have called for an organization of the literature in order 
to clarify the plethora of theoretical constructs and experimental paradigms that have been 
used in the past (Druckman, 2001; Keren, 2011a; Levin et al., 1998). From a theoretical 
perspective, these taxonomies are essential to understand the distinct psychological 
mechanisms that are involved in the different types of framing effects. In the next section, we 
will discuss the specific accounts that have been put forth to explain the occurrence of 
framing effects and how they map onto the different types discussed. 
Beyond the various accounts of framing, differences between the types of framing 
effects can also be found at the empirical level. In their narrative meta-analysis, Levin et al. 
(1998) found the valence consistent shift in attribute framing to be the most consistent 
framing effect within their classification system. Yet, in terms of effect sizes, Piñon and 
Gambara (2005), found attribute framing (d = 0.260) to produce smaller effect sizes than the 
risky choice (d = 0.437) and the goal framing paradigm (d = 0.444). Thus, framing effects do 
not only differ in terms of their theoretical foundations, but also in terms of their empirical 
robustness. 
Accounts of Framing Effects 
Prospect Theory 
To explain the preference reversal obtained in the original demonstration of the Asian 
disease problem and other risky choice frames, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) drew on 
Prospect Theory as a descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). At its core, prospect theory suggests a value function whereby a subjective 
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value is assigned to each possible (objective) outcome. Three basic principles characterize this 
value function: First, outcomes are construed either as positive deviations (gains), or as 
negative deviations (losses) from a reference point. Second, the function is concave in the 
domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Thus, for instance, the difference 
between $10 and $20 is perceived as greater than the mathematically identical difference 
between $110 and $120. Third, the value function is steeper for losses than for gains implying 
a larger negative impact of losing $10 than the corresponding positive impact of winning $10. 
Now, consider the subjective utilities which are implied by the different outcomes of 
the Asian disease problem within this framework (see Figure 1). Due to the value function’s 
shape, 200 people being saved has a higher utility than a 1/3 probability that 600 people will 
be saved. As a consequence, the sure option is preferred when the choice is framed in terms of 
“lives saved”. In contrast, when talking about “lives lost”, the sure option of 400 people dying 
is less attractive than a 2/3 probability of all 600 people dying. Thus, due to the concavity and 
convexity of the value function, the certain and the risky option are asymmetrically attractive 
for gains and losses. 
A similar account based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has been 
suggested to explain goal framing. However, instead of focusing on the value function’s 
negatively accelerating shape, the explanation for goal framing is based on the function’s 
different slopes for gains versus losses. According to the notion of loss aversion (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991), a negative outcome has a larger absolute value than the identical positive 
outcome – the value function’s slope is steeper in the negative than the positive domain. Thus, 
with regard to goal framing, the consequences of an action weigh heavier when it is framed as 
avoiding losses rather than as obtaining benefits. For example, Meyerowitz and Chaiken’s 
(1987) classical finding of higher rates of BSE performance in the loss frame condition can be 
explained by the value function’s steeper slope in the negative domain – the decreased chance 
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of finding a tumor when not engaging in BSE weighs heavier than the increased chance of 
finding one when engaging in it. 
Prospect theory serves as an empirically well-founded framework that helps 
understanding and integrating framing effects of various typologies (e.g. risky choice framing, 
goal framing, outcome framing, task framing). Yet, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced 
the theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk rather than as an explanation 
of such behavior. For prospect theory to be regarded as an actual explanation for framing 
effects, it needs to be backed up by psychological principles that provide reasons for the 
specific slope and shape of the value function. For instance, the value function’s differences 
in slope for gains versus loses may root in a general negativity bias of giving greater weight to 
negative as compared with positive information (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Likewise, the 
function’s concavity and convexity may be attributable to such fundamental psychophysical 
laws as the Weber-Fechner law and the economical principle of diminishing marginal utility. 
Category Accessibility and Priming 
Perception and cognition are essentially guided by mental categorization processes 
(Bruner, 1957). Human information processing is characterized by pre-organizing 
informational input and by differentiating it along the mental structures that are activated at 
the moment of encoding. Activated concepts prime the activation of related concepts. 
Different semantics evoke different associations. 
Drawing on category accessibility and priming as fundamental principles of human 
cognition, Levin and colleagues (1998) suggested an account for attribute framing. In attribute 
framing, logically identical information is either presented in positive or in negative terms 
such as success versus failure rates or winning versus losing proportions. As a consequence, 
the frames should evoke different associations in the recipient’s mind: Success rates and 
winning proportions activate predominantly positive associations; failure rates and losing 
proportions active mostly negative associations. 
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For instance, in Levin and Gaeth’s (1988) study on the framing of ground beef that 
was already introduced at the beginning of this chapter, one may easily imagine that upon 
hearing the word ”fat” consumer think of fat, how it looks, how it tastes and how unhealthy it 
is. In contrast, the word „lean“ elicits completely different associations about the beef such as 
healthiness or high nutritional value. And, indeed, support for this idea of spreading activation 
can be found in the additional measures that were assessed in the study. The framing 
manipulation did not only affect judgments directly related to the greasiness of the beef, but 
also judgments related to its taste experience. 
Related arguments to explain attribute framing have been put forth based on the notion 
of confirmation bias (Klayman & Ha, 1987): Once a certain evaluative tone – be it positive or 
negative – is communicated by the framing manipulation, people are more likely to continue 
their information search in a confirmative rather than disconfirmative fashion. Thus, when 
hearing about the success rate of a medical treatment, people are more likely to generate 
information that supports the treatments’ success rather than its failure and vice versa. As a 
result, their information sample will be skewed towards the evaluative tone of the frame and 
preferences are formed correspondingly. 
Compatibility 
Compatibility has been suggested as another account of attribute framing drawing on 
principles that are similar to category accessibility and priming (Keren, 2011a). According to 
the compatibility principle, “the weight of a stimulus attribute is enhanced to the extent that it 
is compatible with the required response” (Shaﬁr, 1995, p. 248). For instance, when the 
stimulus material is presented in an auditory mode, a vocal response is faster than a pointing 
response due to the higher correspondence between presentation and response mode. Any 
transformation of incompatible input and output modes requires additional mental processing 
that is potentially effortful and error-prone (Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990). 
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In framing research, the compatibility principle is particularly applicable to situations 
in which the manipulation concerns the response mode used to elicit the answer such as 
choosing versus rejecting, or expressing like versus expressing dislike (i.e., task framing, 
Soman, 2004). In a series of decision problems, Shafir (1993) provided participants with 
impoverished options that had mostly average attributes as well as with enriched options that 
had both many positive and many negative attributes. For instance, in one of their studies, 
participants chose between two vacation packages for spring break. Package A came with 
“average weather, average beaches, medium-temperature water, and average nightlife”, 
whereas package B came with “lots of sunshine, gorgeous beaches, very cold water, and no 
nightlife”. Because of the higher compatibility of positivity and choosing, and negativity and 
rejecting, the enriched option was both more often chosen and more often rejected than the 
impoverished option. Similar findings that support the significance of the compatibility 
principle have been documented for choosing versus matching tasks when evaluating the 
quality of bets (Slovic, 1995). 
Conversational Logic and Implicatures 
At its heart, framing is concerned with communication. Any information that is 
communicated by a frame – particularly when it is conveyed in an impoverished 
informational environment such as in a scientific experiment – is enriched with the receiver’s 
pragmatic inferences about the sender’s intentions. The conversational account focusses on 
the principles of cooperative communication to explain framing effects. 
According to Grice (1975), effective communication is based on conversational 
implicatures. Implicatures characterize the meaning of an utterance that goes beyond its literal 
or strictly implied message. For instance, logically the utterance “Tom had two beers 
yesterday” implies that Tom had two or more beers: Even if he had five beers, the utterance 
would still be true. Based on the logic of conversation, however, most listeners would infer 
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that Tom had exactly two beers, because otherwise an utterance such as “Tom had at least two 
beers yesterday” would have been more appropriate (for a review, see Wänke, 2007). 
The idea that utterances carry information beyond their literal content and, therefore, 
convey different implicatures can be applied to framing (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & 
McKenzie, 2006; Wänke, 2007). Sher & McKenzie (2006) argued that a chosen frame leaks 
information that is not part of the explicit description but part of the background knowledge 
the person choosing the frame has. Whereas the amount of water in a glass is exactly the same 
when the glass is described as half empty of half full, the chosen frame may convey other 
information. When the glass is described as half full it evokes the comparison to an empty 
glass or one that was empty before whereas describing the glass as half empty tacitly implies 
a deviation from a full glass. In other words, although formally equivalent, both statements 
differ in their pragmatic meaning.  Likewise, McKenzie and Nelson (2003) showed that when 
the outcome of a new therapy lay above the previous survival rate for a disease, a large 
majority of speakers chose to express this rate in a survival frame (e.g., 25% survival). In 
contrast, a mortality frame was chosen when the survival rate lay below a previous reference 
point. From this perspective sensitivity to communicated frames is highly rational and it 
makes sense to prefer a therapy that is described in terms of its survival rate compared to one 
where its mortality rate is given.  
In this realm it is interesting to note that framing effects in the Asian disease problem 
disappeared when the problem was presented as a statistical rather than a medical problem 
(Bless, Betsch, & Franzen, 1998). In fact, when participants considered the task as a statistical 
problem, either of the two options was chosen by about 50%, which suggests that they 
realized that both options were statistically equivalent and chose at random. Presumably, 
choice of words was seen as less diagnostic when the task was to calculate expected values. 
A speaker does not only choose slightly different words to express different things. 
The way something is framed apparently also carries meaning for the receiver. A similar 
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example comes from comparative questions. For example when asked whether traffic 
contributes more than industry or less than industry to air pollution 45% of the respondents 
thought traffic contributes more. When the question was framed differently and respondents 
were asked whether industry contributes more than traffic or less than traffic to air pollution 
only 24% thought traffic was the main polluter (Wänke, 1996; Wänke, Schwarz, & Noelle-
Neumann, 1995). The reason for such asymmetric comparison judgments lies in respondents 
focusing on the (grammatical) subject of the comparison and neglecting the referent (Tversky, 
1977). Presumably they assume that the speaker chose this particular comparison object as the 
subject because this is the target of interest (Wänke & Reutner, 2011). In a similar vein, 
pragmatic assumptions can account for task framing effects: Apparently people understand 
defaults as recommended options and are therefore hesitant to depart from it and accept the 
default (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006). 
Moderators of Framing Effects 
While theoretical explanations are still being debated, there is little doubt regarding the 
phenomenon’s significance for applied fields. Framing allows for shifting preferences without 
changing an object’s actual properties by merely altering the object description or the 
response format. In this vein, products and services can gain an advantage over their 
competitors, rendering framing a powerful strategy for practitioners, from policy makers over 
advertisers to salespeople. In order to better understand under which conditions framing 
effects occur in applied settings, researchers in the areas of marketing, consumer and health 
psychology dedicated much of their work on what moderates framing effects on persuasion 
and decision making (Covey, 2014; Updegraff & Rothman, 2013). In the remainder of this 
section, we want to introduce various receiver characteristics that qualify whether framing can 
be assumed to have an effect on consumer choice. We will then turn to the framing of 
persuasive messages, and consider which frame is expected to work best with whom. Finally, 
we will broaden our perspective on framing research and discuss findings from related areas 
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that are still very much related to the idea of framing, although they may not fulfill the 
equivalence criterion in its strictest sense. 
When framing choice options puff out 
As a marketer, you may ask whether framing is a viable technique for promoting your 
product to the clientele in mind. From the consumer perspective, however, you may consider 
framing a manipulation of your self-guided choice (Brehm, 1966)(cf. chapter XY this 
volume). Furthermore, assuming invariant product utility across frames, falling prey to frames 
comes at the risk of making a bad choice. From either perspective, the question arises whether 
there are conditions under which framing effects are likely to fizzle out.  
To a great extent, this question has been addressed from the perspective of dual-process 
models of decision making (Epstein, 1998; James, 1890) and attitude change (Chaiken & 
Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)(cf. chapter XY this volume). As a common 
denominator, these models propose two modes of thinking, one of which is analytical and one 
of which relies on affect and simple heuristics. Whether people process information 
analytically or in a heuristic way depends on people’s processing motivation and capacity 
(Chaiken & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Only if processing motivation and 
capacity are high enough, people are likely to think analytically, and therefore, to discount the 
irrelevant information provided by the frame (see Kahneman & Frederick, 2007).  
In line with this notion, the Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)(see chapter 
XY in this volume), a construct used to describe inter-individual differences in intrinsic 
processing motivation, has been identified as a moderator of framing effects. That is, studies 
show that choices are less affected by frames for individuals high rather than low in Need for 
Cognition (Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004; Smith & Levin, 1996). McElroy and Seta 
(2003) further found that individuals with a disposition to think analytically are less 
influenced by choice framing than are less analytical individuals.  
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More compelling evidence for the causal role of processing motivation in resisting 
framing effects is obtained from studies in which processing motivation is manipulated 
experimentally. McElroy and Seta (2003) varied the personal relevance of the decision. Only 
in the low involvement condition, framing effects had been obtained. In other studies, 
processing style was manipulated in a more direct manner. In order to induce an affective 
processing style, Fagley, Coleman, and Simon (2010) asked participants to focus on their 
feelings. Indeed, framing effects on risky choice increased for participants who had received 
this instruction.  
As mentioned above, analytical processing does not only depend on processing 
motivation but consumers also have to be capable of analyzing the information. Provided with 
a risky choice, for instance, only consumers able of calculating the expected utility of both 
options will be able to realize their objective equivalence. Indeed, empirical findings suggest 
that high math skills enable consumers to compare alternatives and buffer against framing 
effects on risky choice (Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006), at least for individuals motivated to 
elaborate on the information (Simon et al., 2004). This finding is complemented by studies 
demonstrating that susceptibility to framing effects may be reduced, when information is not 
provided in an abstract numerical format, but a format familiar to the decision maker (Garcia-
Retamero & Dhami, 2013). 
Capacity constraints however, are not a necessary condition for framing effects to occur. 
In fact, a cognitive load manipulation did not alter the influence of a win- vs. loss-frame on 
risky decisions. Yet, cognitive load had a main effect on decisions for the sure option. People 
for whom capacity was reduced by high load tended to choose the easy-to calculate sure 
option more often than those in the low load condition (Whitney, Rinehart, & Hinson, 2008). 
Future research is needed to corroborate the notion that easy-to-calculate options are preferred 
over hard-to-calculate ones – a finding that was in line with the heuristic use of processing 
fluency as a basis for evaluations (Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006)(cf. 
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chapter XY, this volume). Pertinent to the starting question, however, there was also a main 
effect of the frame: Win-frames as opposed to loss-frames caused more risk-averse choices in 
both, the load and the no-load condition. One may speculate that despite unconstrained 
capacity, participants’ motivation to carefully process the information was not high enough. 
As a rationale for practitioners, framing appears a viable strategy for shifting 
preferences, at least if consumers are either unmotivated or unable to engage in analytical 
thinking. Arguably, in real-life these conditions are often met. Consumers tend to be cognitive 
misers, thus heuristic processing may be the default rather than the exception (see Chaiken & 
Ledgerwood, 2012). Yet, conditions of minimal capacity and motivation do not necessarily 
constitute a good soil for framing effects. The processing of the frame and its integration into 
the decision already requires some motivation and capacity. When under severe time 
constraints, individuals actually disregard the framing information and choices thus remain 
unaffected (Igou & Bless, 2007).  
Framing persuasive messages to match the receiver 
One research domain that markedly advanced the identification of moderating 
conditions is persuasion research. In principle, the effects obtained in the studies on choice 
also pertain to the framing in the domain of persuasion. For instance, the persuasive impact of 
irrelevant information is increased for individuals low as opposed to high in Need for 
Cognition (e.g., Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992) or personal involvement (e.g., Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). However, the question addressed in persuasion research goes 
beyond identifying whether frames do have an effect or not. It addresses the question whether 
it was worth fitting the message frames with the receiver characteristics (e.g., Cesario, 
Higgins, & Scholer, 2008; Higgins, 2000, 2005; Rothman et al., 1999). 
For an illustration, consider a message meant to persuade consumers of buying an 
isotonic drink. As anticipated in the paragraph on goal framing, an advertiser may point out 
that the drink offers a gain (e.g., “Drink X, get energized!”) or that it prevents a loss (e.g., 
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“Drink X, get rid of tiredness!”). Although both frames provide different reasons for 
consuming the drink, they focus on the same goal and promote the drink by emphasizing its 
benefits(e.g., Lee & Aaker, 2004; Yi & Baumgartner, 2008). However, the advertiser may 
also use a negative frame, demonstrating the disadvantage of not using the product, and 
announce the absence of a gain (e.g., ”No Drink X, no energy”), or the presence of loss (e.g., 
“Without Drink X, tiredness will become your enemy!”). Which message do you expect to 
work best? The answer is: It depends on whom you are trying to persuade. 
Given the prominence of dual-process theories of persuasion, it may not come as a 
surprise that the differential framing effects have been studied for indicators of processing 
motivation and capacity. However, whereas a recent meta-analysis is in support of a 
moderating function of dispositional processing motivation, the direction is not clear: Some 
studies suggest that positive frames are more effective for motivated than unmotivated 
receivers, while some other studies lead to the opposite conclusion (Covey, 2014). 
A theoretical framework, more closely related to the question of how to match a frame 
with a receiver is regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997). According to this theory, goal-
attainment is achieved via two foci, a promotion and a prevention focus. In a promotion focus, 
individuals strive for self-fulfillment and aspiration; in a prevention focus, they try to fulfil 
their duties and obligations. In the former, people tend to be eager, whereas in the latter 
people tend to be vigilant. And finally, in a promotion focus people tend to be sensitive 
toward possible wins, but a prevention focus sensitizes people towards positive losses. Hence, 
a win frame has been proposed and demonstrated to create a fit with a promotion focus, but 
loss frames should be more appealing when recipients are in a prevention focus (Cesario, 
Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004). Note that a fit does not require matching the 
frame with the dispositional focus. The situational regulatory focus can be induced by the 
message itself. That is, a message that highlights a promotion goal is more persuasive when 
depicted as a possible win than a loss (e.g., “Boost your energy!” versus “Do not miss 
Framing Effects  Page |161 
 
 
boosting your energy!”). Vice versa, a message concentrating on a prevention goal is less 
effective when framed as a gain (e.g., “Avoid a cold!”) than when framed as a loss (e.g., “Do 
not miss avoiding a cold!”). 
Fit Effects beyond Framing 
In the previous paragraph we have reported a series of fit effects. Hence, the application 
of well-studied frames (e.g., positive vs. negative frame; gain vs. loss frame) in persuasion 
can be optimized by matching the frames with characteristics of the target clientele. Given the 
practical significance of matching messages with the receiver, fit effects have been studied for 
numerous message aspects, other than the frames reported in this chapter. Many of those fit 
effects suppose a rather broad definition of framing based on a very lenient conceptualization 
of equivalence across the frames. However, the respective message variation is often referred 
to as framing, and due to their practical relevance we reiterate some of them here.   
One such thing is that messages can consist of language describing either an endorser’s 
thoughts or on an endorser’s feelings. It has been shown that the former works better with 
persons who tend to evaluate things based on their thoughts (i.e., cognitively-oriented 
persons) and men whereas the latter works better with people who tend to evaluate issues 
based on their affective reactions (i.e, affectively-oriented persons) and women (Mayer & 
Tormala, 2010). Thus, companies should carefully consider their clientele when phrasing 
advertising copy that “they feel” or “think” that consumers will “enjoy” or “profit from” their 
new product.  
Further, many studies have elaborated on the interplay of linguistic frames and 
processing styles on persuasion outcomes. For instance, against the backdrop of Construal 
Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010)(cf. chapter XY this volume), the persuasive impact 
of describing a product’s benefits in concrete versus abstract terms depends on temporal 
distance. Some weeks prior to the release, an upcoming computer should be advertised by an 
abstract description (e.g., “The computer includes modern processor technology”). At the 
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point of sale, however, it was advisable to describe the product in a concrete fashion (e.g. 
“The computer has a 3.9 GHz i7-Haswell processor”). A series of other message 
characteristics (e.g., highlighting why to use the product vs. how to use it) has been shown to 
create a fit effect with temporal distance on persuasive outcomes (e.g., Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Whereas consumers could aggregate concrete features into an 
abstract category, disaggregation from abstract to concrete is much more difficult or even 
impossible. Note that, in this context, the equivalence of the frames is much more debatable 
than in classical risky choice or attribute framing where equivalence at least in logical terms is 
incontestable. Thus, one may argue whether to still consider these findings as framing effects. 
We will elaborate on this discussion of equivalence and the resultant definition of framing in 
the subsequent section.  
Equivalence and the Rationality Debate 
Framing effects gain much of their appeal from the fact that preference shifts or even 
reversals are obtained for equivalent choice alternatives that only differ in the way in which 
they are presented. Indeed, the rationality debate that accompanied framing research from its 
very beginning – namely, the discussion whether framing effects violate the invariance axiom 
of rational choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) – is only pertinent in the light of some 
reasonable standard of equivalence. Preference reversals across inequivalent choice options 
neither represent a challenge to human rationality nor do they violate normative theories of 
choice (cf. Thaler, 1980). 
The definition of equivalence thus is of central relevance when talking about framing 
effects – but what exactly does it mean for frames to be equivalent? Arguably, there is more 
than a single standard according to which one might define whether two frames may be 
considered equivalent. And, indeed, a glance at the literature reveals that equivalence has 
been characterized in many different ways like, for instance, as “objective” (Levin et al., 
1998), “unquestionable” (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988), “effective” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1981), or “formal” equivalence (Kühberger, 1998). However, the value of adding such 
adjectives with regard to clarifying the notion of equivalence has been questioned (Sher & 
McKenzie, 2006). Adding a qualifying adjective may simply raise the question of how to 
define the respective qualifier – what exactly does it mean for two frames to be “objectively” 
or “formally” equivalent? 
Qualifying equivalence as “logical” or “mathematical” equivalence, however, is a 
different case. Logical equivalence can be unambiguously defined by computing the expected 
utilities implied by each frame. However, as Sher and McKenzie (2006, 2011) argue, there is 
no normative problem with logically equivalent frames generating preference asymmetries: 
Let us assume that there are two logically equivalent frames A and B. Whenever there is some 
background condition C (neither explicitly stated in frame A nor in frame B), whose 
likelihood differs as a function of whether frame A or frame B was chosen, the mere fact that 
the speaker chose A rather than B leaks information about the likelihood of C. Given that C 
bears some relevance to the decision problem, preference asymmetries across the two frames 
A and B can be attributed to differences in the likelihood of C and, therefore, may be entirely 
reasonable from a rational point of view. 
For instance, in one of their studies (Sher & McKenzie, 2006), participants received 
one empty cup and one cup filled with water at the beginning of the experiment. Then, they 
were asked to pour half of the water from one cup into the other. After this procedure, both 
cups were roughly identically filled with water. Nevertheless, when instructed to move “the 
half empty” (vs. “the half full”) cup to one of the corners of the table, 69% (vs. 46%) of the 
participants chose the cup that was full (empty) at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, 
despite their logical equivalence, the two frames “half empty” and “half full” conversationally 
leaked different information about which cup the experimenter wanted to be moved and 
thereby affected participants’ choices. 
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Based on their research, Sher and McKenzi (2006) suggest information equivalence as 
a benchmark when considering framing effects to be at odds with rational decision making. 
Information equivalence refers to the idea that frames need not only be logically equivalent, 
but also equivalent in terms of their information leakage, that is, in terms of the pragmatic 
intents that can be inferred from the mere usage of the particular frame. In the water cup 
experiment, the two frames evoked different inferences about the experimenter’s intentions 
and thus were not informationally equivalent. Note that in the light of this argument, 
judgments about human rationality derived from framing research have to considered much 
more carefully, because participants’ responses are interpreted as picking up on subtle 
linguistic cues (such as the experimenter’s choice of words) rather than as not following basic 
rules of logical reasoning. 
Arguably, the concept of information equivalence may be considered a very strict 
conceptualization of the equivalence idea. Yet, it illustrates the importance of thoroughly 
analyzing the particular equivalence standard before prematurely calling human rationality 
into question.  
To reconcile different concepts of equivalence, Keren (2011a) recently suggested to 
not define equivalence as a universal property, but to restrict it to particular dimensions. For 
instance, in the 75% lean versus 25% fat ground beef example, the two frames indeed are 
logically equivalent. Yet, at the same time, they were shown to differ on the trustworthiness 
dimension – a butcher presenting his beef in terms of 25% fat is considered more trustworthy 
than a butcher relying on the 75% lean frame (for trust–choice incompatibility, see Keren, 
2007). Thus, any identification of equivalence between two frames should address the specific 
dimensions that are involved (and probably also relevant dimensions which are not involved). 
Likewise, any conclusion about human rationality has to be considered in the light of the 
particular equivalence standard: Not detecting logical differences between simple percentages 
would surely qualify as irrational behavior. However, being able to notice small linguistic 
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nuances and interpreting them as hints toward a certain option appears to be quite rational 
from a pragmalinguistic perspective. 
Above and beyond the rationality debate, framing effects are intriguing for being 
necessarily involved in real-world decision making. At the end of the day, any decision has to 
be framed in a certain way, which may substantially influence the decision outcome. A 
superficially small policy change regarding organ donation from an opt-in to an opt-out 
default can increase the donor rates by almost 60% (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). 
Governments cannot avoid making a decision about which choice model to adopt. In this 
regard, insights from the behavioral sciences on the pervasive influence of framing effects can 
be used in order to make informed decisions about how to optimally construct a choice 
context. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Asian disease dilemma explained by prospect theory’s value function. In the 
domain of gains (“lives saved”), the value of saving 200 lives is more positive than 1/3 the 
value of saving 600 lives. In the domain of losses (“lives lost”), however, the value of 400 
people dying is more negative than 2/3 the value of 600 people dying. As a consequence, the 
certain option is preferred in the domain of gains, whereas the uncertain option is preferred in 
the domain of losses. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Epilog 
My PhD not only culminated in this dissertation, but also in approximately €25.00 of Pfand-
money. I hereby declare that money to be used to buy office games. The winners of those 
games shall be worshipped. 
A finished dissertation may read as a success story. However, the present dissertation arose 
from defeat. In three consecutive Christmas parties, Team Hiwis won against Team 
Mitarbeiter at the CRISP Olympics. From time to time, I still cry myself to sleep even though 
it were the Portuguese to be blamed. 
At the time Andi bought the talkmaster for our office, I was skeptical. In retrospect, my 
skepticism was a huge mistake and requires an apology. The talkmaster proved to be the 
single most useful tool in our office and at times the only reason I pursued this work. If there 
is any humble advice I may pass on to further generations of PhD students, it is to buy a 
talkmaster early on. 
The statement from the acknowledgements that without André “a lot of this never would 
have been possible” is a lie. In fact, a lot of this would have been much better without him. 
I am still the second best dart player in the corridor. It is official. Scores are written on the 
black board in my office. Next to the word picha in capital letters. 
What happened in Barefootpark shall stay in Barefootpark. Yet, what happened in 
Barefootpark shall never be forgotten. 
Good, I never watched Cabin in the Woods. After all, life is finite. 
 
Thank you so much. You were all great. Tobias 
  
 
